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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of the Brazilian informatics industry and 
its relationship with and role in the international division o f labour for informatics. The 
principal focus of the analysis is the Brazilian national policy for informatics (PNI). The 
PNI successes and failures at the national and regional level are related to the weak 
articulations between the Brazilian and the global informatics industry. The evidence 
•for these fragile links are in the regional distribution patterns of the informatics
industry throughout the national territory.
The thesis differs from previous studies of Brazilian development policies in its 
assertion that industry and firms have specific sets of social relations which are spatially 
grounded and these depend on technology, itself socially created. Previous studies 
however have depended solely upon technological criteria with which to evaluate 
Brazilian development strategies.
Five main points are covered: the organization of the global informatics 
industry; different forms of state intervention to cope with and secure nations’ strategic 
stakes in this important industry in the AICs and NICs; interactions between this sector 
and other sectors of the national industry; and regional patterns of this sector’s 
industrial development in the country. The thesis identifies contradictions between 
Brazilian policies for modernization of the economy as a whole and modernization of 
the informatics sector. Modernization requires introduction o f new technologies 
(products and processes) which the heavily protected national informatics industry is not 
yet capable o f producing. Current industrial (and therefore also regional) development 
bottlenecks faced by the Brazilian industry reflects structural rigidities in the nation’s 
social-political structure. The inward-looking character of Brazil’s informatics 
development policies, which are both unique (in national terms) and ambitious (in 
technological terms), the thesis argues, fails to take into account the global organization, 
and thus the role of international capital, in the informatics industry.
The thesis emphasizes that it was the need to solve economic problems that 
triggered the Brazilian development process. However, the development o f informatics 
industries around the globe cannot be seen as a direct and exclusive cause o f capital 
migration. Brazil, together, with other developing countries, is an integral part of the 
world system and must take this system into account in order to make the most of its 
possibilities.
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INTRODUCTION 
I l  Aims and Issues
"The National Informatics Policy has already survived the first phase of 
its implementation. Today the policy is confronted with new challenges 
to define new strategies and to set new priorities. This task becomes even 
more significant when Brazil needs to overcome the present economic 
crisis and to re-define its role in a more complex and interdependent 
world economy." (SEI, 1989a)
Until the late 1970s Brazil’s electronics industry was controlled by foreign 
companies which operated in the country as final assemblers of products and as sellers 
of imported finished equipment.
Between 1979 and 1986 the production of informatics goods and services grew 
at an average of 30% a year. The industry’s total profits added up to US$ 3.2 billion 
in 1987 (57% of which was realized by Brazilian firms). The value of computer 
installations was worth US$5.4 billion and 40% of the installed equipment was ‘made 
in Brazil’. This activity was carried out by over 300 firms, 37 of which were Brazilian 
based subsidiaries of transnational corporations (hereafter TNCs), employing 150,000 
people in an industry that was unevenly located across the national territory from 
Amazonia to Rio Grande do Sul. All of this has been supported through Brazil’s 
national informatics policy (hereafter PNI) both with financial subsidies and institutional 
backing. This policy is stated in Law 7232 of 29 October 1984. The main objective of 
the 1984 Law of Informatics is to develop an informatics industry which would 
contribute to the social, cultural, political, technological and economic development of 
Brazilian society (Brazil: National Congress, 1984).
These events in Brazil follow a pattern of industrial growth of informatics sectors 
in others parts of the world. They are intimately linked to the development of 
electronics complexes first in the United States (1940s), then in Europe (1970s), and 
Japan (1970s), and more recently in many parts of the developing world (1980s). The 
aim of this thesis is to examine the links between developments in the informatics 
industry in Brazil and those which have taken place abroad, and the constraints to and 
possibilities for Brazil’s informatics industry to achieve the goals outlined in the second 
national informatics plan (SEI, 1989a). It is argued here that the policies adopted by the 
Brazilian government for the past 15 to 20 years, albeit instrumental in the development
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of the present industry, do not take into account the links between the development of 
the Brazilian industry and the development of informatics industries worldwide, and that 
no matter how relevant these policies might have been for Brazil, the national industry 
is part of a global industry and it is directly affected by events taking place globally.
The focus of the study is the informatics industry which includes producers of 
mini and microcomputer systems, and which has been at the centre o f recent growth. 
By way of contrast, and considering the technological links between different sub­
sectors, I compare the policies and performance of informatics with other sub-sectors 
of the electronics complex.
To develop this argument I examine the Brazilian experience in the context of 
the development of informatics industries in other parts of the world, particularly in the 
United States, Europe and Japan, and the experiences of other developing countries. The 
global changes in the informatics industry directly affect the evolution of this industry 
in a developing country like Brazil. The development of both Brazilian and international 
industries is situated within the context of capitalism. The uneven nature of capitalist 
development, evident in the asymmetrical configuration of the informatics industry 
worldwide is emphasized when examining the industry on a global scale. Lastly, in this 
thesis the industry is examined from a spatial regional perspective. This approach adds 
a new dynamic to the analysis o f a fast changing industry. This regional perspective is 
particularly necessary given the almost complete neglect of this subject in the available 
literature.
To date, the literature has taken different foci and has used different criteria to 
measure the development o f the Brazilian informatics industry. To some extent there 
have been attempts to pronounce on the successes and failures of the Informatics Law 
and subsequent national informatics plans. The government itself produces an annual 
survey on the industry and has published works on a variety o f other related topics \  
These data are widely used in the literature, which tends to focus on the political 
economic  ^ and technological * facets of the industry and policy. There is also a
‘ See SEI 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989. 
 ^Adler, 1986; Dantas, V. 1988; Tapia, 1984.
’ Frischtak, 1986; Piragibe, 1985; Tigre, 1983.
* Piragibe, 1984; Tigre & Perine, 1984.
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literature which compares the Brazilian experience with other countries’ \
The opinions expressed on the Brazilian industrial development strategy are 
mixed. Some observers support Brazil’s protectionist strategy, both as a prerequisite for 
and as a successful step towards the development of infant industries such as informatics 
Supporters of this strategy emphasize the development of nationalistic forces inside 
the government  ^ and the economic, technological and employment implications of 
more autonomous industrial developments Others criticize the economic and 
technological bottlenecks of excessive protectionism. Or as one observer argues, despite 
protection the production of informatics goods in Brazil is still restricted to local 
markets and the production of standard and overly priced products (Frischtak, 1986:1). 
Similarly, another commentator links the slow pace of technological development, the 
persistence of wide technological gaps and the production o f highly priced and standard 
equipment to a resistance to open up domestic markets to foreign trade and engage in 
greater bilateral ventures with leading TNCs (Cline, 1987).
Independent of the opinions given, studies focus on the uniqueness o f the 
Brazilian initiative at the expense of, and often dissociated from, industrial and 
economic processes occurring at a global level. These studies fail to give equal 
importance to the social, political, economic and technological aspects o f industrial 
development.
It is not very difficult to identify the relationship between the Brazilian and the 
international informatics industry. Piragibe described the Brazilian informatics policy 
as one that began internationalized, but that later had to be dismantled and controlled 
at a national level (Piragibe, 1985). Another observer identified the Brazilian informatics 
industry as international on the basis that it was dependent on international producers 
of main frame computers (Cline, 1987). Brazilian firms still rely heavily on the large 
international producers following the same technological trajectories and standards as 
they do, and the national industry is also heavily dependent on key imports of electronic 
components (microchips).
Brazil’s informatics industry is distributed unevenly throughout the country and
‘ Cline, 1987; Piragibe, 1986; Rushing & Brown, 1986. 
 ^Adler, 1987; Dantas, 1987; Evans, 1979.
 ^Adler, 1986.
* Hewitt, 1988
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the process of this unequal regional development is reflected in qualitative and 
quantitative variations in employment, R&D activities and production. Front-end 
functions (e.g. R&D and marketing) are primarily concentrated in the South East, while 
manufacturing activities are more widely spread. The roots o f this regional pattern lie 
in the concentration of early electrical industries in and around S. Paulo and along the 
S. Paulo and Rio axis. This localization became self-perpetuating from the 1950s 
onward since other industries such as electronics, defense, automobiles, light and heavy 
manufacturing -all major users o f informatics goods- have long concentrated in the 
South-East. From the late 1970s, other regions of the country began to emerge as sites 
for electronics firms. This industrial dispersal is partly the result of a range o f regional 
development policy incentives designed to attract investment to different regions of the 
country. Competing regional development policies, initiated as early as the 1960s, have 
altered the spatial divisions of labour in Brazil. These initiatives include the creation of 
the Manaus Import Zone in the North, the proposal of export processing zones in the 
North-East and, most recently, the creation o f science parks nationwide.
Others aspects of the development of industries like informatics are important to 
the discussion proposed here. The informatics industry is considered strategically 
important by both the developed and less developed nations. Technological aspects of 
informatics are constantly presenting these countries with new challenges. The new 
computing and telecommunications technologies have given rise to rapid and major 
changes in economic and organizational activities. New products create new markets, 
shift economic power among nations, lead to new services, dictate or allow new 
organizational schemes and re-define social relations. Technological developments in 
electronics have contributed to changing patterns of industrial agglomeration and 
dispersal worldwide.
The dynamism and continued spatial change that has characterized the 
informatics industry worldwide is not however simply a result of technological change. 
Other factors have contributed to this. First, the informatics industry is enmeshed in a 
global economic system, and as such it is affected by fluctuations in this global 
economy. Second, the strategic importance of informatics industries necessitates close 
participation by governments in the process o f transnational expansion. Governments 
mediate technological and industrial development through the application o f different 
policies. Most developed and developing countries, including Brazil, have implemented
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some form of user and production related policies. Third, the international division of 
labour of the informatics industry has undergone significant changes during the 40 years 
of the industry. These changes are the result o f national strategies adopted by different 
countries to compete with each other. Given the economic and technological supremacy 
of industries located in the Advanced Industrialized Countries (hereafter AICs), Newly 
Industrialized Countries (hereafter NICs) wishing to enter this industry are under severe 
pressure to form their national strategies in line with competing international trends.
Capital internationalization in the informatics industry is not an homogeneous 
process. The patterns of capital internationalization in the informatics industry have 
changed according to different stages of technological development both in the 
semiconductor and computer industries. Patterns of capital internationalization are 
associated with particular types o f industrial relocation and expansion throughout the 
world, and the relocation and expansion of industrial capital in the informatics industry 
has had varied impact on the localities where these activities take place. The location 
o f informatics firms in selected places can be both positive (contributing to the overall 
development of an area through the creation of jobs, raising taxes, etc.) and negative 
(contributing to environmental damage, overcrowding, deskilling, unemployment, 
employment shifts). For these reasons the successes and failures in the Brazilian 
informatics industry must be examined in an international context.
The arguments raised in this thesis touch on a number of questions about 
development including the nature and relevance of industrial development in countries 
like Brazil, the role of international capital and the patterns of capital internationalization 
in the developing world. The theoretical focus of this thesis is uneven development, and 
most specifically how this unevenness manifests itself over space. This is at times a 
problem, since many social scientists take space as a given variable, a by-product of 
development (see Massey, 1984:51; Duncan, 1989).
Much of the theoretical work on development and capital internationalization 
fails to consider space as a significant variable for industrial and social development 
(Smith, 1984). In this thesis I review dependency theory arguments, theories o f capital 
internationalization, uneven development and regulation theory. The first theory does 
not see sustained development in the Third World as a possibility. The second theory 
focuses on the expansion and retraction of economic activities throughout the world. The 
third theory looks at the rise and fall of capitalism in a given locality as a response to
19
the cycles of growth and decline characteristic of capitalism. The last theory focuses on 
the role o f the state as key actor in the development process over the last three or four 
decades.
The choice of Brazil as a case study is based on the following factors. First, 
Brazil allows for the examination of uneven development within a NIC. To a large 
extent, economic development in Brazil has not been paralleled by essential social 
developments. The discrepancies between economic growth and social inequality 
(including, but not only, uneven income distribution) in Brazil confirm and provide a 
context to examine the uneven nature of development within the country. Second, the 
state has had a clear role in Brazilian industrialization and overall development. Third, 
the position of Brazil in an international economic and political context has changed 
over the years. In short, Brazil offers an excellent case study of the role o f the 
informatics industry in the development process.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This chapter outlines the main issues addressed in this thesis and discusses the 
technological and strategic aspects of the development o f informatics worldwide. The 
first chapter develops the theoretical framework of this thesis. This framework examines 
competing development theories and how each interprets and explains development. A 
review of dependency theory (section 1.2) is followed by an evaluation o f the usefulness 
of the theory of capital internationalization (NIDL) (section 1.3) to understanding 
industrial development in the last 20 years. Section 1.4 stresses the importance of 
historical and geographical uniqueness of economic development from the 1960s to the 
present in analyzing the development of the Brazilian and international informatics 
industries and the role o f the state in these processes. Section 1.5 defines uneven 
development. The main points of the chapter are summarized in section 1.6.
The next six chapters (Chapter 2-7) move to an empirical examination of the 
informatics industry. For the sake of clarity and organization, it proceeds from the 
global level (Chapter 2) to the regional (Chapter 3) to the local level (Chapters 4 -7). 
It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that each level is not a single entity but part 
of the totality (Morgan and Sayer, 1988)
The second chapter is contextual. It examines the internationalization of capital 
in informatics industries located in Europe, Japan and the United States and three
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competing models of economic growth pursued by each o f these countries/regions in the 
past 40 years. It also looks at the relationship between technological change and labour 
(section 2.3), technological change and capital internationalization (section 2.4) and the 
relationship between industry and regional development policies (section 2.5).
Chapter three provides information about the development of informatics 
industries in the developing world. Set in the context of global development, it discusses 
the position of the NICs in the international division of labour for informatics (section 
3.2), and the types o f government strategies that have been used to promote industrial 
development (section 3.3). Following the format used in Chapter two, the level of 
analysis then shifts to examine internationalization and technology transfer (section 3.4), 
employment changes (section 3.5), and industry and regional development (section 3.6).
Four chapters (four through seven) focus on the Brazilian informatics industry. 
Chapter four focuses on the national level, and using both secondary and primary 
sources of data it examines the evolution of the national informatics policy and its main 
components within a historical and economic context of the Brazilian industrialization 
(section 4.2). Section 4.3 compares and contrasts government support given to 
informatics and to other sectors of the electronics complex. Section 4.4 reviews the 
government support given to science and technology in Brazil.
Chapter five looks at economic performance of the informatics sector and the 
level of competitiveness of the Brazilian industry examining key criteria (sales, 
employment, and computer installations). Particular attention is paid to the case of  
electronic banking, since achievements in this sector have been used to illustrate that the 
industry as a whole is successful. Lastly, the position of Brazilian firms in the industry’s 
international division of labour is examined (section 5.4).
Chapter six focuses on the geographical location of the Brazilian industry in 
terms of regional initiatives to promote its development, and historical patterns of 
industrial concentration in Brazil (section 6.2). Section 6.3 looks at the distribution of 
informatics and other electronics firms, of industrial users (section 6.4), and o f regional 
sales and employment (section 6.5).
Chapter seven focuses on the six geographical regions where informatics and 
other electronics firms are located throughout the country. Linkages between these firms 
and the regions where they are located are examined.
The last chapter, eight, summarizes the main empirical findings of the thesis.
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highlighting the contributions of this work in reviewing the Brazilian experience through 
an international lens and in identifying economic/industrial unevenness. It comments on 
the achievements and limitations of this work, and makes suggestions for future research 
on related topics. Finally, it re-examines the theoretical starting point in the light of this 
work. The research methodology and research documentation are discussed in the four 
appendixes.
The following section describes technological characteristics of the informatics 
industry. This discussion is set at a general rather than at a technical level and has two 
purposes: to show how information technology has been transferred from the AICs to 
the rest of the world, and to link technical aspects of the development of informatics 
technologies to social, political and economic developments.
1.3 Some Definitions: High technology, Electronics, Informatics
The electronics industry occupies a dominant position in so called high 
technologies. The activity includes three major groups of industries: Group 1: electronic 
components; Group 2: consumer electronics; and Group 3: industrial and professional 
electronics. Group 1 includes both electronic components such as semiconductors and 
integrated circuits. Group 2, consumer electronics, covers the entire range of audio­
visual equipment. Finally, Group 3 includes instrumentation, computers and peripherals, 
telecommunications and industrial automation (UNCTC, 1983). Together they form 
what has been referred to as an electronics complex of industrial sectors, which are 
technically connected through digital technologies (Erber, 1985).
Wide and growing application o f electronics in society have made this industry 
strategically important and economically strong. The digital technology used in 
computers allow the storage, production, analysis and circulation of information. A 
growing number of private and public users rely on information systems to organize and 
control data sets in the belief that an accurate and efficient control of records aids 
decision-making, facilitates the efficient flow o f information between and within firms 
and countries and therefore determines their competitive position in the world.
Informatics is here defined as the ensemble of objects and techniques necessary 
for the electronic manipulation, processing and diffusion of information (data) where the 
computer is but a part of the whole system. The informatics industry is a productive 
sub-sector o f Group 3 above, comprising the production of computers and the
22
supporting components needed for their functioning. The interdependence between those 
three groups is shown in figure 1 .1
Figure I . l
InTorm atics w ith in  th e E lectron ic  C om p lex
Z Main divisions o f ihc complex
CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS
ELECTRONIC
CONIPONENT
INDUSTRIAL 
& PROF. 
ELECTRONICS
AUDIO
i\TDEO
EQUIP
FOR
HOME
EVTRET
INSTR.
PASSIVE
IND. 
AUTOM I
SERVICE
Key;
^  Micro electronic 
dependency link
^  ^  Interdependences 
^  ^  between divs.
main divisions
SOFT
WARE
TELE
COM
The definition of informatics industries and their scope varies from place to 
place. In Brazil, the informatics industry is broadly defined in the law of informatics to 
encompass most digital related activities. According to Article 3 o f law 7232 of 29 
October 1984:
" any activity related to the rational and automatic treatment o f information is 
considered informatics activity, and specifically, those activities regarding:
I - research, development, production, import, and export o f semiconductor 
electronic components, optical electronics, as well as their respective electronic 
inputs;
II - research, import, export, manufacturing, marketing, and operation of 
machines, equipment and devices based on digital techniques and having 
technical functions such as collecting, treating, structuring, storing, switching, 
retrieving, and displaying information, their respective electronics inputs, parts, 
elements, and physical operation support;
III - import, export, production, operation and marketing o f programmes for 
computers and automatic information treatment machines as well as the 
corresponding technical documentation (software)."*
‘ Brazil: National Congress: Law 7232 of 29 October 1984, article 3.
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This apparent contradiction between the definition given in the law, and the 
organization of national industrial statistics used in SEI reports (SEI, 1982 to 1989) 
which includes simply the producers of computers and peripherals, poses methodological 
problems for data collection and research. This thesis uses the employment and trade 
figures provided by the government and industry associations covering only the 
producers of computers and peripherals. The geographical survey of the distribution of 
the industry in Brazil includes producers of computers and peripherals as well as those 
firms directly involved in the production of parts and components necessary for the 
functioning of complete data processing systems. Included in the spatial analysis 
provided, in addition to producers of computers and peripherals, are other sectors of the 
electronics industry. This is done to illustrate distinct spatial organization and linkages 
pursued by different sectors throughout the national territory.
7.3,1 Computer Manufacturing
Computers have certain characteristics that are relevant to the discussions that 
will follow in this thesis. The production of a computer draws from a range o f inputs 
(hardware). The computer itself must be connected with other products (peripherals) and 
programmed adequately (software) in order to perform its functions properly. The 
production and marketing of hardware, components, peripherals and software vary 
greatly.
Computers are both intermediate products incorporated into the making o f others 
(cars, military equipment, consumer electronics, etc...) as well as final goods to be used 
in the home or office. The wide range of applications and increasing penetration of 
computers into many aspects of human life make them an appealing product with 
increasingly large world markets.
Computer producers depend on technology and scientific knowledge to develop 
new products and open new market frontiers. After years of development, the 
manufacture of standard equipment has become a possibility for most potential entrants 
in this industry. However, for non-standard equipment, companies are under continuous 
pressure to participate in developing and keep up with producing the latest technology. 
Thus companies most closely involved in, or that can best appropriate, research and 
development (hereafter R&D) stand a better chance of remaining in business. Adequate 
state support of national science and technology (hereafter S&T) programmes and
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research and development targeted at these industries is, as a result, strategic and 
determinant in the success of new entrants.
The computer industry has been in existence for less than 40 years. The first 
computer architecture based on sequential processing was developed during the 1940s 
at Princeton University. From then on there has been a sequence of five technological 
phases also known as ‘technological generations’. These are summarized in table 1.1.
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TABLE 1.1
TECHNOLOGICAL GENERATIONS IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
Generation Period Computer
Model
Characteristics Applications
0 1940s ENIAC Not capable of 
storage programmes. 
Valve processors.
Basic
Calculation 
(e.g ., artillery 
trajectories)
1 early
1950s
UNIVACI Programmes in 
memory. 
Programming in 
machine language 
Valve processors.
Scientific & 
Technical 
calculations. 
Pay rolls.
2 late
1950s
IBM 7090 Higher languages: 
COBOL. CPU with 
transistors. Magnetic 
memories, data 
input with 
perforated cards.
Same as above
3 early
1960s
IBM 360 
BURROUG 
HS 6500
Hybrid ICs (IBM) 
or Low integration 
ICs (Burroughs) in 
CPU.
Semiconductor
processors.
Real time 
processing. 
Greater 
applications.
3,4 or 5 late
1960s
IBM 370 
DEC PDF 
11
High integration IC. 
Growth of mini 
computer markets. 
Development micro 
computers.
Development
of specialized
applications.
Technological
convergence
with other
sectors.
5 late
1980s
1990s
? Programming in 
natural languages. 
Voice recognition. 
ICs of gallium 
arsenide.
Source: International Competitiveness in Electronics 
US Office of Technology Assessment, OTA - ISC, 1983.
These five technological periods have been made possible by developments in 
the microelectronics sectors and have revolutionized the way computers are used. The
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sections below look at products and market changes in the industry resulting from the 
developments in the microelectronics sectors.
1.3,2 Product and Market Changes
Advancements in microelectronics, associated with the reduction in the size of 
components, have significantly altered the computer industry. Below six aspects of 
miniaturization are described.
First, 8-bit chips made possible the construction of smaller and architecturally 
simpler machines: the micro and later the mini computers. These, in turn, have been 
followed by new telematic systems, robots, industrial automation. The reduction in 
machine size, its greater acceptability and wider use raised demand, brought costs down 
and made the computer a mass produced commodity. Table T.2 shows the world market 
for computers in 1984, in which personal computers represented 26.3% of  the total 
sales, second to mainframes with 33%. By 1987 mainframe sales decreased to 13% of 
the world market for computers (Vasquez & Zimmermann, 1988). Figure T.2 shows the 
computer sales in the US market, the leading market for informatics goods, indicating 
the position of micro sales vis-a-vis the rest. The arrival of microcomputers, and the 
simplicity o f the machine’s architecture, also lowered entry barriers to a number of new 
producers worldwide.
Table T.2 
World Market for Computers, 1984
Types o f Systems %
Very Large and Large Computers 33.0
Medium size computers 21.6
Mini and super mini computers 19.1
Personal Computers 26.3
Total 100
Source: Delapierre & Zimmermann (1986:77)
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Second, new chips used in micro and mini computers are comparable with some 
existing mainframes (as with the introduction of 16 and most recently 32 bit machines). 
This blurs product boundaries even if  it has not as yet affected nor replaced the role 
played by large systems. There are a number o f applications which demand the handling 
o f large quantities o f data (such as meteorological monitoring, real time industrial 
manufacturing controls, a range o f  public services, and so on), over and beyond the 
processing capacity o f today’s single most powerful integrated circuits. As such, the 
market for large machines remains and this tends to perpetuate its role as a significant 
demand pull for smaller units, to complement the performing of their tasks.
Third, developments in microelectronics allow for a reduction in the product life 
cycle o f smaller machines. For each generation of a new chip, com puter producers 
introduce a new model, more powerful and with more features to replace existing ones. 
Shortening product cycles does not reduce the R&D costs o f new products. The 
relationship o f research to product development is a crucial determinant in the reshaping 
o f competition patterns worldwide. Chip producers need to devote large sums o f money 
to the R&D o f new and more powerful components. Computer producers do the same, 
with the hope of launching these innovations ahead of competitors. The faster these new 
products hit the market the shorter the product cycles of existing goods. Rates o f  return 
on capital are affected in these shorter cycles, increasing the risk factors every time a 
firm decides to launch new, more advanced products.
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Fourth, new products bring changes in market targets. The mainframe era meant 
the construction predominantly of large expensive machines to satisfy the needs o f very 
select institutions (namely the government, defence agencies, research centres, and so 
on). These sophisticated and highly specialized client demands included basic machine 
maintenance, and software which was custom made to satisfy individual needs. New 
products are smaller and more user friendly machines and their market is larger, more 
complex and more demanding. Potential buyers of micros are no longer experienced 
and informed users but a spectrum of customers demanding greater support services 
from computer producers and, even more important, from software programmers. The 
turning of computers into mass produced commodities meant the reorganization of 
computer production, to use mass production techniques and to achieve economies of 
scale. "Computer systems become more complicated and diverse and in order to win 
orders from the new kinds of user, computer firms had to put much more emphasis on 
marketing, sales and custom support than hitherto." (Morgan & Sayer, 1988). It also 
fosters the restructuring of the industry’s distribution and marketing schemes (dealers, 
distributors, and so on) to reach the expanding market o f new consumers.
Fifth, technological developments in the computer production sector have led to 
a split between software and hardware production. As pointed out above, the computer 
depends on a set of software packages that make it operational. As hardware becomes 
more standardized the demand for different software applications rises. New products 
developed with greater processing capacity have created a demand for more 
sophisticated software.
Software can be divided into two types: system and applications. With the first 
type o f software, programmes were written to be executed by machines. In the first 
years o f computer production, machines were only able to process internal, binary 
languages. Programmes were custom made and were not transferable from system to 
system, each producer had to provide their own programming. Today software can be 
produced independently from the computer producer and the type o f computer which 
will execute it. Programming languages are becoming more similar to natural ones, the 
scope of innovation goes beyond the binary system. The industry is involved in 
facilitating access to computers with the introduction of ‘user friendly’ systems (e.g., 
the Apple Macintosh architectures) to bring even more users into the market. The 
second type of software is for applications programmes, oriented to fill the growing
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needs o f users. Therefore, the greater the utilization of computers in daily life, the 
greater the demand for complex and diverse software packages. The scope of software 
production has become so wide that it has become an industry in itself. ‘
Sixth, new products, technological improvements, the widening application of 
computers (exemplified by the convergence of telecommunications and informatics), and 
the expanding consumer base paved the way for the demand for ‘total solutions’. Total 
solutions call for well-equipped production facilities and human skills which are put into 
constant interaction with customers (Morgan & Sayer, 1988). Relevant to the regional 
focus aimed at here, this new product/service arrangement is clearly spatially-biased. 
Increasing technological sophistication can only occur where there are R&D centres, 
production facilities and qualified labour. Regions that can offer (make available) these 
locational features have a greater chance of being chosen as sites for new investments.
Each technological generation o f computer is accompanied by substantial 
changes in computer production, utilization and distribution. These technological 
changes have repercussions on both a global (TNC) and national levels.
The following chapters examine relationships between technological changes 
described above and the emergence and development o f informatics. Also highlighted 
are the relevance of other factors, particularly the role of the state, which are equally 
important in this process.
1.4 Summary and Conclusions
The development of Brazil’s informatics industry has been very uneven, and is 
dependant on, and influenced by changes taking place in the industry on an international 
scale. This thesis looks at the relationship between developments in Brazil and those 
which have occurred elsewhere, and in so doing it examines the constraints to and 
possibilities for the Brazilian informatics industry to achieve the goals outlined in the 
second national informatics plan.
This thesis looks at the asymmetries of the development in Brazil and elsewhere, 
bringing out the spatial and regional perspective o f Brazilian development. This 
approach has not yet been pursued by the relevant literature on the theme. The current 
literature has asserted the primacy of certain factors (e.g., uniqueness of the national
‘ Due to technological differences between software and hardware production plus space limitation in this 
thesis, software is not included in the empirical analysis.
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initiative, changing competitive structures of the national industry, the political context 
of the policy) to the relative neglect of others (e.g., the relationships between industries 
and localities and the links between the Brazilian experience and that o f other countries).
More importantly for a discussion on the relationships between developments in 
Brazil and those occurring elsewhere are the arguments put forth in the literature on 
development. The theoretical framework used in this thesis draws from different 
development theories the elements necessary to explain how the Brazilian informatics 
industry has developed and grown, looking at the historical and geographical uniqueness 
of the Brazilian experience.
To examine the international context in which informatics has developed I have 
looked at technological aspects of this industry. These include the international nature 
of the industry, the links between informatics and other sectors o f the electronics 
complex, the strategic role of information technologies for private and public sectors and 
so on. A working definition o f informatics as spelled out in the Brazilian informatics 
law is given and the methodological limitation of this definition explained when it comes 
to surveying the spatial distribution of informatics in Brazil.
The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework for this thesis.
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CHAPTER I
I Is Underdevelopment Pre determined? 
Theoretical Perspectives
1.1 Introduction
Authors o f different political perspective have accepted industrialization as a 
precondition for successful economic growth (Corbridge, 1986:129). They have offered 
different accounts of the pace and place o f this economic transformation and of its 
potential impact on the Third World. This thesis is about industrial development. It 
focuses on the development of the Brazilian informatics industry and policy. The 
approach chosen is to look at these developments through an international lens and to 
demonstrate that the industrial, technological and geographic development aspects of the 
Brazilian industry are linked to global developments and are uneven.
No single theory can provide a comprehensive framework that brings together 
development, capital internationalization, role of government and geographical 
unevenness, the four elements in this thesis. This chapter, therefore, reviews three 
theories written to explain industrial development of national and transnational 
informatics industries: development of underdevelopment theories, new international 
division of labour thesis and regulation theory, and it gives a definition o f uneven 
development based on the work of Smith to explain different levels of social and spatial 
unevenness (Smith, 1984).
7.7.7 Structure of the Chapter
Many NICs have managed to develop national informatics industries. The 
emergence of these industries in the NICs contradicted earlier analyses of the 
possibilities o f economic development in the Third World. Section 1.2 examines 
contributions to the development of underdevelopment debate based on the works of 
Frank and Wallerstein.
Section 1.2.2 is a critique o f these two authors, demonstrating that these theories 
do not provide a useful framework to understand the recent industrialization processes 
taking place in the Third World.
The rapid internationalization of capital that started from the 1950s onward 
offered new food for thought for theoreticians looking for ways to explain development. 
Section 1.3 reviews the new international division of labour thesis. This theory explains
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the relocation of productive capital to the Third World, while putting overdue emphasis 
on the supremacy of certain factors such as cheap labour and declining rates of profit. 
Section 1.3.3 is a critique of the NIDL.
Section 1.4 shifts the emphasis from development to focus on the role of the 
state in designing and implementing industrial development policies. Regulation theory 
provides a framework of analysis centered on the role o f governments as key 
formulators o f social economic development policies.
A prominent argument of this thesis is the uneven development o f informatics 
industries throughout the world and in Brazil. The theories reviewed in the chapter are 
weak in their conceptualization of uneven development. Section 1.5 explains different 
levels o f differentiation and spatial unevenness, and section 1.6 summarizes and 
concludes the chapter.
1.2 The Development of Underdevelopment
After the Second World War, scholars of various traditions began to examine the 
different ways economic development occurred worldwide. The reshuffling of political 
and economic powers among different nations seemed not to even out countries’ 
standards o f living but continued to enhance their inequalities. In the late 1960s a 
growing body of literature broke away from the ethnocentrism and empiricism of more 
traditional social science to analyze development (Henderson, 1989:11). The new 
explanations of the process of growth (or lack of growth) and theoretical frameworks 
of the dependency paradigm are significantly different from one another (Palma, 1981). 
Yet they suggest that
"it is simply not possible to adequately comprehend a vast array o f economic, 
social, and political phenomena in particular Third World countries unless these 
phenomena are theorized in relation to the changing circumstances under which 
those countries are structurally connected with the economic and political systems 
of the advanced capitalist societies" (Henderson, 1989:11).
The realization that development issues had to be examined through a global 
perspective remains a key factor in subsequent studies on industrialization, and for this 
thesis.
To illustrate the contribution of the dependency paradigm, this section examines 
the works of Frank and Wallerstein. These are not the only proponents of this theory. 
Within the ‘dependency theory’ or ‘dependency approach’, there are many distinctions 
(Larrain, 1989: chapter 6). These extend from a non-Marxist critique, which looks at
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dependence as a testable theory (O’Brien, 1975; Lall, 1975), to a Marxist critique 
focusing on the development of capitalism (Warren, 1980), and to yet another looking 
at the articulation of modes of production (Rey, 1978). The two contributions explored 
here fall within a Marxist framework.
a. Frank
Frank’s work focused on explaining how some countries managed to place 
themselves in the centre of political and economic life to control others (Baran, 1967). 
Frank placed the origins of capitalist social productive relations in the formation of a 
global economic system in the late 15th century. During this period capitalism spread 
out o f Europe to incorporate the world into a single organic mercantile capitalist system. 
As capital expanded across boundaries it "destroyed or totally transformed the earlier 
viable social and economic systems of these societies, incorporated them into the 
metropolitan dominated worldwide capitalist system, and converted them into sources 
for its own development" (Frank, 1969:225). Frank saw in these global exchange 
relations the essence of capitalism.
He argued that the control of certain countries by others - or the perpetuation of 
underdevelopment - arose from the circulation of capital in its commodity form, and its 
transference from less development regions of the world (as raw materials) to more 
developed regions (to be manufactured and resold for higher prices) on the basis of 
unequal exchange (the different prices paid for raw materials and manufactured goods) 
(Henderson, 1989:12).
By focusing on the unequal relationships between less developed and developed 
regions, Frank was unable to understand he called earlier viable social and economic 
systems. He made no distinction between two economic realities and social structures 
between less developed regions and developed regions. According to him, development 
and underdevelopment occur under identical historical and geographical conditions and 
"could not be the product of supposedly different economic structures or systems." 
(Frank, 1969:28).
b. Wallerstein
Wallerstein, like Frank focused his work on the roots o f development in the more 
economically advanced countries (Europe and North America) and how it related to 
development in other parts of the world (Wallerstein, 1974). His conceptualization of 
space did allow for the capitalist system to expand through world trade. That is, he saw 
in development of commerce the emergence of new forms o f productive organization.
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a division of labour, and a regional specialization through surplus transfer and capital 
accumulation in the more economically advanced nations. Like Frank’s interpretation, 
the driving force behind this system rested on exchange (e.g., trade, commerce) and not 
on production per se.
Wallerstein also recognized the possibility of genuine development of less 
developed parts of the world within the capitalist system. He accepted a growing 
involvement of local capital in the growth process, the emergence o f corporations 
indigenous to these countries, and the movement o f this new capital both back to the 
more advanced nations and/or to other less developed countries.
In explaining these developments Wallerstein moved away from Frank by 
identifying a capitalist and a pre-capitalist social system in interaction. For him "the 
social system is of prime importance, and external factors must take precedence over 
internal factors in accounts of underdevelopment" (Corbridge, 1986:34). He was also 
able to identify different levels and qualities of uneven exchange between countries, 
regions and economies. He divided the capitalist world system into three tiers o f states, 
the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery, with the difference between them being 
determined by the political and economic strength of nation states to put in motion 
exchange relations.
One shortcoming of Wallerstein’s conceptualization o f development was to 
describe it as a series of tiers and spatial regions like core, periphery and semi­
periphery. For, as Henderson argues, these are only formal categories that describe and 
designate particular territorial units in particular historical periods (Henderson, 
1989:15). Second, Wallerstein makes no concession to the possibility of the 
development of the forces of production, technology, or innovation in places outside 
the realm of more advanced economies. He accepts the possibility of the development 
of some countries (semi-peripheral units), however, according to his theory, these 
countries seldom develop organizational and scientific technical knowledge to exercise 
more control over their development process.
L2.1 Critique
The ‘development of underdevelopment’ theories are weak in capturing the 
dynamics o f capitalist development in both space and time, and in concentrating heavily 
on the global scale alone. The recognition of systematic barriers to economic 
development in the course of capitalist expansion led to the formulation of theories to
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explain obstacles to development.
Frank’s and Wallerstein’s conception of development places heavy emphasis on 
the sale o f manufactured goods produced with cheap raw materials as the single source 
of income generation and profit making. According to Cardoso and Falleto, uneven 
development has to be examined in terms of how productive activities are organized and 
not on how much money countries can make from the sale o f products. (Cardoso & 
Falleto, 1979). A focus on production exposes different mechanisms used by developed 
countries to maximize their gains by relying on labour and resources located in less 
developed regions of the world. It also demonstrates the different types of interaction 
between less developed and developed regions, the possibility of a gradual 
transformation of underdevelopment, and the achievement o f maximum capitalist 
development goal -accumulation.
The criticisms of dependency theory do not end here. Larrain in his review of 
theories o f development (Larrain, 1989: chapter 6) argues that dependency or 
underdevelopment theories are mainly focused on a Third Worldist perspective and 
ideology. This ideology assumes that capitalist accumulation proceeds in the advanced 
countries in a relatively uninterrupted manner while the major locus o f contradiction is 
in the underdeveloped countries. This is problematic for, as it will be discussed below, 
capitalism is uneven even inside the AICs (Chapter two). AICs are a patch of more and 
less privileged areas with more developed and less developed regions within. In terms 
of the global informatics industry, areas like Wales, Scotland, Ireland or Spain 
comprise a so-called European ‘periphery’.
Dependency theory is also contradictory in the way it defines development in the 
advanced countries as a self-sufficient process, yet one which is reliant on the existence 
of less developed regions. However, if  indeed developed countries are self-sufficient 
they should not be dependent on underdeveloped regions. This functionalist view of 
dependency underestimates the prospects of some form of a successful capitalist 
development in selected parts of the world documented by abundant empirical evidence 
(Chapter three). Lastly, though dependency theory tries to be a critique of 
modernization, it remains within almost the same frame of reference. Both theories 
propose a model of development where the Third World is an appendix of the 
developed world (Larrain, 1989: chapter 6).
Emerging patterns o f capital internationalization in the 1960s and the appearance 
of industries including electronics throughout the developing world inspired many 
theories of Third World development, some looking at it as a positive and long lasting
36
phenomenon, others defining it as functional to needs of developed countries (Forbes, 
1984). The next section examines the ideas behind capital internationalization and the 
division of labour thesis.
1.3 Industrialization and Development
A salient feature of advanced capitalism has been the internationalization of 
capital. (Amin & Goddard, 1986; UNCTC, 1983a; Taylor & Thrift, 1982). 
Internationalization is understood here as the movement of capital across national 
boundaries. Capital has from its origins developed internationally. The theories 
described above confirm that and even explain capital’s mobility as a way to set up 
world markets.
By way of contrast, the contemporary expansion of productive capital and 
financial capital since the second world war has been marked by its international 
expansion through transnational corporations (hereafter TNCs). By 1980, 28% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of developed and developing countries was accounted 
for by the sales o f the top 350 TNCs (UNCTC, 1983a). Perhaps more illustrative of 
the dominance of TNCs is the amount o f trade which is channeled through these 
companies. For example, it has been estimated that up to 40 percent o f world trade is 
in the form of internal transfers between TNC subsidiaries (Taylor & Thrift, 1982). 
Through the activities of TNCs, capital has extended its role around the globe and with 
it has come a new geography of production.
An important strategy of TNCs has been the establishment of production 
subsidiaries in selected industrial sectors (e.g., textiles and electronics) where there are 
abundant supplies of low wage labour. This is evident in the growing importance of 
many Third World countries and specially the NICs, in terms of their share of capital 
growth, manufacturing output and exports (OECD, 1988).
The growth of manufacturing output has been paralleled by a rapid expansion 
of manufacturing exports to the industrialized countries. The NICs share of 
industrialized country exports of manufactured goods increased from 1.6% to 9.5% by 
1985 (OECD, 1988). As a result, the focus of the academic debate on the 
internationalization of capital has been on the relocation of productive capital to these 
low wage sites in the Third World.
This process of industrialization and internationalization affects different 
countries. The internationalization of capital has a marked spatial bias with the 
movement of capital among the advanced industrial countries in many instances far out
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weighing the shift of capital towards the Third World. TNCs investments are more 
prominent in selected industries including informatics.
The international division of labour thesis is reviewed below.
L3A The New International Division of Labour and the 
Internationalization of Capital
The New International Division of Labour refers to the breakup of the bi-polar 
global capitalist economy (AICs vs. NICs") associated with the era of empires and the 
increasing fragmentation of manufacturing processes, whereby partial operations are 
geographically dispersed to capture labour cost savings (Frobel et al, 1980).
Frôbel et al argue that three sets of conditions have developed which have given 
rise to a restructuring of the conditions of valorization and accumulation of capital, and 
consequently to the restructuring of the international division of labour. First, is the 
development of a global reservoir of potential labour power. This labour power is 
characterized by low wages, long working days, high rates of exploitation and limited 
employment rights. Second, the development of the labour process has led to the 
decomposition of complex tasks into elementary units thus facilitating the substitution 
of skilled labour with un-skilled and semi-skilled labour. Through advances in 
production and job organization techniques that were already being used in 
manufacturing in the AICs, capital is argued to have a "monopoly of the knowledge 
related to the control and execution of the labour process", reducing the worker to a 
mere appendage of the production process (Frobel et al, 1980:35). Third, is the 
advancement of the forces of production relating to transportation and communications 
technology which, "...renders industrial location and the management of production 
itself largely independent of geographical distance" (ibid.:36).
These pre-conditions have generated the possibility of a world market, engulfing 
both the developed and underdeveloped countries, for production sites and labour power 
and the opportunity for surplus profits. "The overriding pressure of competition turns 
this possibility into a necessity for the survival of any individual capital" (ibid.:44). 
The consequence o f acting upon this necessity is the decentralizing productive activities 
and the establishment of "world market factories" designed to take advantage o f low 
wage locations from which commodities (including intermediate products) may be 
exported back to the AICs.
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L3.2 Critique
The NIDL theory tends to over-emphasize cheap and unskilled labour as the
central explanatory variable of spatial change. The emphasis on nominal labour costs
confuses wage rates and rates of exploitation, the latter of which take into account the
varying productivity of labour power. In part, this problem stems from a tendency to
generalize the nature of the process o f industrial change and relocation based on the
experience of a narrow selection of industries at a particular historical conjuncture.
More generally, the model proposed by the NIDL theory presupposes a linear
conception of product development and particular management practices. Based on
these suppositions a logical argument is advanced to suggest the importance of labour
cost differentials as the prime determinant o f industrial location in standardized product
markets. This conception is logically and empirically inadequate.
Logically, even if we accept a linear conception of product development (e.g.,
towards standardization), it does not necessarily follow that this will mean the
production process will become labour-intensive or that decentralization to cheap labour
sites will occur. In fact, this is only one possible strategy available to capital to increase
the rate of profit. Equally plausible is the application o f new capital-intensive
production methods such as computer aided design and manufacture (CAD/CAM) and
robotics as a means to preserve profitability. In the case o f semiconductors, while there
has been a tendency to concentrate on labour costs as the exclusive factor governing
location dynamics, initial R&D costs, high labour skill to carry out those activities, and
the increasing importance of high quality and reliability (non-price factors) of
semiconductors, has necessitated more rigorous production demands including quality
control. The importance of quality control has in turn stimulated the automation of
assembly operations thus reducing the need for labour-intensive assembly (Cho, 1985).
Moreover, these differences are not simply reducible to varying organic compositions
of capital, also important are the nature of the production process and the specific
mechanisms of labour control.
"The emergence of powerful, effective labour control mechanisms, the 
employment relations and work organization that maximize the extraction of 
surplus with little labour-management conflict, has emerged as one o f the major 
conditions promoting the recent return o f capital to the United States in the 
electronics industry. This new development suggests that with automation of 
production, the cheapness of labour costs for capital has become less and less 
important." (Cho, 1985:214).
Empirically, a linear model o f product development towards mass production and
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price competitive markets does not appear to be a useful abstraction in the context of 
many industries, including informatics. Factors such as political alliances, restriction on 
the transfer of technology, financing, counter-trade agreements, and non-price forms of 
competition are at least as important as price factors in structuring locational patterns in 
informatics markets. This will be demonstrated in Chapters two and three.
Second, there are problems in the way in which technological change is handled 
in the NIDL theory. Frobel et al. emphasize the importance of the development of the 
productive forces, in a restricted fashion. The NIDL thesis excludes the tendency of 
capital to revolutionize the labour process and increase the productivity of labour, that 
is for capital to accumulate through relative surplus-value production. At the same time 
the introduction of new use-values and barriers to entry are not given due consideration, 
although these may have quite profound social and locational consequences. In product 
markets characterized by rapid product development and/or technical barriers to entry, 
as is the case in informatics, labour costs are likely to be relatively unimportant as a 
locational factor.
Further, Frobel et al. see technical change, and specifically the development of 
the productive forces enabling capital to liberate itself from geographical distance, 
operating in a unidirectional way, towards decentralized production. The effects of 
technical development cannot be assumed to operate in this way. More correctly, these 
effects are two edged. For example, computer network technology allows firms to 
expand markets by facilitating the rapid conveyance of services and information to 
dispersed sites. At the same time advanced communications and information processing 
systems provide control and monitoring capabilities, i.e ., centralizing tendencies over 
hitherto decentralized activities, reducing the "bounded rationality constraints on more 
complex spatial forms of business organization." (Hepworth, 1987:173).
Third, the issue of demand is equally inadequately addressed, again with 
implications which can obscure the factors contributing to industrial and spatial change. 
The convergence of information and telecommunication technology in informatics 
discussed in the introduction, has led to growing importance being attached to the 
dynamic interactions between producers and consumers (tailoring products to consumer 
needs) and creating greater possibilities for industrial agglomeration. The shift in demand 
from military to civil applications, with a concomitant shift in market dynamics away 
from non-price forms of contracting to more commercial pricing practices in the 
semiconductor industry, was associated with the shift in location of the industry towards 
low wage sites for assembly. Also different institutional structures of demand may have
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a very important influence on locational dynamics. IBM is a major chip producer but 
has not used off-shore assembly operations because of its vertically integrated production 
structure (Balds, 1977).
Fourth, the role o f the state and its effect on industrialization and 
internationalization is under-emphasized in the NIDL model. In a study of the motor 
industry, direct state intervention (through investment incentives and export subsidies), 
and not cheap labour, was a crucial factor underpinning foreign investment decisions 
(Jenkins, 1985). The same is true for much of the development of informatics in certain 
Third World countries, notably in Brazil. The internationalization of capital to most 
Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s faced a number of barriers in the form 
of national policies of import substitution which prevented the establishment of TNCs 
owned branch plants. TNCs were thus compelled to expand through licensing and co­
production arrangements with host country firms in accordance with government 
regulations.
To summarize, the first body of theories which are part of a dependency 
paradigm saw the development of the Third World as an impossible task. Tied to 
developments of capitalist countries through unequal exchange. Third World countries 
were to remain forever dependent on them for most of their needs. The second theory, 
the NIDL thesis advanced understanding of the development process. Drawing from a 
restricted and historically specific case of a selected group of industries (e.g. textiles, 
consumer electronics and semiconductors), this model, however, gave evidence and 
proof that some of the Third World was finally coming out of the trap of 
underdevelopment.
These theories, however, do not explain two major factors with which this thesis 
in concerned: the role o f the state as agent in the development process operating at 
national regional and international levels, and the uneven nature of development.
In what follows I review regulation theory’s account o f the role o f political 
institutions in economic development.
1.4 The Regulation Approach
Regulation theory provides a general framework through which economic 
development can be conceptualized (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1982). Given that capitalism 
is both ridden by, and dependent upon, crises, the regulation school addressed the 
question of how relatively stable periods of economic growth occurred. Two concepts 
stand at the core of the regulation approach, these being a regime o f  accumulation and
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a mode o f  regulation. A regime of accumulation refers to the "stabilization over a long 
period of the allocation of the net product between consumption and accumulation; it 
implies some correspondence between the transformation of both the conditions of 
production and the conditions o f the reproduction of wage earners."(Lipietz, 1986:19). 
This implies a continual and parallel coordination of both the conditions o f production 
and conditions of reproduction o f wage earners. For a regime of accumulation to 
materialize there must be a corresponding mode o f regulation which embodies a set of 
norms, laws, habits, regulation networks, a "body of interiorized rules and social 
processes" (ibid., 20), which ensures the unity o f the process o f accumulation. Using 
these concepts, an explanation of relatively stable, albeit temporary, periods of 
accumulation could be advanced, notwithstanding the contradictions o f the capital 
relation and class antagonisms.
According to the regulation school, the post-war period of capitalist expansion 
was characterized by an intensive regime of accumulation termed Fordism. Fordism was 
characterized by two historically and theoretically linked phenomena. On the one hand, 
it was based on radical and constant change in the labour process, combining rising 
productivity and an increasing technical composition of capital. Within the labour 
process, the gap between conception and execution of work was created as capital sought 
to "...systematize the ever new content of workers’ skills, and to ensure capitalist 
control over it by hunting down the ‘free space’ left in the labour process." (Lipietz, 
1982:35). On the other hand. Fordism involved the continual adjustment o f mass 
consumption to rising productivity. This linking of production and consumption was 
established through monopolistic forms of wage regulation (such as cost-of-living and 
productivity linked wage settlements), thus facilitating the realization o f a rising mass 
of value. The link between wages and expanding production was further complemented 
by the development of particular institutional structures, consumption patterns and modes 
of state intervention. Crucially, Fordism could only temporarily offset the contradictions 
and tendencies towards crisis of capitalism.
By the mid-1960s the pace of expansion slowed and productivity stagnated. 
Fordism had seemingly reached its technical and social limits. Fordist accumulation was 
predicated on rising productivity which offset a rising organic composition o f capital and 
limited the share of wages in total value impinging on profits. Increases in wages 
necessary to maintain the realization of surplus-value became counterpoised to declining 
profit rates, and a profitability crisis ensued. "For capital in general...the problem is 
not so much to find markets as to drive up the rate of exploitation."(ibid., :36), as a
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means to realize surplus value. Along with technical and social limits to expanded 
reproduction of capital within the regime of Fordist accumulation, the corresponding 
modes o f regulation which governed this also reached their limits.
Responses to the crisis of Fordism may be seen along two lines: capital
restructuring within and along Fordist lines; and capital restructuring along a post- 
fordist trajectory. At this point I will confine myself to the former since much that has 
been written on the process of internationalization has developed these arguments. Two 
ways in which capital has attempted to ameliorate profitability crises within Fordist 
lines have been, "... a quest for gains in productivity and a search for cheaper wage- 
zones."(ibid.:37). Each strategy has important and distinct implications. In terms of 
the former, to the extent that productivity increases under Fordism are linked to mass 
production and scale economies, national capitals sought to broaden consumption 
through greater international trade within the AICs. In effect, there was a move towards 
greater integration and interdependence amongst AICs which will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter two. At the same time, the search for cheaper wage zones brought 
about a different spatial structure of accumulation. In particular, there was an 
internationalization of productive capital to other countries, whereby branch circuits of 
Fordist production systems are spread "over a pool o f unevenly skilled and unevenly 
paid workers."(ibid.:37). In some ways this ties in with the NIDL thesis in explaining 
the movement of capital across international boundaries, even if  the reasons for such 
movement are explained differently.
The basis of this Fordist capital mobility lay in the disjunction in the labour 
process between conception, skilled production and unskilled assembly, each of which 
offered distinct spatial possibilities. The more advanced elements of the labour process 
remain largely tied to the AICs. To a lesser extent in the case o f skilled production, they 
may however be found in a few NICs. However, given the crisis o f Fordism, the 
possibility of restructuring the spatial organization o f production to take advantage of 
low-wage labour for labour intensive unskilled assembly led to the decentralization of 
productive capital in order to realize opportunities o f increasing the rate o f exploitation. 
At first, this process of internationalization was mainly confined to labour intensive and 
low organic composition industries run along Taylorist, or ‘bloody Taylorist* 
principles.^ Later, there was an internationalization of capital designed on the one
* Taylorism basically refers to the fragmentation of the labour process into simple repetitive tasks and is 
frequently associated with textile and electronics assembly operations. Bloody Taylorism refers to the 
extremely oppressive conditions under which these activities are organized particularly in the periphery
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hand to penetrate local markets and, on the other, to establish low-wage production 
centres for components for re-export to the AICs.
L 4 ,l Critique
Regulation theory recognizes that capitalism is a relation o f class struggle yet the 
analytical categories used separate struggle from structure, subordinating them to a 
structural logic (Jessop, 1982:149). Regulation theory hopes to question the survival of 
capitalism when the capital labour relation itself contains and leads to a continuous crisis 
that tends to hamper the process of capitalist accumulation. The way to understand how 
the dialectical relationship of capital and labour was in fact made operational was by the 
identification of specific institutional forms, societal norms, and patterns of conduct that 
concurrently expressed and represented capital labour conflicts up to inevitable moments 
of crisis or the mode of regulation of capitalist growth.
Regulation theory emerged, as did previous theoretical contributions, as a critique 
of NIDL theories (Lipietz, 1982, 1986). Concerned with the historical processes of 
transformation of societies and the logic o f their development, regulation theory opposes 
both the neo-classical idea of general equilibrium and the orthodox Marxist conception 
that the development of the forces of production is the principal determinant o f capitalist 
evolution (Silva, 1988:25).
Regulation also rejects a bi-polar interpretation of ‘North-South’ put forth by the 
development of underdevelopment theorists where economic relations were based on an 
unequal exchange of manufactured goods from the North and primary goods from the 
South. It offers, instead, a methodological framework that avoids falling into dogmas 
of universal concepts (e.g., imperialism, dependency, periphery) to pay closer attention 
to the level of the nation states (ibid, 1986).
Economic, social, and political variables are equally important for the regulation 
approach. This is crucial for this thesis as the type of analysis I propose here intends to 
bridge the gap left by a literature that has focused too heavily on economic, or political, 
or technological issues alone. Regulation theory is based on the analysis of a historical 
perspective. On one hand, this focus on history makes the regulation framework quite 
flexible in explaining the changing character and nature of capitalist development 
through time and over space. On the other, it lacks some sort of "consistent framework 
for the understanding of contemporary relationships, once historical analysis is not the
(e.g., inside export processing zones).
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core o f the study" (Silva, 1988:30), but is formulated only to provide the contextual 
background to explain the present. Despite these bottlenecks, regulation theory seems 
to provide a unifying element to what often appears to be isolated outcomes, or as 
Lipietz puts it: "the reconciliation of national and of global regimes of accumulation 
which are two aspects of the same thing depending on the perspective taken" (Lipietz, 
1986:22).
Next follows a discussion of uneven development.
1.5 Uneven Development
This section centres on the uneven nature o f capitalist development. As 
mentioned above, most development related theories have great difficulty in dealing 
with the unevenness of capitalist development. For as capitalism has developed, it has 
done so with a clear spatial bias. The informatics industry is one example of this, as 
will be demonstrated in the next chapters.
The three theories reviewed above conceptualize spatial change differently. In the 
case o f the development o f underdevelopment theory the movement o f capital between 
regions is reduced to trade relations between and within regions to satisfy the 
consumption needs of richer countries. Frank did not allow for much change between 
regions o f the world let alone within them: according to him capitalist development 
divided the world into a less developed one that existed to provide raw materials, and 
a developed one that lived off the former. Wallerstein, in turn, identified different layers 
of development with countries occupying a position among the developed, the semi­
peripheral or the peripheral. He argued, however that semi-peripheral countries 
experienced great difficulties in sustaining their national development plans. Also like 
Frank, he argued that these distinctions existed between countries and never within 
them.
The NIDL thesis explained the relocation o f capital to Third World countries as 
a strategy for saving on labour cost. Regulation theory, in turn, aims to explain the 
crises and booms of capitalism. The spatial explanation of crises and booms is defined 
within and along fordist lines. In the first case, restructuring can be partly carried out 
through relocation as a cost saving device. In the second case, restructuring can take 
place inside the AICs through the adoption of more capital and technology intensive 
methods.
Unevenness, or the asymmetry of the development process, has to be dealt with 
at a global, regional and national level, for each level poses different challenges and
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brings different constraints for those countries and industries trying to develop.
According to Smith the logic of capitalist unevenness lies in the struggle to 
achieve the optimum levels of production, marketing, and profit. Profit is by far the 
most important critermby which the success o f any development process is measured. 
To achieve maximum profits capitalists are continuously seeking the best balance 
between market demands and production capacities. And as argued in regulation theory, 
while the main objective of capitalism is accumulation and growth, this process of  
accumulation is itself uneven, being characterized by a continuous sequence of crisis and 
recoveries occurring in different sectors and scales.
The economic history of the industrialized world and, to a lesser extent, that of  
developing countries invokes different cycles o f investment and disinvestment, with 
certain places being developed at the expense and underdevelopment of others. Chapter 
two describes the main features of 30 years of economic development in the 
industrialized countries and how they influenced the development of informatics 
industries in the AICs. Likewise, Chapter Uhree illustrates different stages of 
development pursued by some o f the NICs to seize global opportunities to develop 
national informatics industries. All these accounts come to illustrate cycles of growth 
and decline that have shaped development worldwide.
Smith has identified different levels o f unevenness between capital and labour. 
To explain these levels he proposes a model that superimposes divisions of labour and 
capital. These differences are summarized in the table below.
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Table 1.1
DIVISIONS OF LABOUR DIVISIONS OF 
CAPITAL
OUTCOME TYPE
A
General division of labour
(e.g. between agriculture & 
industry)
Division of capital 
into 3 departments
Department I - 
means of production
Department II -
individual
consumption
Department HI -
collective
consumption
General societal 
division o f labour 
& capital into 
departments
town & 
country 
distinct 
ions.
B
Particular division of 
labour
(e.g. the sub-sectors within 
the general divisions)
Division of capital 
into sectors
(e.g. textiles, steel, 
airspace, 
electronics..)
Division of labour 
& capital into 
particular sectors
spatial
unevenness
C
Detailed division of labour
(e.g. distinctions among 
different work processes)
Divisions of capital 
into individual units 
(firms).
Divisions of 
capital between 
individual capitals
spatial
unevenness
Detailed division 
of labour within 
the work place
social
unevenness
Source: After Smith, 1984: 106-108.
In this table, Smith identifies three levels in which to observe unevenness. 
Differentiation occurs in all levels, however, these have both a social and spatial context 
to them.
In the first case, the general division o f labour has been historically determined 
by the division between agriculture and industry, with a spatial or territorial dimension 
found in the dichotomy of town and country. Given recent developments, this 
differentiation no longer holds true for many developing and developed countries. Also 
such a general scale is not fundamental in determining patterns of spatial differentiation.
The division of capital into departments has however, influenced territorial 
differentiation at an intra urban level. It remains, nevertheless, an insufficient 
explanation for why certain regions are developed and others are not. Amin tried to 
demonstrate the discrepancy between the less developed world and the advanced 
industrialized nations in terms o f a departmental division between the two. He gave up 
this analysis since concrete developments in some of the LDCs and NICs indicated that 
it was no longer possible to associate the latter as sole producers of department II
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goods, and the AICs as producers o f department I and III goods (Amin, 1974; Smith, 
1984:112-3). Above, in the review of Frank and Wallerstein it was also demonstrated 
that their conceptualization of dual systems no longer served to account for economic 
developments in many countries.
Differentiation is most obvious at urban, national and global scales at the level 
of individual and particular capitals. First, individual capitals concentrate and centralize 
in one place at the expense of others. Second, there is constant movement of individual 
capitals from one sector to another in order to maintain and increase the rates o f profit. 
This point will be discussed again later.
The last level, that of the detailed division of labour is a technical necessity 
dictated by the instrument of labour itself (Smith, 1984:109). Differentiation on this 
level is due to technical development of the instruments of production which contribute 
to a form of social differentiation and is generally restricted to the domains of the 
factory, or the work place. Although the detailed division of labour has little relevance 
to the macro implications of spatial unevenness, understanding it is essential to 
understand the geography of production. The specificities of the labour process vary 
from product to product and market place to market place cannot be transferred across 
borders or resolved by technological innovation.
Spatial unevenness is best perceived, therefore, at the levels o f individual and 
particular capitals. To further explain the continuous economic rise and fall o f regions 
Smith develops a framework based on Vernon’s product cycle theory (Vernon, 1966). 
Smith’s cycle, however, is centred on profit. This profit cycle is defined in terms of 
spatial dimensions of capital movement between sectors and regions of the world 
(Smith, 1984:113).
While the continued movement within and between different sectors of economic 
activity is a necessary condition to keep the rate of profit high, the concentration of 
many investors, capitalists^^resources in selected and deemed profitable sectors poses 
barriers of growth. Being in a situation of competition with other capitals (e.g., 
industrial sectors, products), investors are compelled to move avoiding the risk and 
reality of falling rates of profit. Since competition takes place at the level of individual 
capitals, for firms to survive in the market place they must always be alert to keeping 
up their competitive role. Technology becomes the crucial element leading individual 
capitals to seek new product and process technologies (that can be developed by them 
or appropriated to their own benefit), to set up and invest in R&D centres as a way to 
maintain their technological leadership. In sum, according to Smith, the driving force
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of capitalism, accumulation and growth, is a competition for survival of the fittest. 
Those countries equipped with capital, resources (human, natural, technical), will 
manage to stay ahead and those who are at a disadvantage will eventually lose.
Smith, however, abstracts from what he calls the "empirically messy historical
conditions upon which capitalism seizes, and in part produces unevenness" (Smith,
1984:155). This abstraction results then in a reductive position that overlooks the
particularities of history and geography, and that clearly sees no possibility for
development. He says:
"Empirically, however, and despite the dramatic industrialization that has 
taken hold in the 1970s in selected Third World economics, a general and 
sustained industrialization seems unlikely. This kind of restructuring is, so 
far, blocked by inherent patterns o f capitalist accumulation." (Smith, 
1984:158).
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
To conclude, this chapter examined different theoretical explanations of industrial 
development in the Third World. These theories: the development o f underdevelopment, 
capital internationalization and regulation theories have been selected and critiqued for 
their representativeness of each of these debates. They are not, however, the only 
theories that have dealt with the issues listed. They provide a small but relevant portrait 
of distinct interpretations of the development issue.
Some important themes emerge from this theoretical chapter which will inform 
the discussions developed in Chapters two to seven.
First, it is no longer possible to comprehend development in particular countries 
unless this is done in the context of a country’s political and economic links with the rest 
of the world. This international perspective put forward by the three theories reviewed 
in this chapter is evident throughout this thesis.
Second, studies of development should focus on the development of productive 
(economic) activities in the developing countries. A focus on production reveals ways 
to develop or to not develop social relations in a given country. Frank’s and 
Wallerstein’s work, although relevant in some respects have placed heavy emphasis on 
trade and commerce between regions. The emergence of the NICs in the latter part of  
the 1960s suggested that capitalism was developing on its own account in selected places 
within less developed countries in the world. These developments contradicted the 
interpretations of the development of underdevelopment thesis and demanded new 
interpretations of the processes. Relevant points of the technological evolution and
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production of computers were summarized in the Introduction. This focus on production 
is central in Chapters two and three which examine the experiences o f the AICs and 
NICs, and in the review of the Brazilian initiative in Chapter four.
Third, capitalism is ridden with crises and booms. The economic history of the 
past 100 years shows the rise and decline of regions, countries and economic activities 
throughout the world. These changes cannot be explained solely in terms of falling rates 
of profit and cost saving devices.
Fourth, an important theme permeating throughout this thesis is the role of the 
state in formulating and executing industrial development policies. This chapter states 
that no single theory can grip the totality and complexity o f processes occurring 
worldwide and in particular industrial sectors. New capitalist realities are embedded in 
a broad set of institutional and economic processes. They are manifested by new forms 
of social/economic organization tied to a system of nation-states, by changes in the 
existing international divisions of labour, and by an overall reorganization of industrial 
activities in both the developed and developing world. Both dependency theories, and 
the NIDL neglect the role o f governments in development. Regulation theory identifies 
the ways in which different national systems are influenced by global development. The 
framework offered in regulation theory is useful to analyze different forms of exchange 
between countries and TNCs, which are so important in the informatics sector. These 
articulations are used by countries trying to set up national informatics industries, it is 
used by those trying to position themselves in the industry’s division o f labour, and to 
maintain a level of independence (e.g., industrial, technological, market) from leading 
companies in the sector (e.g., IBM). Regulation theory also has some limitations- its 
macro-economic nature which does not explain how processes occur at specific localities 
and under specific conditions.
Fifth, another important argument made here is that most o f the industrial 
studies, and accounts of the Brazilian initiative, and for that matter, most of the 
literature on development o f informatics industry in the NICs, treat industrial 
development as an economic field void of a spatial dimension. Using Smith’s 
conceptualization of different levels of unevenness table 1.1 shows which levels are most 
directly related to spatial and social changes. According to him spatial unevenness, or 
the existence of regions with high concentration of profitable industries and of declining 
regions is explained by the continuous movement of capital from low profit sectors 
(e.g., electric industries) to high profit sectors (e.g., electronics production), and within 
sectors (e.g., from production of hardware equipment to the production of industrial
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automation machinery) following a capital profit cycle. Broader divisions such as the 
one between agriculture and industry and between departments (production o f public 
consumption goods and goods for individual consumption) can no longer be used to 
explain uneven development processes. Smith’s work on uneven development however, 
is set an abstract level. He does not see the possibility o f development in less 
industrialized countries.
The following chapters examine empirically the development o f Brazilian 
informatics looking at it from a global perspective. This global focus aims first to locate 
the Brazilian industry in an international economic context subjected to the vagaries of 
the world economy. Nearly half of Brazil’s domestic informatics market is controlled 
by TNCs. This is a significant proportion for a market o f an estimated value of 5.4  
billion dollars (SEI, 1989). Second, to complete this international perspective Chapter 
three reviews industrial developments in the NICs. Third, with an international 
perspective in mind, and the realization that global, national and local industrial 
outcomes are different manifestations of the capitalist process. Chapters four to seven 
analyze the Brazilian experience.
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CHAPTER II
II Informatics: An International Complex
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the main features of Fordism and three different industrial 
development regimes for informatics: an American one that started in the 1950s with 
the first internationalization strategies, a Japanese one that began to take shape in the 
late 1970s, and an European one, consolidated in the late 1980s primarily as a response 
to the growing Japanese and American presence in the European markets. The chapter 
also reviews the impact of changing patterns o f competition on labour markets and on 
industrial collaboration.
This focus on Fordism follows a framework developed by regulation theory 
focusing on the interdependencies of political, technological and economic issues in the 
development equation (Chapter one, section 1.4). It also looks at the position of large 
transnational corporations. TNCs are the major force behind internationalization. They 
determine the patterns of competition and in a way (particularly in the case of IBM) 
define the environment in which other firms operate (Morgan & Sayer, 1988).
The nature and significance of TNCs’ strategies to maintain and expand their 
share o f the international market in this sector and to transform the industry’s 
international division of labour is important in this process. In contrast with the NIDL 
thesis’ interpretation that TNCs’ relocation was essentially a cost saving strategy, it will 
be shown that these companies do not operate in isolation. Leading firms have been able 
to gain a grip on world market shares by relying on their national economic 
environments.
This chapter is the first of six which provides empirical evidence to support 
theoretical arguments outlined in the Introduction and in Chapter one.
Recapitulating, the Introduction presented the object o f study of this thesis - the 
uneven development of the Brazilian informatics industry and policy. To substantiate the 
argument that unevenness reflects both the nature of capitalism and the relationship 
between the Brazilian industry and that o f AICs, it discussed the role of technological 
change in industrial development, and particular technological features o f computer 
production. From the discussion it is clear that technology alone cannot explain the
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development of informatics worldwide. The driving force behind the development 
process is economic and the emphasis given in this thesis is on the development of 
productive activities (industries) and not on trade per se.
Chapter one reviewed theoretical perspectives concerning economic development 
and capital internationalization. Contrary to arguments put forth in dependency theory, 
industrialization in the NICs gives evidence of possibilities o f development of many 
parts o f the Third World. Theoretical interpretations of these developments are, 
however, problematic. The NIDL thesis overemphasizes the internationalization of 
capital as a means to save labour costs. It does not take into consideration the role of 
governments as actors in the development process. Regulation theory is centered on the 
role that states play in the development o f informatics industries and, on the economic, 
political and technological linkages (or non linkages) evident between these.
2.1.1 Structure of the Chapter
The patterns of capital internationalization in the global informatics industry have 
changed through time. Section 2.2 examines major technological and political events 
leading to the present structure of competition in the informatics industry.
Following the regulation approach, section 2.3 looks at the three distinct 
industrial regimes which have been used to promote the development of informatics in 
the United States, Japan and Europe, and focuses on the role of governments in 
designing strategies to meet their national needs for informatics.
Technological change and capital internationalization in this industry had a 
distinct impact on labour markets throughout the AICs. These changes are reviewed in 
section 2.4.
Section 2.5 focuses on more recent strategies pursued by governments and TNCs 
to maximize growth opportunities in an industry that has already reached a certain level 
of maturity. These new strategies include different forms o f national and international 
industrial collaboration schemes in R&D, marketing and production, and it is centered 
around the experience of the European Economic Community. Section 2.6 summarizes 
the main points o f the chapter regarding the development o f informatics in the advanced 
industrialized countries.
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2.2 Changing Patterns of Capital Internationalization
This section summarizes patterns of competition in the informatics industry for 
the past 30 years.
Patterns o f competition in informatics worldwide reflect shifts in the industrial 
and technological power among nations and regions of the world. These shifts or 
changes are the result of important developments in microelectronic technology which 
have affected computer architectures. These developments have been summarized in the 
Introduction and in table 1.1.
The development of the computer in the USA marked the beginning of the 
informatics industry. By the mid 1960s, American corporations like IBM and Burroughs 
began to internationalize and to consolidate their activities beyond national boundaries. 
Since then, these companies have transformed the structure of the informatics industry 
worldwide through becoming TNCs. (UNCTC, 1983a).
For 15 to 20 years, America’s development and growing control of the new 
informatics technologies brought different reactions in different countries (EEC, 1985). 
America’s industrial and technological power threatened Europe’s national industries. 
The emergence of new computer technologies in the late 1970s developed by American 
based companies happened at almost the same time as Europe’s geo-political and 
economic decline. Many European countries were experiencing problems of 
deindustrialization and job decline and loss, and of necessity they began restructuring 
their productive capacities in response (Gordon, 1988). As discussed in Chapter one the 
restructuring o f economies in the late 1970s and 1980s included both the 
internationalization of segments of the productive process (as labour cost saving devices, 
for example), or through the introduction of new management techniques, new 
technologies, and other technology intensive processes.
Informatics technologies offered many possibilities o f helping in the process of 
restructuring of European economies and at the same time informatics was regarded as 
a new and profitable sector for investment. To counter American expansionism, the 
European response was to put together different types o f industrial policies, as in the 
case of France in the 1970s (English & Watson Brown, 1985). Some o f these policies 
will be discussed below. However, even if  apparently powerful, these policies alone 
could not ‘re-industrialize Europe’. These countries had limited and/or inadequate 
industrial and technological resources for reindustrialization, and their internal markets
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were not large enough to compete with those of American corporations (Arnold & Guy, 
1986).
American industrial expansion afforded Japan the opportunity to capture the 
technology needed to develop its own industry. Starting with the consumer electronics 
sector, by 1970s the Japanese had destroyed American hegemony in the consumer 
electronics market by using different forms of technological transfer like reverse 
engineering and original equipment manufacturing (hereafter OEM) agreements. At the 
same time Japan conquered the American RAM (Ready Access Memories) markets in 
the early 1980s. In 1981, Japan consolidated its position as a major world competitor 
with the announcement of the 5th generation R&D project. (Arnold & Guy, 1986).
For the NICs, the expansion of American capital, which included that of 
electronics industries, had multiple effects. To a few countries it appeared to bring to 
an end the problems of underdevelopment and to trigger a process of industrialization 
and economic growth in these regions (Bernstein, 1979; Warren, 1980). However, to 
the vast majority o f Third World countries, including NICs, it made little difference. 
Capital in the form of foreign direct investment and TNCs was not free to and would 
not go anywhere. Internationalization was dependent on a particular set of political, 
economic and locational pre-requisites. American capital investments did relocate to a 
few East Asian countries. Another handful of Latin American countries joined the high 
tech development bandwagon. Chapter three explores in greater detail industrial 
development in these geographical locations.
A few years before the launching o f the Japanese 5th Generation project (late 
1970s), American industrial and technological hegemony began to reach the limits of 
its growth. This process of American decline is connected with a broader process of 
capitalist decline which has come to transform social and political economic structures 
worldwide (Bluestone, Harrison & Baker, 1981; Harrison & Bluestone, 1982; Martin 
& Rowthom, 1986). These transformations have been identified by two observers as 
part of the new historical realities o f capitalism emerging in the 1980s (Scott & 
Storper, 1986:3).
Following regulation theory’s concept of regime o f accumulation, Scott and 
Storper have analyzed the main features o f Fordism in the 1980s (see Chapter one 
section 1.4) and a possible transition to a post-fordist one in the 1990s. The transition 
from one industrial development regime to another is far from linear and varies across
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industries and countries. The rise o f a new model of growth or of a new regime of 
accumulation is also a point o f theoretical dispute in development literature (Castells, 
1989; Cooke, 1989; Harvey, 1989).
In what follows I summarize key issues that have affected capitalist development 
in the last decade. This summary will provide a global economic background for an 
examination (in the next chapters) of NICs and in particular of Brazilian industrial 
strategies and political choices regarding the development o f a national industry, and the 
flexibility (or rigidity) of the Brazilian model to accommodate global changes to its 
greatest benefit.
* From the late 1950s to the mid 1970s the world experiences an economic 
boom of global dimensions.
* This boom is characterized by a commitment to Keynesian macro 
economic policy and other mechanisms such as oligopolistic pricing policies and 
the eminence of a military industrial complex. The American case discussed 
below will reinforce this point (section 2.3.1).
* Contributing to the boom is the rise of many NICs as investment sites, 
the expansion of large world labour markets, the growth of internal domestic 
markets in the NICs and the development o f selected industries in the NICs. 
These processes have been theorized in the NIDL thesis in Chapter one.
* One of the boom’s most significant features is the internationalization of 
social and economic relations to an extent never before known. Many large 
industries relocate part o f their production activities to the NICs. Investment 
flows tend to favour AICs - AICs in direction rather than AICs - NICs, NICs - 
NICs and even less NICs - AICs.
* The very success of the boom creates the conditions which undermine its 
advance. Market saturation and industrial overcapacity both in the USA and in 
Europe are intensified with the rise of Japanese growth through exports. Falls 
in profit vary across industries and countries. Falling rates of profit force 
capitalists to seize new opportunities for growth which, according to Smith 
include turning to new industrial sectors that are more profitable, or creating 
new productive opportunities (Chapter one, section 1.5) Smith describes this 
process of capital movement between sectors and within sectors as uneven and 
as part o f a system that generates its own crisis (Smith, 1984).
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During the transition from boom to crisis TNCs relocation and 
investments do not necessarily lead to a real development o f indigenous 
industries in the NICs. Latin America reacts with the introduction o f a new 
round o f selected import substitution policies (late 1970s) to curtail TNCs 
activities inside national territories, as Brazil has done with informatics. A few 
years later (early 1980s) South East Asia matches export promotion policies with 
industrial and social polices to upgrade labour skills, to secure technological 
transfer (e .g ., through reverse engineering, subcontracting contracts) and to 
expand production beyond the boundaries of domestic markets (e.g., economies 
of scale).
Globally, the crisis is marked by the rationalization of production systems 
in old industries, which in many instances are followed by plant closures, job 
loss, and capital flight. The timing of this varies from country to country. 
Britain, the US, France, Italy and West Germany all experience differentiated 
forms o f economic and social stress. The NICs are affected by the same 
processes in the early 1980s, even Japan feels the crisis in the late 1980s (Martin 
& Rowthom, 1986).
Outcomes of the crisis vary significantly across industries and countries 
and reflect a process of capital reorganization to cope with declining and 
stagnant rates of profit. Opportunities for restructuring along Fordist lines 
include the intensification or extension of Fordist practices such as 
standardization, scale economies, higher wages and intensified consumption 
(Lipietz, 1982). Alternatively, restructuring along a post Fordist trajectory 
includes the development of new production processes based on economies of 
scope, flexibility, the use of new process and product technologies and new 
kinds o f international labour relations. It also includes new location demands. 
New versions o f foreign direct investment include both the establishment, and 
not only the relocation o f assembly plants and R&D centres, most inside the 
AICs. Both in Europe and in the USA, firms begin to engage in new industrial 
consortia consisting of project specific alliances and a greater commitment to 
collaborative ventures. These issues will be explored in greater depth at the end 
of the chapter (section 2.5).
For NICs and the Third World at large, the prospects for continued
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development are bleak. Some are faced with serious debt problems as a result 
of the oil crisis and the financing of their industrialization by private American 
and European banks during the 1970s. National productive systems, like the 
Brazilian one, reach a point of saturation and are in urgent need of restructuring, 
modernization and expansion (Barros de Castro & De Souza, 1985; Suzigan,
1989).
In the sphere o f the informatics industry, by 1981, during the peak of the 
crisis, Japan launched a project to push its participation in the technological 
race, the 5th generation programme to build computers and intelligent systems. 
Revolutionizing in two ways, the 5th generation project was based on the 
application of artificial intelligence which enabled computers to mimic aspects 
of human intelligence together with the application of parallelism to the design 
of computers. That is, a new system that allows machines to process larger 
amounts of information in parallel (Arnold & Guy, 1986:4).
The Japanese challenge, like the American development o f computers 20 
years earlier, triggered an unparalleled reaction world wide. American industry 
was shocked with the Japanese ability to close the technological gap, given that 
Japanese industry had been oriented towards economic, not military concerns. 
The American industry reacted with an equally powerful project ‘Star Wars’, as 
they became more aware of Japan’s growing industrial and geo-political 
importance.
Also in the 1980s, the European response came ‘en bloc’, as a result of 
the lack of success of many of the region’s individual efforts, leading to 
European realization that countries could not do much individually. ESPRIT and 
a series o f other European related programmes came to represent the region’s 
efforts to counteract Japanese moves. The EEC experience will be examined 
below (section 2.5.1).
For the NICs, however, the new technological perspectives in electronics 
and the overwhelming dominance of the international market by competing 
American, Japanese and European based TNCs came to threaten national hopes 
of reducing the technological gap, keeping their position in the industry’s 
international division of labour, and of gaining new market shares. Growing 
international competition puts at a risk achievements to date in selected NICs,
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calls for tighter articulation o f national interests with the international industry, 
and for the restructuring of some o f these industries (Dalapierre & 
Zimmermann, 1987). This will be demonstrated for the case of the NICs 
(Chapter three) that of Brazil (chapters four to seven).
* To conclude, technological, economic and political changes in the
informatics industry, changes in the world economy following the crisis of 
Fordism, and changes in geo-political power of nation states have affected and 
continue to impact upon the development of national industrial complexes. 
Countries that have been most successful industrially have been sensitive to 
these global changes.
New electronic developments such as the 5th generation project have an impact 
on the functioning of national industries, bringing new demands to existing competitors 
and to NICs trying to develop their informatics industries. It is clear that having a 
degree o f control over aspects of industrial and technological production processes is 
particularly important for countries trying to succeed in the informatics race. First, the 
rapidity of technological change calls for a continuous readjustment of policy to 
accommodate such issues as emerging industrial areas, new products, new markets, new 
consumer demands. Second, the informatics industry is an expensive industry. "The 
ability for countries to participate effectively in this industry is closely related to the 
amount o f money the players have at their disposal", thus, "small countries and less 
developed countries have difficulty in keeping up, and are obliged to develop 
specialized survival strategies or to bend the rules of the game" (Arnold & Guy, 
1986:6). Third, as a consequence of the previous two aspects, entry barriers are higher 
than ever, often above the capacity of single companies and sometimes countries to 
enter the informatics race.
Illustrating the above. Figure 2.1 shows the position of leading world 
corporations in four market areas in 1987. The basic structure of the global industry has 
been almost unchallenged for nearly two decades. American corporations, such IBM, 
have retained a firm grip on their market shares. Reflecting the latest technological and 
industrial developments, Japanese firms (e.g., Fujitsu, Hitachi, Nec and Toshiba) are 
now challenging the American hegemony. A separate list of the leading non-US 
companies indicates that among the top 20, eleven are Japanese, and two are from West 
Germany (Siemens, Nixdorf), one from Italy (Olivetti), one from France (Bull), one
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from Belgium (Alcatel), one from Sweden (Ericsson) and one from Switzerland 
(Inspectorate) (Datamation 100, 23/06/88).
The following section examines three different industrial development regimes 
that have competed from 1950s to the present for greater technological and market 
control of the informatics industries worldwide.
Figure 2.1
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2.3 Competing Industrial Development Models
2.3.1 The American Model -1950 to late 1980s
The electronics revolution began and developed in the United States through the 
activities of American firms inside and outside the national territory. A summary of 
technological developments in this sector is found in table 1.1 in the Introduction. The 
Americans explain the process of capital internationalization of American based firms 
as a result of natural market forces rather than a result of state led strategic plans 
(Cline, 1987). Not only do they claim not to have any form of industrial policy to
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coordinate economic activity within the country but they often accuse Europe, Japan, 
and even countries like Brazil of being guilty of strategic targeting o f their industries to 
the detriment of American interest in these markets (English & Watson Brown, 
1985:71). Liberal ideals, and what is defined as a ‘hands o f f  approach to the private 
sector, give the impression that the economy is self regulated by the invisible hand of 
the market (Cline, 1987:23) It will be shown, however, that the government has had 
a crucial role in promoting the development of a national informatics and electronics 
industry inside and outside the United States through its prioritizing of defence 
concerns.
It is difficult to separate America’s role in the informatics industry from that of 
its defence related activities. Defence is the major building block of the American 
economy. Since the base of government activities is centered around the issue of a 
national and international defence, and electronics and informatics can be used 
in both civil and military markets, government activity tends to spill over into the civil 
sector as well.
The importance of defence is so great that government strategies even have an 
extraterritorial dimension to them as a means to prevent the spread and diffusion of 
strategic technology to other parts of the world. This extraterritorial influence is 
enhanced by the spatial expansion and overwhelming presence o f American based TNCs 
a(L over the world, and by the criteria used to decide to whom they sell and license their 
technology and their products.
"The maintenance of a strong military-industrial complex acts as a channel for
(Keynesian) economic policy and underpins American foreign policy.
Technology superiority is a powerful economic and military weapon, so
American policy strives both to create advantage and to prevent it leaking away
through technology transfer." (Arnold & Guy, 1986:34).
Thus, US refusal to sell electronic technology to France in the 1960s prompted 
the French government to formulate specific policies to procure the technology through 
other means (Delapierre & Zimmermann, 1986). More recently, the American 
government banned the sale o f a Cray supercomputer to the University of London 
arguing that the machine could be used for purposes other than academic research 
(Financial Times, 18/05/87). The ban eventually was removed and exchanged for a 
guarantee that the computer would not be used ‘improperly’.
The distinction between defence and civil markets is important (Arnold & Guy,
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1986:34). The US government, represented by the Department of Defence (hereafter 
DoD), formulates very strict policies which are centrally coordinated and targeted at 
selected programmes. US Government R&D projects aim to develop entire systems 
(e.g., in aerospace), rather than single products or process technologies. The 
development of these complex projects demand financial, human and scientific resources 
that exceed the capacity and resources of single firms. Single firms are therefore brought 
together to produce whole systems.
The institutionalization of American military interests occurred in 1958 with the 
creation of Darpa (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency). Darpa’s main aim is 
to advance American technological frontiers. Darpa has various basic and applied 
research programmes under its supervision and a budget of US$ 864 million (1984) 
distributed between industry and academia. To achieve its aim, the agency controls some 
of America’s most prominent projects like SCP (Strategic Computing Program) the 
VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Programme), and SDI (Strategic Defence 
Initiative).
SCP focuses on artificial intelligence for military purposes. Launched in response 
to Japan’s 5G project, SCP’s major goal is to develop a broad base of machine 
intelligence technology as a means to increase national security and economic strength. 
(Arnold & Guy, 1986:40). VHSIC is also a programme to develop faster monolithic 
chips for military requirements. The DoD also formulated policies to encourage the 
semiconductor industry to research microelectronics, thereby reducing the amount of 
time needed to introduce new generations of chip technology into military systems 
(Arnold & Guy, 1986:40). The DoD also has large stakes in software initiatives. ADA 
programming language, for example, is part of a plan to unify the language in which 
military software is written. A special laboratory, the DoD’s Software Engineering 
Institute, was established as some 90% of the cost in embedded systems currently being 
developed for the DoD lies in software (Arnold & Guy, 1986:44). The last major 
programme, and by far the most publicized, is SDI, also known as "Star Wars". 
Planned to last five years, the plan has received US$ 26 billion in financial resources 
to develop a space based system to defend the United States against enemLss’ mter- 
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). To carry out these expensive projects, the DoD 
has the largest budget o f any government department in the world. According to Arnold 
and Guy the American government spent US$7,75 billion in 1984 and US$9,5 billion
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in 1985 in their weapon programmes, divided between both applied and basic research 
(Arnold & Guy, 1986:44). This demonstrates the extent of state commitment to 
industrial development related to broader strategic interests.
In the civil sector, on the other hand, where there is really no coordinated effort, 
firms are left to structure themselves according to on going market forces. This is where 
American views of the ‘hands o f f  approach becomes most visible. However, with such 
an extensive influence in defence related activities, it is very difficult for the civil sector 
not to be influenced by military concerns, and state regulation.
The civil industry benefits from activities in the defence sector in many ways. 
Trained engineers and technicians are often encouraged to move from government 
supported defence work to the private sector and vice versa. For example, the founders 
of Hewlett Packard (HP) started in the defence sector where they were employed by 
General Electric (GE). They left GE to form HP, a commercial enterprise that also 
depended on defence contracts during its formative years (English & Watson Brown, 
1985:70). Also engineers take with them ideas and solutions first developed for military 
purposes and make them commercially viable. Most American leading edge technology 
research is undertaken at the country’s top universities such as MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, 
Harvard, etc. These schools are civil environments catering to a great extent to military 
demands, and in a way are tied to them as most o f the projects are funded by the DoD.
The private sector is also a heavy investor in R&D. The best example is IBM. 
In 1984, IBM’s R&D budget totalled US$3.15 billion, over 7% of its total computer 
revenue for that year. Other firms like HP, DEC and ITT spent over US$ 500 million 
p.a. on similar activities (Hewitt, 1988:25).
The first phase of American electronics from the early 1940s to the 1960s was 
characterized by the formation of large electronic conglomerates with business interests 
well established outside national boundaries. By late 1950s the US had a well developed 
informatics industry. American informatics producers supplied over 70% of the world’s 
market for computer systems (Piragibe, 1986:32). Industrial spin offs were used both 
in the private and civil sectors. The importance attached to the defence-industrial 
complex secured the necessary resources to finance, coordinate and undertake substantial 
R&D activities. The national government provided a guaranteed market for American 
products through the Buy American Act and other forms o f subsidies (English & Watson 
Brown, 1985:76). These subsidies helped to cover initial overhead costs such as R&D,
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product and process development, and favoured the absorption of necessary learning and 
scale economies and consequent price reduction.
Challenges to the American informatics industry, already mentioned above, were 
not only external to the country. In the mid 1980s, despite all the resources that were 
made available to develop basic and applied research, the industry faced some internal 
problems. In the sphere of human resources, a shortage of faculty and doctoral students 
put at risk the American tradition o f basic research and leading edge scientific 
discoveries. Also computer engineering facilities in American’s leading research centres 
were considered already obsolete through the rapid pace o f technological change 
(English & Watson Brown, 1985:75). These factors led some to argue that American 
industry was no longer competitive and flexible enough to accommodate to changing 
patterns o f international competitiveness in this particular industrial sector. It was also 
agreed that to remain viable the US electronics industry would have to be restructured.
In sum, the American experience reveals a tight link between defence interests 
and the development o f electronics industry through liberal/hands off policies. 
Developments in military related R&D have led to most of today’s civil applications of 
products and materials and have determined research and development trends in the 
American industry. American corporations still retainan important position in the world 
industry, partly because of their existing strength, structure, level of internationalization, 
technological know-how and, last but not least, because o f the amount of financial 
resources they dedicate to R&D activities. But in spite o f these strengths, the challenge 
to the American electronics industry by the Japanese has led to questions about the 
government policies towards the industry, and necessitated a restructuring of strategies.
Japan, on the contrary, has exercised a more direct ‘hands on’ approach to 
manipulating national strengths and weakness to secure a very strong hold in world 
markets and to try to consolidate its model of economic growth in the world. The 
Japanese case is examined below.
2.3.2 - The Japanese Model -1980 -?
Economic and technological policies have been part of Japan’s development 
strategies for over a century; and the idea that the state has a legitimate role to play in 
development is also well accepted (Arnold & Guy, 1986:70).
In the 1950s post-war period, Japan found itself in a state of dependency on
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imports and local markets dominated by American TNCs. The alternatives to foster local 
indigenous development were:
a) Labour intensive types of industries for a country with a large population, few 
resources and little capital savings,
b) or the development of a capital and technology intensive industrial structure 
(Arnold & Guy, 1986:71).
The choice was for an active technology policy. This aimed to protect Japanese 
firms which were in a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis foreign companies. Later, 
these policies aimed to dismantle protectionist policies so as to encourage Japanese firms 
to compete internationally. The protectionist phase lasted almost two decades leading 
to the expansion of national groups, giving them the assurance of a captive internal 
market; and improving their competitive position internationally.
Central to Japan’s dynamic and effective approach to economic and industrial 
development is the agency in charge of the coordination of policy, M lTl (Ministry o f  
International Trade and Industry). MITI does more than just provide general and broad 
industrial policy. It is set up so as to cater for the specific needs of the electronics 
industry. State bureaucrats are in constant contact with industry, and they are familiar 
with and responsive to industry’s needs. (Arnold & Guy, 1986:77).
The first batch of state support measures consisted of restrictions on foreign 
through limiting foreign direct investment (the law concerning foreign direct investment 
of 1950), suspending joint ventures (the foreign exchange control law o f 1949), and 
restricting purchase preference to Japanese goods which was administered by JECC 
(Japan Electronic Computer Company) in charge of purchasing domestic products and 
leasing them to the market.
Technology acquisition remained the crucial issue in the country’s strategy. The 
government set up national R&D laboratories associated with MITI (Electro-technical 
Laboratory), and with MPT (Ministry o f  Post and Telecommunications), the NTT 
(Nippon Telephone and Telegraphy) R&D centres. The close relationship between the 
three agencies facilitates the acquisition of technologies and the execution of 
programmes. According to Arnold & Guy, Japan is one of the few countries that has 
been successful in adopting an infant industry policy (Arnold & Guy, 1986:83).
Today there is no formal protection o f the domestic markets. However, Japanese 
companies are very successful in export markets. They have led Japan’s economic
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recovery and today lead the country’s growth. Export activities make Japanese firms 
very competitive domestically. This high level of competition works as a barrier to 
potential foreign entrants that must be equally able to compete in the Japanese markets.
Government expenditure on R&D is not very significant in Japan. Since the war, 
defence related activities including defence R&D have been restricted to 1% of the 
national GNP. This constraint has affected Japanese’s economic strategy. To oppose 
concrete limits on how much is invested, Japan has historically given importance to 
other factors. For example, Japan produces 40% more graduate engineers than the US. 
To train them properly the country supports academic activities and together with 
industry provides the universities with funds for research. Mm’s bureaucratic industrial 
structure, on the other hand, encourages the relationship between university and industry 
on applied research. These strategies have included different forms of technology 
appropriation such as technological transfer, reverse engineering and manufacturing 
licensing.
In the first years of Japanese industrial policy, in the 1960s, MITI itself took the 
responsibility o f negotiating directly with IBM on patent licensing for Japanese firms. 
Ten years later M m  allowed greater technology transfer agreements between Japanese 
and other European and American firms, while it also made available results obtained 
from the governments R&D labs (Piragibe, 1986:70). Once some benefit was extracted 
from these arrangements, the country changed its strategy. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s Japan became a reputable OEM producer to take advantage of this effective form 
of subcontracting.
OEM producers make equipment which is not sold to the final consumer but to 
other producers who incorporate the parts intoihâirown systems and then market them 
with their own brand name. This arrangement allows for a degree of specialization to 
be achieved as the producer is not obliged to learn and specialize in the entire process 
of production of a complete system. As a supplier the firm receives from the 
subcontractor the necessary technological and technical support to achieve the quality 
and price ratio desired, while obtaining the necessary learning and scale economies for 
that particular component. Fujitsu started out as ao OEM producer of large mainframe 
computers for Amdahl, Siemens and ICL; peripherals to Memorex, and robots to 
General Numerics. The American firms DEC and Control Data have also been very well 
known OEM producers (Delapierre & Zimmermann, 1986:21).
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enables these firms to underwrite otherwise very expensive R&D and new product 
development costs. They are the pillars o f the Japanese economy.
Japanese firms and Japanese policies, however, have always been turned inward. 
In 1985 national companies carried on 80% of their business inside Japan (Delapierre 
& Zimmermann, 1986:51). And even so most o f the transactions were carried out in 
the realm of consumer electronics and semiconductors rather than informatics 
commodities p er se. The Japanese experience shows that under certain conditions (a 
highly favourable domestic environment for production and high value, low weight, 
mass produced goods) an export strategy may be superior to one based on foreign direct 
investment (hereafter FDI) (Morgan & Sayer, 1988). This also means that a lack of 
FDI, one of the pillars o f the NIDL thesis, is not to be seen as evidence of 
backwardness as other strategies have proved to be as powerful in securing capital 
expansion.
Strategies used by the Japanese government to extend the influence of Japanese 
corporations outside Japan were initially targeted to developing countries’ markets rather 
than to American and European markets. Japan linked its foreign aid programme to 
developing countries to commercial interests of Japanese firms, offering soft loans to 
underwrite the purchase o f Japanese goods. Japanese influence is quite pronounced in 
the Pacific rim region (recipient of 75% of total Japanese commercially tied aid), 
followed by Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
The choice to focus on the Pacific Basin has a strategic significance. Japan has 
a leading edge on the command of non-roman scripts of local languages and a deeper 
understanding of local culture, features which are yet too ‘foreign’ to many Westerners. 
Its leadership in the area is based on the control and development of technologies that 
can process information in those languages. Also IBM has a rather weak participation 
in the region (English & Watson Brown, 1985). This cultural and economic affinity is 
strategically beneficial to the formation, under Japan’s leadership, o f a regional Pacific 
block.
Most recently it is clear that there has been a change in strategies that would 
underpin the technological leadership so far achieved rather than concentrate on 
structural development. The Fifth Generation Computer Project is an example, which 
inspired reactions from both the United States (The Star Wars programme) and Europe 
(the ESPRIT and Eureka programmes).
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With the advent of a capitalist crisis o f world proportions in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, described above, Japan has also become more aggressive in its
internationalization schemes to include industrial investments in the AICs as a means of
pre-emptying protective barriers and minimizing battles in the GATT over trading
practices (English & Watson Brown, 1985). There is still great interest in OEM exports
as a means of increasing market shares and exploring new markets. Japanese
internationalization strategies also include setting up new production facilities within
major competitor’s markets (USA and Europe), as a means o f circumventing protective
barriers, and to gain access to new markets. This strategy also involves the reduction
of export activity and an intensification of activities directed towards international
standardization and co-operation in R&D.
These aims were spelled out in MITI’s Visions fo r  the 1980s and,
"stressed Japan’s need to reduce dependence on external energy sources and for 
basic research to underpin new industry. It identified five problems for Japan: 
an ageing society; lack of renewable resources; employment and human worth; 
primary and tertiary sector productivity; and integration into the international 
community. Knowledge based industry was seen as necessary to cope with these 
problems "(Arnold & Guy, 1986:75-76).
In sum, Japan’s success rests on its explicit approach to economic and industrial 
development which specifies targets for the Japanese industry, the training of Japanese 
labour, and the emphasis, notably from the mid 1980s to the present, on staying 
technologically ahead. The results of this determination are reflected in the growing 
importance of the Pacific Rim geo-economic and political region under the economic 
influence o f Japan. The country enjoys an unparalleled period o f prosperity and 
strength. To some, Japanese success alone explains much reshuffling of international 
political and economic scenarios and inter- and intra-regional relations.
2,3,3 European Approaches to Industrial Development
The issue of the technological gap between American and European TNCs gained 
momentum in the 1970s \  Europe recognized that America’s effort in R&D, product 
development and innovation in the area of electronics were gradually differentiating the 
American economic profile and the strength of the country vis-a-vis Europeans. The 
1970s were also characterized by a deepening of efforts towards internationalization of
 ^ See EEC publications listed in the bibliography EEC 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987.
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American firms in Europe, and their eventual control o f local markets. The process of 
internationalization of American firms into Europe compelled European national 
governments to exert greater intervention in their indigenous industries (Baudin, 1987; 
Webber et al., 1986).
National responses to American and most recently Japanese efforts to control the 
world production and markets of informatics goods vary enormously from country to 
country. Yet Europe, neither as a region nor individually (the region’s nation states), 
had the expertise in a wide range of technologies within the electronics complex, nor 
an internal market large enough to serve as a launching pad for European products and 
FDI (English & Watson Brown, 1985:81).
Not all European countries have local informatics industries. France and UK are 
medium sized entrants in the electronics and information technology race. Their 
economic resources are not sufficient to allow them to compete with countries like Japan 
and the United States; and yet not small enough to prevent them from developing their 
domestic industries.
In terms of their developmental approach, the United Kingdom has chosen the 
liberal free market strategy (Kelly, 1987). France relies on a centralist policy and on 
direct state intervention (Arnold & Guy, 1986:131). France and the UK are also very 
heavy investors in the development o f military industrial complexes. In 1980, the USA, 
France and the UK spent 47%, 40% and 60% respectively o f their government R&D 
funds on defence alone. Defence and aerospace together consumed even greater figures 
(64%, 49% and 65% by each of the mentioned countries) (Arnold & Guy, 1986:12). 
Other European countries are the home of very successful corporations in other branches 
of the electronics complex such as the Netherlands and Sweden and Italy (e.g., Phillips, 
Ericsson, Olivetti), while others are heavily dependent on imports (Portugal and Greece) 
or act as suppliers o f parts and components for leading TNCs (Spain).
European based informatics industries have never had a significant role in  the 
sector’s international division of labour. Trade and employment figures show the flow 
of commodities within the regions, emphasizing the importance o f regionally based 
TNCs in maintaining spatial monopolies inside their home countries, and the region 
occupies a secondary position in the international informatics complex. The following 
section briefly examines two European cases of France and the UK, and looks at the 
European wide experience, under the umbrella of the EEC, to illustrate recent European
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responses to both American and Japanese industrial strategies. 
a, France
France’s decision to invest in the development of a national electronics industry 
came partly as response to the increasing expansion overseas of US interests from the 
mid 1960s onward. Two factors determined government intervention in the process of 
economic development in this sector. First of all was the take over o f Compagnie des 
Machines Bull by the American General Electric in 1964 (Delapierre & Zimmermann,
1986). Bull was France’s national informatics firm. The second factor was US imposed 
restrictions on the sale of large mainframes to France’s Nuclear Commission Agency. 
These two underscored American superiority in the sector and the consequent growing 
French dependency on American products and willingness to sell these commodities.
Like Japan, France has had a long tradition of centralism in industrial policy 
(Piragibe, 1986). The nationalistic and interventionist nature of the country’s electronic 
policy is no exception to this. In 1966 was created the Plan Calcul, whose target was 
to boost computer production by providing and combining the necessary financial, 
scientific, technical and human resources. The Plan was institutionally coordinated by 
a Delegue a L ’Informatique which, in turn, was aided by the Commission Permanente 
de L ’Electronique du Plan (COPEP) and the Comité de Recherche in Informatique 
(CRI). The Thompson Group, a major leading French conglomerate coordinated the 
industrial side o f the programme. The Plan was scheduled to last five years (from 1966 
to 1970) with an operating cost of F726 m. (US$150 m.). A company CII - Compagnie 
Internationale pour l ’Informatique was formed in 1966 to engage in computer 
production, and two thirds o f Plan Calcul ’s resources (F 480 m.) were allocated for 
that. The government adopted a Buy French Policy and sponsored two other companies 
SPERAC (Systèmes et Périphériques Associes aux Calculateurs) responsible for the 
production of peripherals; and SESCOSEM in electronic components. Software 
development was centralized on the hands of IRIA (Institut des Reserches 
d ’informatique et d ’Automation) (English & Watson Brown, 1985:98).
During the 1970s further alliances between government and companies were set 
up. The failure of the first European collaborative task, the UNIDATA project, meant 
stronger partnerships between CII and Honeywell which culminated with a joint venture 
between CII - Honeywell and Bull where Honeywell supplied the technology for the 
production of larger machines. The government also developed other sectoially define
71
development plans: the Plan Mini-informatique (for minicomputers), the Plan Peri- 
informatique (for peripherals) and many updated versions of Plans Calculs. 
Semiconductors were looked after in the Mission pour les Circuits Intégrés with the 
Plan Composants. The strategy included among other things the association of American 
and French companies to obtain from the former the necessary know-how for the 
production of these vital components (Baudin, 1987).
France, of all European nations, went furthest into centralized planning to 
develop a national capacity in all branches of the electronics complex. Electronic sectors 
were identified as parts offilieres. The idea was built around the notion that all industry 
can be divided into a number o ffilieres. Each filiere represents a chain o f supplier-user 
relationships from primary goods to consumption (Arnold & Guy, 1986:132). As a 
result any measure to change a link within the filiere can have an impact on the others.
The filiere électronique is looked after under the Plan d*Action pour la Filiere 
Electronique and has US$ 20 bn. in resources for the first five years. It is an ambitious 
plan. It selected four companies to lead the development programmes in four strategic 
areas: CII- Bull is in charge of computer production. Alcatel is in automated systems 
and office automation, Thompson is in charge o f consumer electronics and Matra is in 
charge of the production of components. The goal is to make France the third leading 
producer of electronics after Japan and the United States (English & Watson Brown, 
1985:100). This ambition, however, comes together with a number of side effects. The 
two most obvious ones are scale and R&D capacity. France lacks in both. National 
market bottlenecks and lack of financial resources to fund stand-alone projects 
contribute to the problem of the technological gap. In order to catch up and compete 
with both Japan and the USA, France may have to consider moving towards greater 
collaboration and cooperation at the level of the firm within many o f the existing 
European collaboration schemes. 
b. United Kingdom
Great Britain’s leading company in the informatics sector was ICL. Created in 
1968 under the Wilson Labour Government in the Industrial Expansion Act, it was part 
of an industrial rationalization programme to create a large internationally competitive 
presence in the computer industry (Kelly, 1987:41). The company came into being after 
a series of mergers and acquisitions as part of a capital concentration strategy to oppose 
IBM’s hegemonic position in the field. ICL was also protected by government
72
preference purchases so that in 1974 it controlled 46.5% of the local market (Piragibe, 
1986:18)
The UK, in contrast to France, has opted for a more decentralized liberal 
industrial policy which is heavily backed by the country’s Conservative government. For 
over 20 years the government has supported a policy of decentralization in Britain and 
the pattern became particularly popular in the recession of the early 1980s.
Defence receives the greatest support in British government priorities as well as 
consuming the largest shares of government R&D funds (60% spent on defence). 
Defence related research is not as easily absorbed by civil spheres, as in the US context. 
Projects are very expensive and complex, and are supported through government 
procurement policies.
The United Kingdom has no centralizing agency to coordinate the country’s 
R&D activities. Institutional support and coordination of policy has been fragmented 
between many agencies. The Ministry o f Defence (MoD) controls development in 
defence electronics, the Post Office (PO) and British Telecom (BT) are in charge of 
telecommunications, while the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) deals with 
informatics production and final end users. At the same time during the 1970s the MoD, 
PO and BT have adopted a type of protective policy which shelters the large UK firms 
from direct international competition. During the 1980s, under the Conservative 
government, non-interventionist strategies and spending cuts have exposed national firms 
to greater risk. This transition from protection to liberalization has not strengthened the 
British position in the global industry. Like other European companies and sectors, the 
British computer industry experienced a decline in both output and employment. The 
emphasis on defence and telecommunications has also meant that other sectors could be 
and in fact are controlled by multinationals. IBM UK, Hewlett Packard, Texas and NEC 
account for a sizeable proportion of output and other microelectronic firms control the 
semiconductor sectors (Morgan & Sayer, 1988).
There are visible problems with the British liberal approach. The British 
electronics industry suggests that over decentralization - along with a lack o f product 
focus and excessive reliance on defence - is doing serious harm to the global 
competitiveness of leading national companies such as GEC, Ferranti, Plessey and 
Racal. The structure o f the local computer industry remains faithful to a late 1960s and 
early 1970s idea of focus on short term results rather than long term investments
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(Financial Times, 01/07/88).
2.3.4 Summary
To summarize, the discussion of the two countries above demonstrates the crucial
role o f the state in preserving national interests, resources and strategies, and the
multiplicity of options available to countries to do that. Constrained by small markets
and limited in financial, human and technical resources for more advanced R&D
activities, Europe stands a weaker chance of winning the technological race, and of
maintaining as individual national states a position in the international division of
labour. It has been noted:
" France and the UK are in the gap of a logic which states that whichever route 
one takes, the end point is always the same. All roads do not necessarily lead to 
M ecca.... The two countries have faced similar challenges and responded to 
them differently "(Arnold & Guy, 1986: 178).
As to Europe as a whole, the EEC option has turned into some kind of solution 
or alternative to a battle lost before it even began. To others, it is another sphere where 
national resources can be invested in the community. The case of informatics in the 
EEC is examined in section 2.5.1 below.
Changing pattern? of internationalization from the 1950s onward have given rise 
to three industrial development regimes in informatics under the leadership of the United 
States from the 1960s to the late 1980s, Japan in the 1990s, and a more inward oriented 
model of Europe from the mid 1980s on.
The task of developing technologically autonomous national industries is by no 
means simple. As illustrated above, a country’s choice of development strategy% y  
enormously and it changes with time. By and large, the United States and Japan have 
maintained a coherent approach to the development of their respective industries. In the 
US case this has been based on a liberal development focus of an industrial military 
complex where the country has managed to keep a lead in technological development 
and output, even though production is no longer as cheap and productive. In the 
Japanese case, it is based on a centralized and target oriented policy to include a broad 
range of interdependent sectors. Japanese firms have started out as a mere assemblers 
of parts and components, to become efficient reverse engineers, OEM subcontractors 
and world wide industrial competitors. Europe, in turn, stands on the edge. Individual 
nations have realized some of the financial and market shortcomings o f operating alone.
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Under the umbrella of the European Community, they hope to gain a better chance to 
protect European TNCs, and to maintain a place in the technological race.
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, technological change and capital 
internationalization have had an impact on labour markets in informatics and on the 
technical and spatial organization o f this industry worldwide. The next two sections 
move from a macro economic and political focus on the industry to examine uneven 
patterns o f development. Thelm ptof technological change and new forms of capital 
internationalization on labour is examined (section 2.4), and the ways developed 
countries cope with uneven development is reviewed (section 2.5). This discussion takes 
into account the changes in the world’s political economy described above (section 2.2) 
and examines contemporary strategies that are emerging.
2.4 Technological Change, New Forms of Capital Internationalization 
and the Labour Mark^
In the review of uneven development in Chapter one, I demonstrate^^^'^''1^ith 
that the movement o f capital between sectors and sub-sectors of the economy creates 
spatial unevenness. Technological change and shifts in capital internationalization 
strategies, both determinants of industrial development, have a direct effect on labour 
and employment. These changes have been the object of study in the specialized 
literature (Cho, 1985; Ernst, 1985; Elson & Pearson, 1981; Frobel, etal,  1980; Hewitt, 
1988; Kaplinsky, 1987; Sayer, 1988; Scott, 1987).
The purpose of this section is to illustrate patterns o f uneven development within 
the AICs. The technological developments from the 1950s to the present described in 
section 2.2 above, have deepened social and technical divisions of labour, calling for 
more diversified labour skills and workers to execute new functions created by new 
technical demands. These in turn, are spatially divided according to different social and 
technological endowments of regions and countries.
Capital internationalization strategies of the past 30 years have included the 
relocation of parts of the production process (e.g., assembly), the establishment of 
factories in the Third World and, to a lesser extent, the setting up of joint venture 
agreements with local producers. According to the NIDL thesis the relocation of 
assembly facilities has been linked to cost reduction. Setting up new factories offshore 
helped pre-empt protective barriers and to exploit local and regional markets.
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In what follows, I examine how informatics employment in the AICs have 
changed quantitatively (number of people employed in the industry); qualitative (changes 
in labour composition and organization) and geographically. Data and processes 
pertaining to employment changes in the NICs will be dealt with in Chapter three 
(section 3.5).
Hewitt has identified three basic trends affecting employment during the course 
of industrial development of informatics industries in the OECD countries. First, 
industrial expansion in the 1960s has been followed by an overall increase in jobs. 
Second, changes in products and processes followed by productivity gains have often 
caused jo b  decline and stagnation. Thiidly, international competition has resulted in 
shifts in employment across countries and sectors (Hewitt, 1988:38).
Trend 1 - Job increase. The first phase in the computer industry is characterized
by a continuous growth in electronics employment across OECD countries. Data
comparisons are very difficult to establish given distinct ways of defining and measuring
employment. In the United States there were 217,000 jobs in the computers and
peripherals sectors in 1974 and 385,000 in 1980. In the UK, employment figures were
68,401 and 75,825 for the same sectors and same years (Hewitt, 1988: 39).
oV
Qualitatively, the types and demand for labour at the beginning o f the computer 
industry are associated with R&D activities, systems development, software production 
and support interactive services to very specialized customers. The first large systems 
(e.g., Eniac, Univac I, IBM 7090) of generations one and two (see table 1.1 in the 
Introduction) were few in numbers^afmost custom made to fit specialized functions. The 
lack of an assembly line to speak of, and of the necessary scale to achieve 
standardization, perpetuated the importance of skill in the sector. The technical division 
of labour was restricted to conceptualization and almost batch production, where most 
of the work put into their production was geared to putting a system together, piece 
by piece, the search for solutions rather than the assembly of standardized parts.
In the late 1970s came the turn o f smaller machines. They were the minis,
micros, printers, disk drives and an array o f other support equipment to make computers
operational. The scale of these product innovations, the product range, the expansion
of markets, and the increased demand for mass produced computers (scientific or
were,
custom made products) reflected in labour composition, and in the
geographical expansion of computer markets and computer industries. New products
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brought a deepening of the technical division of labour in the industry. The growing 
demand for these products called for greater standardization of the production process 
into assembly lines, and these demanded less skilled assembly workers (Morgan &
Sayer, 1988:108).
According to Smith, changes in the technical division of labour do not 
necessarily have a significant spatial impact, they are carried out inside the work place 
and these create different forms of social organization (Chapter one, section 1.5). Thus, 
the spatial requirements of this period of increase in jobs were geographically restricted 
to the US and American firms. Industry had to be located where research and 
development could be done, and of course, where engineers and specialists work and 
live. Computer firms were concentrated in and around more traditional industrial areas 
of Eastern USA, encircled by the bulk and specificity of their products and markets. At 
the same time, firms like IBM and Burroughs had already expanded their commercial adivltie 
and factories to locations outside the USA (Bakis: 1977).
A deepening of technical (new processes) and social (new products) divisions of 
labour in the industry, followed by a growing strategic importance of informatics and 
its functions prompted governments to promote national industries, as happened in 
Europe. New processes and products lead to the possibility of separating the productive 
process into various stages of production and therefore, different production sites. This 
revolutionized the industry’s spatial patterns. Companies (mainly American) were free 
to move part of their operations to areas where the tasks could be performed most 
efficiently. The partial relocation from the US to foreign countries was viable. Starting 
with the American firms, off-shoring became a widespread practice among 
semiconductor firms from the mid 1960s onward, and for computer producers 10 years 
later. These spatial changes characterized the second phase, that of job loss and 
stagnation.
Trend 2 - Job decline, stagnation. The impact of technological change leading 
to new products and new processes in OECD based informatics industries was associated 
with job stagnation and or loss. Again using OECD statistical data on electronics 
employment, the US and most of Europe, suffered some form of employment 
stagnation and or loss. West Germany lost 30,000 jobs from 1974 to 1984 (Morgan &
Sayer, 1988:108). In the UK employment in the computer and peripherals sector fell 
from 68,401 to 66,865 between 1978 and 1983. Looking at total UK electronics
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employment, there was a loss of 64,391 jobs between the same years (Hewitt, 1988). 
Leading industrial firms also experienced similar processes. With new technologies and 
processes, production no longer had to be done all under the same roof. At the same 
time, higher production scales and the standardization of tasks demanded more workers 
to be involved in assembly activities (UNCTC, 1986). Increasing labour demands inside 
the AICs (e.g., higher wage levels, better working conditions, higher productivity) 
made employment inside the AICs for assembly activities very problematic.
Trend 3 - Shifts in employment. This phase comprised, in fact, two inter-related 
processes. First there was a surge of new labour markets associated with new 
employment demands resulting in the job increases of the first trend (UNCTC, 1986). 
These demands varied between the AICs and the NICs. In the AICs case, there was a 
growing demand for people to work in sales, maintenance, support, system support, 
software, and naturally R&D, in some ways like the first phase. In the second case, the 
NICs, the demand was by and large for a particular type of assembly worker. These 
consist mainly of young, single, ‘docile’ and ‘disciplined* females who could perform 
the tasks necessary for the tedious and disciplined assembly work (Hewitt, 1988). 
Spatial requirements in the AICs to satisfy changing labour demands were associated 
with a surge in investments in the most developed AICs countries, that is in the USA 
(e.g., Silicon Valley and Route 28) and less so in Japan. It was also characterized by 
growing investments in the less industrially advanced AICs, in places like Scotland, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal (Financial Times, 14/11/89). In 1988, over 72% of Scotland’s 
electronics output was produced by US based TNCs and a mere 12% of the inputs were 
sourced from within Scotland itself (Financial Times, 07/06/90). Data on these job 
creations are given in Chapter three below.
The second aspect of the phase was characterized by a change in labour demands 
and markets both inside the AICs and NICs. In the AICs, profit objectives and related 
technological innovations were not exclusively aimed at improving products, but 
included a number of solutions directed towards rationalizing and intensifying 
production processes. During the last few years, new competitive behaviour o f firms 
suggests that companies are finding within the AICs most of the elements that permit 
them to maintain their capital objectives and still enlarge their markets and raise their 
profits. In the AICs, this trend is manifested by the introduction o f automation, 
flexibility, just in time production facilities, economies of scope, etc. It also involves
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changes in employment composition. Between 1986 and 1988 IBM laid off 16,000 
workers and redeployed 21,000 others from purely administrative functions to higher 
skilled production and customer relations (Financial Times, 07/06/88). There is a wave 
of technological change paralleled by a phase o f capital mobility starting in the late 
1970s and characterized by the return of certain portions of the productive process back 
to the AICs.
In sum, technological change and profit squeezes have had an impact on the 
quantity and quality o f employment both inside the AICs and the NICs. Using Hewitt’s 
three trend model, employment quantum and quality suggest that AICs electronic 
employment has gone through 1) job  increase, represented first by a demand for high 
skilled engineers, and second, after standardization, for a rising demand for assembly 
workers; 2) job  decline and stagnation in the AICs specially among lower skilled 
workers as a result of the partial relocation o f production to other parts of the world; 
3) shifts in employment comprising first the creation of new jobs in the NICs and 
second, the transformation of labour demands and markets both in the AICs and NICs. 
In the AICs, there has been a trend towards automation of production processes in 
plants, and for the utilization of a particular types of workers to do the work (Cho, 
1985). In the NICs, there have been improvements in the skill levels, as has been 
demonstrated for the case of Brazil (Hewitt, 1988) and for a selected group of East 
Asian countries (Henderson, 1989).
In general terms these trends have at least two points in common. First, the 
consolidation of a divide between conception and production predominant in the second 
phase has enhanced the rigidities of the labour force at both extremes of skill level, and 
has emphasized the inflexibility and/or centrality of the labour force against the idea of 
a highly mobile labour. As has been argued in Chapter one, not only are companies 
restricted to where they could relocate part of their productive activities (taking into 
account the specificities of the labour force required to perform such tasks, and the 
concern over a whole set of externalities associated with political stability and national 
government support against possible unionization movements), but they also face 
constraints over where to locate R&D centres, and even market outlets. Front end 
activities (e.g., R&D, management, marketing) are readily available predominantly in 
the most developed industrial areas o f the United States, Japan and selected European 
countries, where one also finds well endowed research centres, complementary policies
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and funds to carry out R&D work and pay the increasingly higher wages demanded by 
top scientists.
Secondly, and equally crucial, the split of the labour process between 
conceptualization and production indicates that the crucial social component o f  
technological development remains in the developed nations. Parts of an already 
fragmented production process are transferred to developing countries. The new 
industries find it difficult to learn and absorb the technological process, and they lack 
top quality training centres and universities to produce future scientists. Table 2.1 
describes the nature of the DDL in informatics by identifying the types of activities 
developed by leading TNCs in countries other than their own. Although R&D activities 
tend to be concentrated in the AICs and assembly in the NICs, some Latin American 
and East Asian countries have succeeded in getting something more than another branch 
plant located in their national territories. Along these lines, it will be shown in Chapter 
three that some developing countries have managed to acquire some productive expertise 
in informatics, and within the group o f the NICs these countries distinguish themselves 
as indigenous producers o f informatics goods and not simply assembly sites for these 
goods.
The table also demonstrates the extent o f internationalization of manufacturing 
plants throughout the Third World. American firms have a pattern of 
internationalization that is quite pronounced, to a lesser extent so do European and 
Japanese competitors. In Western Europe ten of the firms indicated have assembly 
activities inside the region and three others are European based (indicated by m). Asia 
comes second with seven TNCs branch plants followed by Latin America with six. This 
list is not comprehensive and reflects 1986 data for computer production only. Since 
then companies have already restructured their geographical positions.
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Table 2.1
International Division of Labour in Informatics Production 
Selected Companies and Locations
Geo. Location USA Europe Japan Latin
America
Middle
East
Asia Other
IBM X @#m @#m @#m Om 0#m ®#m
DEC X @m - @ - - -
Burroughs X @#m - m - #m m
NCR - X #m - - m -
Sperry X m ®#m m - m -
H Packard X ®#m - m m - m
Fujitsu m m X - - - -
ICL @#m X - - m - ®#m
Olivetti @#m X - m - ®#m -
Wang X m - m - m m
NEC - ®#m X - - - -
Xerox X m - - - - -
Nixdorf @#m X#m - - - -
Data General X - - - - m -
® - Research & Development m - Manufacturing X - Home base
- Software Develop, System analysis 0  - Local Adaptation of product 
Source: CEREM in Delapierre & Zimmermann (1986:56)
This section illustrated the uneven development within the AICs. These 
unevenness is expressed both in the type and quantity of labour required and involved 
in the labour process as well as the spatial configuration of informatics in the AICs. The 
next section discusses one strategy to cope with uneven development, industrial 
collaboration.
2,5 An AICs Perspective on Uneven Development
This chapter first outlined the main features o f Fordism in the 1980s, and then 
described the possibilities for and constraints faced by AICs’ governments in 
formulating policy and shaping industrial development in accord with national priorities. 
One of the constraints faced by governments derives from the resources required to 
undertake their ambitions. These include not only the ownership of leading edge
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technology but of all financial, technical and human resources to develop it.
The industry’s features, together with a growing technological convergence have 
a crucial bearing on the need to internationalize production. These present technical and 
economic pressures are not governed by strict market or economic forces. They 
symbolize the coalition of economic and political forces together over determined and 
selected world regions.
The market expansion strategies of leading firms in AICs varied greatly 
according to particularities of different sectors, products, policies and so on.
Capital internationalization is very evident in the informatics industry through 
the operations of TNCs. Dependency theorists, in turn, have focused on the commercial 
expansion of capital through trade. The NIDL theorists have linked the 
internationalization of productive capital with labour cost saving strategies. Smith 
explains capital internationalization as part o f a profit cycle where capital moves across 
and between sectors to overcome declining rates of profit and constraints on 
accumulation. In addition to these justifications capital internationalization can occur as 
a result of:
1. Technological convergence
2. Shrinking product life cycles
3. Overriding R&D costs
4. Smallness of individual national markets
To overcome these constraints on growth characteristic of the informatics and 
other electronics industries companies and governments are seeking alternative solutions. 
One which deserves particular attention is industrial collaboration both at a national and 
international level and aiming at achieving greater control of R&D production and 
market aspects of this highly competitive global industry.
International industrial collaboration amongst different partners is one option 
available to industrialists to overcome falling rates of profit. The driving force behind 
all these patterns of internationalization is capital accumulation, not technological change 
and diffusion on its own, and major companies cannot expect to survive and continue 
to accumulate capital while remaining within the confines of even large domestic 
markets. International collaboration as a new form of internationalization is here 
defined as an emerging form o f  capital organization to optimize production activities 
where different national capitals join together efforts to produce commodities. Their
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partnership is nevertheless based on industrial capacity and mastering of specific 
techniques rather than on labour costs (Financial Times, 23/05/87). The following 
section examines the main features of international collaboration.
Industrial collaboration experiences are primarily focused on R&D activities 
among different companies, companies and research centres and amongst different 
countries. Spatially these collaboration schemes are, in contrast to setting up assembly 
lines at cheap labour cost sites, largely confined to the AICs. These partnerships 
amongst leading firms and leading economies, reflect a degree o f centralization and 
concentration in the industry in the AICs.
Second, there is a critical and yet unclear boundary between pre-competitive and 
market oriented research. Current R&D programmes restrict themselves to the first type 
of investigation often to avoid the complications amongst project participants regarding 
the ownership of technology, the implications of the potential strategic value of 
discoveries, and the right of industrial patents.
Third, partnerships are usually established on the basis o f similar capabilities 
between members in expertise, size, technical, technological and human skill capacity, 
and R&D budgets are often designed on a shared costs basis (EEC, 1985).
Fourth, programmes are deeply tied to some form of governmental institutional 
structure. Those bureaucratic structures tend to be quite rigid and cumbersome. Decision 
making is diffused through a complex institutional web of public laws and regulations 
that if not well coordinated, can compromise the success o f entire projects. State 
intervention can be in the form of active participation in the R&D programme as a 
financier, supervisor or active participant.
Fifth, programmes are opened to industrial participants as much as to universities 
and other research bodies as a means of reducing the institutional gap between the two.
Sixth, international cooperation is a way to overcome the smallness of local 
markets (as is the case in Europe) and to overcome export restrictions on potentially 
new foreign markets (which is now very clear with the efforts of American and Japanese 
based TNCs to become partners in European inspired cooperation programmes).
Lastly, the new forms of industrial-state cooperation place a lesser importance - 
-or even none— on the search for exploitable low wage labour power as a means to 
increase profits. In contrast to other forms of capital flight which rely on low skilled 
and cheap workers, the type of labour involved in R&D programmes is of a highly
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skilled and highly priced nature.
Of the three regimes of industrial development reviewed here in this chapter, the 
European Commission experience with industrial collaboration is the most developed 
and complex. The following section reviews the European industrial development 
strategy based on different forms of national and regional industrial collaboration. This 
strategy is one way to cope with Japanese and American technological and market 
attacks on Europe.
2.5,1 The European Economic Community
The EEC, created almost 35 years ago, comprises 12 nations and a regional 
population of some 335 million. Its participation in the international division of labour 
in informatics is very much restricted to isolated successes by national champions acting 
in their local and regional markets. The EEC national champions are: ICL (UK), Bull 
(France), Olivetti (Italy), Nixdorf and Siemens (West Germany) and Phillips 
(Netherlands).
Section 2.2 above suggested that European companies lacked the resources and 
capabilities to undertake programmes that could compete with Japanese and North 
American leaders on R&D expenditures. This problem is exacerbated by the highly 
competitive and segmented European market. To overcome problems associated with 
very small individual national markets, limited national budgets for science and 
technology, uneven and uncoordinated local industrial policies, and differing technical 
standards, European based companies opted to merge efforts into a single pool of 
financial, technical and scientific skills. In this sense European firms were the first in 
the world to foresee the necessity of and potential regional benefits of industrial 
collaboration and cooperation.  ^ The reasons behind the cooperation option are 
reviewed below.
Industrial performance in the late 1970s showed that most European informatics 
firms were doing quite poorly. Over a 20 year period the exports of high technology 
from the Community fell from 190% to 110% (1983) (EEC, 1985:1). American based 
TNCs retained large chunks of the region’s market for mainframes and related 
equipment. These circumstances prompted some forms of reaction from Brussels and
 ^ See literature on the European experience including EEC, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1984, 1985, 
1987.
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from the industry.
"Europe launched the first two industrial revolutions: is it now missing out on 
the third? Can Europe be satisfied with its continuing domination in medium 
technology products when the newly industrializing countries of Asia and Latin 
America are ready to take over? Must Europe meekly accept the brain drain to 
the United States and let Japan take over its market shares?" (EEC, 1985:3)
Three motives inspired action: the un-competitiveness of the European
informatics industry, the importance of economies of scale and the ensuing need for the
European informatics industry to act together in innovative technologies without
restraining intra-regional competition. However, being a supra state organization, the
EEC has negative and positive points. Getting 12 member countries to cooperate
effectively has not been easy considering differing industrial policies, different technical
standards and nine major languages. Also the Community is subject to substantial
limitations on how it can intervene in industrial policy. To get around these difficulties
that EEC chose ways of achieving industrial objectives through regional development
and industrialization programmes.
On the positive side, the community as a whole is a very large home market for
European firms. The convergence o f some of the leading economies yields the EEC
producers an economic entity as big as Japan, able to compete face to face with
American and Japanese leaders. Together, the region has a diversified technical and
scientific capacity, a mature and widely developed industrial base, geographical
proximity to all of its members, and the political will to engage in cooperation. The
community has a number of multilateral projects to cover a wide range of the spectrum.
The leading EEC programme for industrial development is ESPRIT: European
Strategic Programme of Research in Information Technology (EEC, 1987). Figure 2.3
below shows the distribution of resources amongst the various R&D programmes and
the importance given to informatics which take up 58% of the total (UK, DTI, 1987).
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Figure 2.3 EEC R&D Resources
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The ESPRIT programm e was created in 1984 to be the centrepiece of the 
European Community Technology Policy. Designed to make a contribution to the 
survival o f the European informatics industry which was in danger o f being crushed by 
American and Japanese competition, the programm e also had a political function, to 
bring together different governments into cooperative research, and to spread the idea 
of trans-border collaboration and the development o f leading edge technologies (Baudin,
1987). Today, after six years o f its existence, it has a recognized success and serves 
as the model for both RACE (Research in Advanced Communications in Europe) and 
BRITE (Basic Research in Industrial Technology for Europe) R&D efforts in the related 
informatics fields (EEC, 1987; UK, 1987).
ESPRIT, planned to last 10 years, comprises R&D projects in five selected 
areas: microelectronics, software technology, advanced information processing (AIP), 
office systems (OS) and com puter integrated manufacturing (CIM). This preoccupation 
with all sectors o f the electronic complex or the filiere électronique that the French 
envisioned, predominates in the experience o f all the European industrial and research 
consortia. All the research must be done at the so called pre-com petitive level. This has 
facilitated the design o f very specific and clear rules o f participation and evaluation of 
proposals. It also helps the overcoming o f barriers in pre-m arket projects development.
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In terms of budget, the first programme phase, from 1984 to 1988, received a 
total of ECU 1500 m., 50% of which ECU 750 m. came from the research budget of 
the Community and the remainder from a shared cost scheme between participating 
partners. A total of 1061 proposals were presented by 1986 and 201 got underway in 
the five technical areas. 142 produced concrete results, 44 are still under development, 
and 44 were transferred outside the programmes (EEC, 1987). The second phase of 
ESPRIT has an estimated budget of ECU 3.2 b'n.The previous five technical areas have 
been compacted into three: microelectronics, software and applications (English & 
Watson Brown, 1985:119).
Companies can participate in the ESPRIT programme in cooperation with 
universities. In order to participate industrial enterprises must be involved in informatics 
and carry out their activities within the European community. From 1984 to 1988, 420 
different participants from industry, universities and research institutes have participated 
as partners in projects, o f these there were a total of 240 different industrial partners, 
and 60% of the projects funded included firms with less than 500 employees (SME’s) 
emphasizing the support given to smaller industrial outfits. Project members are 
organized in 201 consortia with an average size o f 5.1 partners per consortium, a figure 
that included also non-industrial partners who participate in 150 of the 201 projects 
(EEC, 1987).
ESPRIT’s objectives have been to boost cross border cooperation, to develop 
new technologies, and to create EEC wide standards. Further, ESPRIT aims at 
concentrating research efforts on the development of powerful processors, on creating 
comprehensive world standards for software, and designing a set of common European 
procedures to achieve the necessary flexibility and fluidity in information between 
different equipments, systems, and activity areas as well as to prepare an European 
platform for standards negotiations. In Oct 1985 the first review report declared that 
"ESPRIT had been highly successful in promoting cooperation between large and small 
organizations and between industry, academia and research institutes" (UK:DTI, 1987).
Bearing in mind the broad programme objectives, the ESPRIT scheme has been 
able to provide value above and beyond that which can be achieved by national 
programmes or isolated R&D actions taken by individual firms and individual nation 
states. The British government has recently extinguished its national informatics 
collaboration programme — ALVEY, for its duplication of technical area research
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pursued by ESPRIT. Furthermore, the programme draws to itself previously scattered 
resources both in labour and financial terms; it provides an increased choice o f options, 
it accelerates research and its exploitation, which is of particular relevance in a sector 
of fast technological development and short product life cycles, and together with EC 
policies it finds a favourable environment to translate R&D into economic success.
To conclude, the implications o f these more recent trends of capital 
internationalization are very hard to measure. International collaboration and product 
based industrial consortia is one among many other ways capital has at its disposal to 
maximize rates of accumulation. Experiences within the AICs suggest that collaboration 
and cooperation offer new opportunities to countries and regions wishing to enter 
technologically intensive industries like informatics. These initiatives have not yet taken 
place in the NICs. Their experience will be discussed in Chapter three.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter centered on the global scale o f the informatics industry focusing on 
three main issues: the global economy, economic growth models and the uneven impact 
of the first two on technology, labour and industrial organization in the AICs.
First, the chapter examined the main features of capitalist crises and booms from 
1950s to 1980s during what regulation theorists called a Fordist regime of accumulation, 
and how Fordism has affected the development o f informatics industries in the United 
States, Japan and Europe.
Second, three growth models were reviewed. The first model, headed by leading 
American transnational corporations, dominated the world from the 1950s to the late 
1970s. American strategies and solid investments in military R&D influenced 
governments and companies outside the United States to formulate their own national 
development strategies. Japan emerged as an international competitor to the US in the 
late 1970s and it has kept a firm control o f technologies in many sub-sectors o f the 
electronics complex. In response to American and Japanese strategies a few European 
countries have developed national informatics policies and industries. However, 
ridden by economic decline in the late 1970s and 1980s, European companies and 
governments sought new ways to gain control of their national markets and to support 
regional developmental efforts through collaboration and cooperation. Lastly, the chapter 
examined the impact o f Fordism (and the crisis of) on technology, labour markets and
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industrial organization.
The review of Fordism illustrated the changing character o f the global 
economy. Changes in the global economy have affected the industry’s international 
division of labour over the past 40 years. Behind the global economic scenario lies 
government’s concerns. The state acts by designing policies that respond to a country’s 
needs. It has been shown here that policy options designed in support o f informatics 
industries worldwide range from a liberal ‘hands o f f  approach of the Americans, to a 
more specific and centralized planning structure o f the Japanese model.
This chapter has shown that both the global economy and the state have had an 
impact on technology development, labour markets and industrial organization (including 
new spatial arrangements). Of extreme importance is the finding that the informatics 
industry in the AICs is not homogeneous.
To demonstrate the unevenness of this industry in the AICs this chapter focused 
on the relationship between industrial development and employment.
In the first instance, during informatics’ infant industrial phase, firms were concentrated 
in the US. American corporations retained the control over technologies and 
technological trajectories. Their labour demand was for highly skilled and capable R&D 
personnel.
Secondly, with standardization and product diversification, there was a rising 
demand for less skilled labour. Rising labour demands conflicted with emerging labour 
needs. Inside the AICs this demand can be met with the redeployment of personnel from 
more administrative and less skilled production functions to higher skilled production, 
R&D, consumer support division, or it can be met with employment o f emigrants to 
work in sweat shops. Companies were also freer to relocate parts of the production 
activity to other parts of the world. To cope with profit squeezes in the AICs, the 
relocation alternative was also a way of countering increasing production costs. 
Concurrent with price cuts relocation brought a split of the production process between 
production and conceptualization which in fact meant that the crucial social component 
of technological development remained in the developed nations. This will have a direct 
impact on the sustainability of informatics industries in the NICs. Parts of an already 
fragmented production process are transferred to developing countries.
A third possibility has been associated with shifts in employment and a growth 
in the labour markets in the AICs, represented by a renewed demand for skilled
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personnel. As the industry grows mature in the new sites, and provided that states 
actively participate in the development process, a change in labour demand is expected. 
These changes in demand may include the introduction of automation both in the AICs 
and NICs, and a surge of FDI inside the less developed areas of AICs, and isolated, but 
significant patterns of plant closures in the NICs. The discussion on labour markets and 
spatial arrangements reiterated the uneven features of this capitalist industry. In the 
quest for a continued expansion, following what Smith dexribcs^^necessity of capital to 
overcome its own tendency to differentiation through competition, capitalist firms and 
states seek strategies to mediate these inequalities.
This chapter also discussed new strategies of industrial collaboration focusing on 
the experience of the EEC and argued that recent trends towards multilateral cooperation 
is one way capital has at its disposal to get around bottlenecks of accumulation.
The position of the NICs in the global economy, and in the technological and 
market battle between American, Japanese and European TNCs is not entirely 
promising. Chapter three below examines the implications of AICs’ strategies for the 
development objectives of the NICs, still within a global framework o f analysis.
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CHAPTER III
III Articulating with a World Logic: 
Informatics in the Newly Industrialized Countries
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the development of informatics industries in selected 
newly-industrialized countries in South-East Asia and Latin America. The chapter 
complements Chapter two in providing the international background against which the 
Brazilian experience is compared in Chapters four to seven below. ,
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, in Latin America; Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, India and China in 
Asia have all developed national informatics industries. Most of these industries have 
been studied individually or as a part of comparative industrial studies (Adler, 1987; 
Breheny & McQuaid, 1987; Correa, 1988; English & Watson Brown, 1985; Grieco, 
1984; Humbert, 1986; Okot-Uma, 1990; UNCTAD, 1978; UNIDO, 1985). Other 
studies focus on the political economy of industrial development in these regions (Cho, 
1985; Delapierre & Zimmermann, 1986, 1987; Henderson, 1989, Scott, 1987, 
Zimmermann, 1986).
The data available about the experiences o f developing countries in creating 
national informatics industries is scattered and not easily comparable. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to examine existing national policies used to develop local informatics 
industries in terms of technological development o f these industries, changes in the 
labour markets, and the relationship between industrial and regional development 
policies that have come in parallel to the development o f informatics in these countries.
Summarizing previous discussions. Chapter two illustrated that AICs 
governments have taken an active role in the development and internationalization of 
informatics industries. The review of the three regimes v focused on important links 
between political, technological and economic issues permeating the development of 
informatics industries in those parts of the world. The chapter also focused on the role 
of TNCs. These TNCs have been given the support and backing of their home states 
which facilitate the control of technological trajectories and world markets. It was also 
indicated that the development of informatics industries in the AICs was not a
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monolithic or homogeneous process, but an uneven structure of producers and 
consumers located in developed and underdeveloped regions inside and outside these 
countries.
In the review of global economic trends and following the proposition o f the 
regulation theory, the main features o f Fordism were summarized over the last 30 years 
and the cycles of booms and crises o f capitalist development, explained. The informatics 
industry emerged first in the United States and has experienced a fast growth rate in the 
US, Japan and Europe in spite of periods o f economic crises in all these three regions. 
This process o f growth has extended beyond the AICs to include many NICs. Industrial 
expansion into the NICs has been linked to the relocation o f TNCs operations beyond 
national boundaries; to the existence o f adequate industrial policies targeted at this 
sector, and through the emergence of national companies seeking high risk and 
potentially high rates of return in these new industrial sectors.
Chapter one compared and contrasted different theoretical interpretations of Third 
World industrialization highlighting the one-dimensional view of some o f these theories. 
In the case of dependency, development takes place in more advanced countries at the 
expense o f the perpetuation of underdevelopment elsewhere. Developments in the NICs 
and the emerging complex regional divisions of labour inside South-East Asia contradict 
these interpretations of the dependency school. This theory is, therefore, not appropriate 
to explain developments in the NICs.
The NIDL thesis focuses on growth and on the relocation o f productive capital 
from the AICs to the NICs. Predominant through the 1960s and 1970s in the textiles 
and electronics sectors, this process of internationalization was heavily based on cost 
reduction strategies (e.g., cheap labour markets) (Chapter one, 1.3.2) pursued by TNCs, 
and not on local initiatives and strategies for sustainable development. In addition, these 
two theories underestimate the role of the state in shaping the development process, and 
the role o f national capital and its vested interests in the industrialization o f their specific 
countries (Chapter one, 1.4). Regulation theory offers a framework of analysis centred 
on the role o f the state and on a broader set of criteria to explain and measure 
development. These are helpful in understanding complex developments both in the 
AICs and NICs.
Chapter one also discussed the uneven nature of development linked to the nature 
of capitalism and pointed out how it has been overlooked by the literature. Unevenness
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is both geographical and social. The concentration of individual and particular capitals 
in selected economic sectors and parts of the world depicts a cyclical process of 
capitalist accumulation characterized by crisis and boom. The latter is expressed by 
different production processes, levels o f labour skills, and organization inside factories 
and offices in and between industries located in the NICs and AICs. The discussion 
about the experience of the NICs in developing national industries in this chapter will 
illustrate these points.
3.L1 Structure of the Chapter
The chapter has seven parts. After this introduction section 3.2 examines the 
position o f the NICs in the global informatics industry. Section 3.3 reviews the role of 
governments in developing policies to support these industries. Section 3.4 focuses on 
technology transfer. Section 3.5 examines changes in labour markets and employment 
in this industry. Section 3.6 reviews regional development policies that have been 
developed together with or parallel to policies to foster the informatics sector, to 
maximize industrial development in these countries. These include science parks and 
special development zones. Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
3.2 The NICs and the International Division of Labour
Different countries have used different development strategies to support 
industrialization, which as stated in Chapter one, is a precondition for economic 
development (Chapter one, section 1.2). The uneven pattern o f development inside the 
Third World calls for a more focused classification of countries according to some 
common denominators.
Ernst & O’Connor have identified the NICs using a broad set o f criteria which 
is appropriate for this study. These criteria include the size and structure o f demand for 
industrial products and related services; the share of industrial manufacturing in gross 
national product, industrial structure and firm size; backward and forward linkages, the 
existence o f subcontracting networks; the sources of technology; the role of the state and 
lastly the international competitiveness. Their classification of NICs is fivefold 
embracing:
i. First-tier Asian NICs: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan;
ii. Second-tier Asian NICs: Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand;
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iii. Large Latin American Economies: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina;
iv. Next tier Latin America: Chile. Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela;
V. Quasi continental Economies: China and India (Ernst & O’Connor,
1989:11).
These definitions do not attempt to equate countries to each other specially when 
the differences between them outweigh their similarities. They do provide, however, a 
background against which to analyze the performance of countries and regions vis-a-vis 
each other, and set the context for an analysis of the Brazilian experience.
As mentioned in Chapter two, the 1970s were a period of turmoil and transition 
for the world economy. Following long, post war expansion, gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth in industrial countries became more erratic. For the decade as a whole 
it declined to 3.1% a year compared with 5.0% during the 1960s (World Bank, 
1988:13).
In the so called Third World, the situation was more complex and intimately 
linked to events taking place in the AICs. Between 1964 and 1983, for example, Brazil, 
Mexico, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan increased their share of total market 
economies’ GDP from 3.5% to 6.2%, and of manufacturing value-added from 3.1% to 
6.6% (OECD, 1988). The economic output of these six NICs together grew at an 
average annual rate of 8.4% between 1964 and 1973, falling to 5.3% between 1973 and 
1983 (Financial Times, 1/08/88). This compares with a 4.1% and 2.1% growth in the 
OECD countries for the same periods (1964-1973 and 1973-1983). This relatively strong 
performance was achieved by a "rapid accumulation of external debt and - in many 
countries - at the expense of growing domestic imbalances" (World Bank, 1988:13)
The patterns of industrial development pursued by the NICs first involved 
strategies of import substitution and protectionism. These have been followed by more 
outward-looking, export-oriented strategies.
The transition from protectionism to liberalism has varied from case to case in 
response to one or more of the following factors: limited domestic markets, under­
utilization of installed capacities, or decreasing rates of profits in domestic markets. The 
increased participation of the NICs in export markets for manufactured goods, in turn, 
is linked to two factors. On the one hand, export promotion strategies pursued by NICs; 
on the other, the presence in the NICs of TNCs subsidiaries from the United States and 
later Europe and Japan, whose business was largely export oriented (Financial Times,
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01/08/88). "Thus, to a substantial degree the NICs challenge has been shaped, to the
advantage o f both parties, by the industrialized countries themselves." (OECD, 1988).
Along similar lines, another observer argues:
"Economic reorganization within Western capitalist societies is in turn 
inextricably bound up with a major restructuring of the international division of 
labour associated with the rapid ascendancy of the newly industrialized countries 
(NICs), particularly in South-East Asia, and with a dramatic intensification of 
international competition and capital mobility... The cheap labour advantages of 
the NICs have enabled their industries to capture increasing shares of the 
domestic and export markets of the advanced nations, while at the same time the 
low cost and expansionary economic environments in the NICs have proved 
increasingly attractive to western-based multinationals which have shifted capital, 
production and hence jobs to these more profitable sites." (Martin, 1988:4)
The growing links between AICs and NICs are more complex than the 
interpretation put forth by ‘development of under-development’ theorists, who saw the 
NICs as satellites for the AICs. Furthermore, developing countries are not an 
homogeneous bloc of nations. They differentiate in terms of their resources, their 
development models, and policy choices to manage their development. They also differ 
in the extent and internal perception o f the development of their social, economic and 
political structures. The following section, looks at the position of the NICs in the 
global electronic context.
5.2.7 The NICs and Global Electronics
The participation of the NICs in world informatics and electronics industries is 
on the increase. Yet this is a difficult claim to measure and must be put into 
perspective. Data covering the most common indicators (e.g., market size, industrial 
output, employment, trade, installations and presence of foreign companies in the 
country)aire not always available, and when so, are hardly comparable (Correa, 1988).
To situate the NICs in the international division of labour I look at trade flows 
between regions. Second, the development of Third World markets for informatics 
goods needs to be examined and the quality and quantity of installations and the types 
of utilization and application of computers commented on.
a. Trade Flows
Table 3.1, Trade Flows in Informatics, shows that in 1982 countries outside of 
the United States, Japan, and Europe (‘rest of the world’) had a trade deficit of 
US$6,319 million (US$ 14,107m in imports and US$8,284m in exports), compared to
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Europe’s trade deficit of US$3,764m. Most of the export activities in the NICs are in 
the hands of subsidiaries of TNCs from the United States, by far the single largest 
source o f foreign direct investment, and the main home country of these companies. 
Most of these companies are located in South-East Asia (Morgan & Sayer, 1988:107, 
Scott, 1987:143, UNCTC: 1986, Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:29).
With respect to technology flows, also in the 1970s, American companies headed 
the list o f suppliers followed by Japanese and European based companies whereas the 
rest o f the world played a marginal role. According to Ernst & O’Connor since early 
1970s about two thirds of the international supply of disembodied proprietary technology 
has been of US origin, with the United Kingdom as a distant second.^ (Ernst & 
O’Connor, 1989:29).
Table 3.1
Trade Flows in Informatics, 1982 in US$ million
Region Total imports from other 
parts of the world
Total exports to 
other parts of the world
Trade Balance
USA 7,795 13,005 4-5,210
Japan 595 5,368 4-4,773
Europe 9,036 5,272 -3,764
Rest of the World 14,603 8,284 -6,319
Source: Based on Morgan & Sayer (1988:107)
Figure 3.1 compares the production of electronic data processing equipment in 
selected developing countries. The data refers to the total industrial production of 
computers and peripherals, including those for export, of leading NICs based 
informatics industries. These figures give an aggregate illustration of different regional 
roles. They do not, however, allow for a more qualitative comparative analysis of 
informatics industries in the named countries.
Table 3.2, in turn, compares the participation of developing countries in the 
global electronics complex to that of Japan and the United States. According to Vasquez 
& Zimmermann (1988), when compared v/ith AICs producers, the position of the 
NICs is limited. India’s electronic data processing output, for example, comes to no 
more than 10% of Brazil’s electronics production in 1985, which in turn, is slightly less
 ^This information is based on the OECD collected indicator - national technology balance of payments 
(TPBs) which covers only part of the international technology flows (sale of patents, licensing 
agreements, provision of know-how, and technical assistance) (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:30).
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than 1 - 2% of American and Japanese figures for the same year. These comparisons, 
as cautioned by Correa (1988), have to be used sparsely. They serve the sole purpose 
of providing a macro view of the position of countries vis-a-vis each other.
Figure 3.1
Production of Electronic Data Processing Equipment
INDIA
KOREA
TAIWAN
SINGAPORE
HONG KONG
0 200 400 600 800 US$ million
Source: Macintosh Yearbook of International Electronics, Data 1985.
Table 3.2
Production of Electronic Data Processing Equipment 
(in millions of US$)
Country 1984 1985
India 36 40
South Korea 208 235
Taiwan 305 377
Brazil 416 463
Singapore 530 588
Hong Kong 664 796
Japan 18365 20909
USA 42409 47069
b. New Markets for Informatics Goods
The NICs and other Third World countries are a growing market for finished 
informatics goods coming from developed countries. The demand for computer systems 
increases year by year, having jumped up sharply since the appearance of the
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microcomputers in 1980. Even so, for every 1000 computers installed in the world, only 
60 are installed in the developing countries, of which 36 go to Latin America, 18 to 
East Asia, and the remaining 6 to the rest of the world (Vasquez & Zimmermann, 
1988:44). This distribution is very uneven. Latin America ranks first amongst 
developing countries with computer installations, whereas Africa has very few. Data 
comparisons are difficult, however. Table 3.3 compares hardware installations 
throughout the world.
Table 3.3 
Hardware Installations in the World
Country or 
region
Number o f Installed Systems per 
million inhabitants (Mainframes)
Value as % GNP
USA 248 2.5%
Western Europe 131 1.3%
Japan 208 1.5%
Asia & Australia 1 0.2%
Latin America 15 0.5%
Africa (except 
South Africa)
2 0.1%
Middle East 4 0.2%
Source: CEREM (1984:29). L’Informatique dans le 
pays en développement. Pour une politique de 
innovation en cooperation. Paris
While computer systems are becoming more common throughout the world, 
computer usage is still quite restricted. That is, computer applications are developed by 
sellers of the technology, rather than being primarily developed by NICs themselves to 
respond to specific needs. As one observer suggests "With rare exceptions, these 
installations are based on the definition o f needs and on software designed and produced 
by international suppliers." (Correa, 1988:4).
Amongst informatics producing countries, computers are already widely used in 
both process and product technologies. In South Korea firms use computers to aid 
assembly and quality control tests of output. In Brazil the industrial sector in 1986 and 
1987 was the largest .consumer of Brazilian made informatics goods absorbing 31.9% 
and 33% in each year respectively. Banking and the finance sector came second with 
21.1% (in 1986 and 1987), and commerce came third with 21.5% and 19.2% for the 
same two years (SEI: 1989:23). In Africa, on the other hand, as well as in a number
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of countries with very restricted access to informatics, computers continue to be 
introduced primarily in the public sector to perform larger calculations (Okot-Uma, 
1990).
To conclude, developing countries are a market for informatics goods produced 
domestically or imported from Europe, Japan, and from the US. Section 3.3 below 
examines the development of informatics industries in East Asia and Latin 
America.
3.3 The State’s Role in the NICs: Regional Divisions of Labour
This section looks at different government policies designed to develop the 
informatics sector and the results of liberal and/or protectionist policies on industrial 
development. Differences in industrial performance between and within South-east Asia 
and Latin America reflect the ways these countries integrate themselves and participate 
in the global economy and the ability of policy makers to formulate effective polices.
Countries in both Latin America and South-East Asia have managed to enter the 
international industrial race for computer production. Together they make up the second 
exporter of informatics goods (after the USA), and the fourth consumer market for 
informatics products (after Europe, Japan and USA). The number of installations, the 
quality and quantum of national industrial employment, and the industrial output for 
their internal and external markets are on the increase. But, as argued in the previous 
section, there are considerable differences inside this group of producers. These 
differences are defined in terms of the scope, scale, production process, technology and 
market of their indigenous industries. The following section illustrates some of these 
differences.
3.5.1 South-East Asia
Following the classification put forth by Ernst & O’Connor, this region 
comprises three groups of countries with informatics and electronics industries - the 
first-tier Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea); the second-tier 
Asian NICs (Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines) and the two quasi-continental 
economies of China and India (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989). China and India will not be 
discussed here.
While there are significant differences in the approach taken by each country to
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develop indigenous industries it is possible to identify common characteristics within 
each group. The first four countries forming the first-tier Asian NICs lack natural 
resources but have an abundance of labour oo1he^v!^h they have built their 
industrialization strategies. They all have pursued primarily export oriented growth 
strategies aimed at dynamic market segments, offering low production costs and low 
cost skilled labour (Santos & Ferreira, 1987).
The structure of production in these countries include very large conglomerates, 
or the chaebol, from South Korea; the traditional TNG subsidiaries (Hong Kong and 
Singapore) whose locational choice had much to do with an already advanced stage of 
development and political stability o f the two city-states; and lastly, the small to medium 
scale firms of Taiwan. With respect to the Korean case, the national policy parallels 
strategies developed in the AICs to strengthen the national conglomerates. There are 
four large Korean conglomerates Goldstar, Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo. They play 
an important role in consolidating the country’s position in the international markets 
(Henderson, 1989:65).
In all but one case (Hong Kong), the governments in these East Asian countries 
have a key role in designing industrial policy and fomenting local R&D capacity, both 
necessary pre-conditions to attract new industries. Governments have also supported 
national capital to take risks and enter these new industrial sectors. South Korea 
followed the Japanese strategy of the 1960s, implementing a policy of import 
substitution and supporting its national firms. After years of relative protection (1960s), 
South Korea adopted a more liberal strategy in the 1970s open to international 
investments (Santos & Ferreira, 1987).
Foreign technologies continue to play an important role in the developments of 
national industries in Asia. Countries rely on different sourcing strategies including 
foreign direct investments (Singapore, Taiwan), original equipment manufacture (OEM) 
(Singapore, Taiwan) licensing, reverse engineering and disembodied technology (South 
Korea) (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:65).
Second-tier Asian NICs on the other hand, are resource-rich and their choice of 
industrialization has been based on the production of exportable commodities. These are 
mainly labour-intensive, low-value-added products. National industrialization strategies 
rely heavily on foreign direct investment, an area that has received attention from the 
state. On the whole, however, the governments of Malaysia, the Philippines and
100
Thailand have not taken an active role in supporting the development of local R&D 
capacities and infrastructure (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:40).
Asian NICs have chosen different entry markets for their national industries. 
Particularly amongst the countries of the first-tier Asian NICs, development programmes 
targeted a comprehensive approach to the development of industrial complexes. 
Investments were equally made in the semiconductor and consumer electronics in the 
1960s, and, in the 1970s, these were extended to include computer production. By 
1979, these countries accounted for 71.8% of the world supplies of radios, 52.8% of 
tape recorders and 45.6% of black and white televisions (Piragibe, 1986:43).
This approach to industrial development, consisting of a build-up of a national 
capacity in a number o f sectors of the electronics complex, helped the position of these 
four countries vis-a-vis other competitors (Santos & Ferreira, 1987:78). They also 
follow similar strategies developed by France (the idea of the filiere), and by Japan, 
both cases already discussed in Chapter two above.
South Korea and Taiwan have benefitted from their experience in the production 
of televisions to become exporters of video monitors. Singapore relies on its experience 
in precision mechanics to produce competitive magnetic discs. To make these 
peripherals compatible with the central processing units (CPUs) of leading brands. East 
Asian producers established technical links with major TNCs producers. Following the 
Japanese model, they use OEM contracts between local firms and the TNCs as a way 
to guarantee quality and reliability of products and to promote the development of local 
products.
South Korea has been very successful in the semiconductors market (computer 
memory). National conglomerates have increased their share in the world market for 
256 D-RAMs (Random Access Memory) to 6% in 1986 and 9% in 1987 (Ernst & 
O’Connor, 1989:28).
The accomplishments of some of these national industries contrast the 
proposition of the NIDL thesis that the driving force behind American foreign direct 
investment in SE Asia on the 1960s and 1970s was essentially low labour costs (Froebel 
et al, 1980). A more recent empirical analysis of hourly wages in the region indicates
that these costs have not remained stable with the arrival of branch plants. Scott
'
demonstrates that the cost of manual labour in countries with higher levels of 
development (again in the first-tier Asian NICs) increased relative to wage values in
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other areas o f East Asia. From 1969 to 1983, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Taiwan had average hourly wages above the US$ 1 mark. Table 3.4 illustrates these 
differences.
Table 3.4
Hourly Wage o f Production Workers in South-East Asia
Country 1969 1975
(US$100)
1985 Average
Wage
(US$)
Hong Kong 10 12 16 1,33
Indonesia n.a. 05 04 0,35
Korea 10 7 14 1,19
Malaysia n.a. 9-10 10 0,84
Philippines n.a 06 08 0,63
Singapore 09 12 19 1,58
Taiwan 08 07 16 1,36
Thailand n.a. 05 05 0,43
In addition, this wage increase is relative to an overall increase in skill levels in 
some o f these countries. Singapore, for example, has developed a two-step strategy to 
attract foreign direct investment. During the first phase of capital internationalization, 
in the 1960s, the country offered a large pool of unskilled and cheap labour. At the 
second stage, starting in the late 1970s, Singaporean labour was better trained as a way 
to attract less labour-intensive assembly activities and more technologically intensive 
operations (Henderson 1989:68).
South Korea, like Singapore, has a long standing tradition to train national labour 
and offer competent engineers and technicians to be employed in the national industry. 
These labour training strategies include support to develop national skills. Policies to 
raise the skill levels of national labour have given both these countries the opportunity 
to move their industries from a position of mere assemblers o f electronics equipment to 
more technologically intensive production operations. (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989)
The Taiwanese industry moved from being a desirable location for branch plants 
to one o f the world’s largest producers of compatibles (e.g., Tandon Computers). The 
arrival of assembly plants in the country incited inter-firm competition. These firms 
were exposed to international competition inside their national territory from the very
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beginning of their operations. To remain operational and to succeed, they made 
themselves competitive producers of clones and invested in R&D. Once in control of 
basic computer technology they moved into large scale production of computers and 
used aggressive marketing strategy to reach international markets (Henderson, 1989).
Relying on comparative advantages of a trained labour force, companies located 
in Taiwan and Singapore have moved into the development of software in oriental 
languages as well. These companies also supply low technology components to the 
Japanese market, taking advantage of geographical proximity and interest from the part 
o f Japan to invest in the region (San, 1990:26) This close relationship between 
companies located in the first-tier Asian NICs, and those in Japan, has positioned the 
former in a superior position vis-a-vis European, American and Latin American 
producers to operate in the region and to penetrate the tight Japanese business 
environment.
To summarize, different approaches to developing electronics industries in East 
Asia have resulted in unique divisions of labour in the region. The first-tier countries, 
today, have managed to widen the gap with other Third World producers in the 
technological race (South Korea and the production of RAMs mentioned above). The 
use o f OEM contracts with Japanese and American manufacturers has contributed to this 
success.
Relying on a population with a good educational level and a high number of 
engineers and scientists \  the emphasis on the development of a trained labour force 
in the production of hardware and software has given some of these countries a 
comparative advantage in the production of software. In the span of 40 years companies 
located in the first-tier countries have moved from industrial activity initially 
characterized by assembly-type, labour-intensive and low-skilled production to more 
technologically sophisticated operations involving the production of entire computer 
systems, and their marketing in western and eastern markets (Henderson, 1989).
The export-oriented option adopted by most governments in East Asia, bear 
positive and negative implications for the economic longevity of these industries. One 
of the problems of export orientation is a dependency on a structure for which decision
 ^ Erast & O’Connor compare the level of education.between South Korea and other NICs and AICs, 
They pointed out that in 1983 the first had 800 R&D scientists and engineers per million population 
against 375 in Argentina, 4,000 in Japan and 3,000 in the USA. In the same year, Korea had 277 000 
tertiary engineering students, Mexico had 257 000 and Brazil, 165 000 (Erast & O’Connor, 1989:56).
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centres are not located in the developing countries but outside, where the investors 
(TNCs) are. Thus, changes in the international strategies of these firms can have a direct 
impact on the economic, social and political spheres of host countries. This is 
particularly important for countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
whose production structures are heavily based on TNCs branch plans. On the positive 
side, international exposure of national productive capacities and national products can 
bring to industries, provided that they are adequately backed by their governments, the 
same medium and long range benefits regarding their ability to absorb new technologies 
and to increase their bargaining power with TNCs operating in the country.
The early exposure to international markets has given local companies a needed 
opportunity to enlarge their industrial outfits, to achieve optimum economies of scale 
and increase their commitment and investment in R&D. To a large extent, these 
countries have managed to maintain a coherence between national policies and 
international industrial trends in informatics and to secure the necessary ingredients for 
the development of their national industries.
3.3.2 Latin America
Delapierre and Zimmermann define the development of informatics industries in 
Latin America in three groups of countries. The first group includes countries engaged 
in the production of computers such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. The second group 
consists o f countries which are heavy users of informatics products and services and 
which, in order to maximize their bargaining power, have developed use and 
procurement policies for both private and public sectors. These countries also have a 
commitment to developing indigenous application software. Venezuela, Colombia, Peru 
and Chile fall into this category. The third group includes countries which do not have 
a specific strategy for the production, use or procurement o f equipment. They also have 
no objective provisions to deal with the introduction of computers in their countries. 
This group includes Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and other Central American countries.
Ernst & O’Connor have a dual classification of countries in the region including 
a first-tier (Brazil, Argentina and Mexico) and a second-tier (Chile, Colombia, Uruguay 
2 Dfid Venezuela). Both classifications provide an adequate description of production and 
market conditions in the region. ’
Countries under the first group (those engaged in the production of computers).
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have relied heavily on import-substitution growth strategies focused predominantly on 
the development of domestic markets. The production structures in these countries 
include the presence of foreign firms, small- and medium-scale enterprises and larger 
state enterprises (Brazil). Their combined GDP is three times larger than the combined 
GDP o f the first-tier Asian NICs. Average per capita income is comparable (World 
Bank, 1987), and income is unevenly distributed (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:50).
The role of the state is quite explicit in the three countries. Brazil stands at one 
end with a high interventionist and protectionist approach to industrial policy covering 
a wide range of areas (different industrial sectors, technologies, production structures). 
Argentina stands at the other end with a lighter version of state intervention which has 
been reduced in recent years. However, more important than the degree of intervention, 
as pointed out by two observers, "state regulation of trade and investment in new 
technologies has been less focused than in the Asian NICs" (Ernst & O’Connor, 
1989:50), which in, turn, has amounted to a dispersal of resources (financial and 
technological) and the weakening of state initiatives.
Foreign direct investment has been the main source of technology acquisition in 
Latin America.  ^ However, the institutional set up to deal with and regulate EDI in 
Latin America has in some cases worked against the countries themselves. As two 
observers remark
"given a high degree of protection joint ventures with foreign capital have been 
relatively insulated from import competition and have had little incentive to 
introduce new technologies to upgrade their operations. Licensing and technical 
consultancy arrangements have been limited as compared with countries like 
South Korea. The severe foreign exchange shortages of recent years have 
reduced technology imports, and even FDI has virtually stagnated as a result of 
the crisis."  ^ (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989:51)
Lastly, education levels in Latin America are lower than in the more advanced 
Asian economies (Unesco, 1986). Brazil has a large number of technicians, engineers, 
and master and doctoral students in science-related areas, the highest in Latin America 
(see section 4.4 below). These figures, however are below those of South Korea, the
1 See Conjuntura Economica, Jan 1988:7-8 and Jul 1989:119-23, 
 ^ UNCTAD, Trade & Development Report, 1987:86-91.
105
Asia country with the highest education level. ^
The following section focuses on Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
a. Mexico
Mexico decided to develop a national informatics policy in response to a internal 
economic crisis that started in the late 1970s when, after 30 to 40 years of 
implementation of import substitutions strategies, Mexico realized that national 
development and achievements were far from enough to place the country amongst the 
group of industrialized economies (Humbert, 1986:67). The Mexican policy for 
informatics initially had very ambitious targets. The policy was based on the granting 
of incentives, import restrictions and the acceptance of foreign participation only in joint 
ventures (Correa, 1988:16). The policy stated among other things that within the first 
five years o f its operation, the national industry should supply 70% of the internal 
demands for informatics (Cline, 1987:110).
Influenced by the geographical proximity to the United States, Mexican policy 
makers opted for not having an explicit form of protection over production, fearing that 
such a protection could stimulate contraband along the borders. As a result, each market 
sector is treated differently. Mainframes can be freely imported. They are not produced 
inside Mexico. Minicomputer manufacturing is in the hands of wholly-owned foreign 
corporations to restrictive measures and having to export part o f their output. 
Microcomputers are manufactured and sold competitively both by Mexican and 
international producers located in the country.
Foreign presence in other sectors of the electronics complex is common in the 
country. In telecommunications ITT, Ericsson and Standard Electric control the 
country’s telecommunication activities. In consumer electronics RCA, General Electric, 
Phillips, Sony and Zenith set up assembly plants in the country in the 1960s to produce 
circuit boards, cases and other sub components for television production (Humbert, 
1986:84). By 1986, Mexico produced one third of the television parts and components 
consumed by North American markets (Piragibe, 1986:91). Mexico is also one of the 
largest semiconductor assembly platforms amongst the NICs Toshiba, Phillips, 
MotoroUa and Mitel have branch plants assembling integrated circuits (Humbert,
 ^The density of scientists, engineers and technicians in Brazil is 25 % less than that of South Korea. The 
proportion of tertiary students in engineering in Latin America is half that of South Korea (Amsden & 
Kim, 1986:110).
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1986:84). With such a significant presence of foreign capital in the country, it has been 
very difficult for Mexico to keep foreign interests away from its informatics sector.
R&D facilities and other support to S&T is limited. According to Humbert it is 
difficult to consider that Mexico has a solid S&T base to support its electronics industry. 
There are 10,000 researchers working in the public sector and 1,200 in industry. 
Investment in R&D reached US$ 400 million in 1984 (50% less than in Argentina and 
one third of R&D investments in Brazil) (Humbert, 1986:86).
Up to 1981, informatics goods could be easily brought into the country. 
Excessive imports did not help the country’s balance of payments and increasing foreign 
debt. To resolve this, import restrictions on informatics goods were imposed in 1981 
followed by the approval of nearly 50 indigenous development projects that were to 
substitute foreign presence on the national market.
Market structures were differentiated by product in Mexico. The mini market 
was controlled by IBM, HP, Burroughs and Sperry. Apple and IBM were also interested 
in entering the micro sector. Under the new restrictions, they would have to set up joint 
venture arrangements with Mexican firms. With few exceptions, TNCs were reluctant 
to invest in joint ventures. IBM, for example, remained loyal to its corporate tradition 
and kept putting pressure on the Mexican government to obtain the permission to set up 
a wholly-owned company in the country. After a few attempts, in 1984, the government 
accepted IBM’s demands, IBM set up a factory in Mexico to produce micro computers. 
The investment totalled US$100 million, the plan has a capacity to produce 
200,000/computer year, and the company agreed to export 92% of its output (Cline, 
1987:115).
The approval of IBM’s proposal affected the country’s policy. For one, Mexico’s 
original policy of 1981 was never formally approved. The lack of an institutionalized 
policy base contributed to the approval of IBM’s proposal. The arrival of this TNC also 
brought change to the local industry. IBM’s production for export helped to alleviate a 
negative trade balance in the sector and to bring much needed foreign currency to a 
country sinking under foreign debt. The local industry also benefitted from IBM’s 
agreement with Mexico to set up a R&D centre for the development o f semi-conductors 
and to source its demands for electronic components from Mexican companies. This 
arrangement was part of the deal to set up a 100% owned company (Humbert, 
1986:90). After IBM, Apple and HP have followed suit to obtain similar treatment from
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the government.
Mexican export activity in informatics has increased. However, the types of 
export coming out of Mexico are not associated with a parallel control over the 
technologies imbedded in these products as most export activity is generated inside 
TNCs.
Mexico is in a similar position of East Asian competitors when it comes to its 
relationship with American capital. Mexico has been a site for US investments from the 
1960s onward. Because of this relationship, expanded to other sectors of the electronics 
complex, the government has always been restricted in playing a more important role 
to defend national objectives. By and large, Mexican based TNCs make it very difficult 
for Mexican corporations to expand their market share and to create brand names of 
their own. As Humbert points out "the crucial question remains if Mexico can develop 
a truly national industry based solely on the activities of TNC’s and joint ventures 
operating in the country" (Humbert, 1986:91). The possibility that a national company 
or champion could be created, according to Humbert, is impossible. The future for 
sustainable national development in this sector is, as a result, unknown. Also, given 
present economic bottlenecks, it is unlikely that the government could impose 
restrictions on the existing industrial activities of leading TNCs, (as India managed to 
with IBM in the mid 1970s) (Grieco, 1984).
b. Argentina
Argentina’s approach to developing a national informatics industry sits at the 
opposite end with direct industrial market protectionism and state regulation. As with 
the other two, Argentina practiced a policy of industrialization through import 
substitution up to 1976. Import substitution facilitated the development of some 
industrial sectors in the country. In terms of electronics industries, the consumer 
electronics sector was developed and supplied most of the country’s internal demand for 
these goods. 80% of the goods consumed were locally produced (Piragibe, 1986:80). 
The absence of any protection for the semiconductor sector allowed Argentine consumer 
electronics producers to acquire technology and product diversification. At the same 
time, the country’s internal market provided the optimum scale for the national 
producers, and local production kept pace with the international markets.
After 1976, liberal polices favoured the exposure of Argentinean markets to 
foreign competitors. This resulted is a slow but fatal destruction of national capacity and
108
competitiveness in the sector, exposed to a newly-arrived wave of Japanese producers 
setting up their assembly plants in the country.
In the realm of informatics IBM, Olivetti and Fate (Argentina) controlled, up to 
1974, the domestic informatics market. However, technological changes in product 
design affected the trajectories of these companies. Olivetti, with the advance of 
electronics technology, shut down its plant in Argentina. IBM maintained its activities 
producing primarily electro-electronic products (e.g. printers and magnetic drives) as 
part o f the company’s international division of labour. Fate, producer of electronic 
calculators, could not cope with foreign competition and went out of business by 1980 
(Zimmermann, 1986).
By 1984, the market for computers and peripherals remained largely controlled 
by imports from the US. IBM concentrated over 70% of the total national computer 
market (Correa, 1988:21).
Inspired by Mexico and Brazil, and by the shortcomings of liberalization policies 
post-1976, Argentina decided to set up a formal industrial policy for the sector. This 
policy, together with other strategies, characterizes the country’s third and most recent 
strategy towards the sector.
The new policy’s main objective was to give Argentina the capital, labour and 
environment conducive to learning and developing indigenous technologies, R&D 
capacity, production and human resources. To create such an environment, policy 
instruments included tariff protection for certain products, fiscal incentives and the 
regulation of foreign investments. With regard to the last, Argentina opted out of the 
promotion of joint ventures between national and international capitals. Bull and 
Burroughs have accepted the country’s terms to operate through local firms (Financial 
Times, 12/03/85). IBM, keeping up with its tradition has a wholly owned operation in 
Argentina which was established prior to the new policy. The company produces 
printers and other peripherals for world markets. The microcomputer sector is in the 
hands of domestic manufacturers, who also produce peripherals and software 
(Zimmermann, 1986)
c. Brazil
The Brazilian experience will be examined in greater detail in The next four 
chapters. Compared to other developing countries, the Brazilian strategy stands out for 
its level of institutionalization, length and extent of policy, and its explicit military
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concerns, as well as for the level o f industrialization. The Brazilian navy has been most 
influential in putting forward a policy to make Brazil technologically competent to 
manipulate, repair and eventually produce computers and other devices for military 
purposes. Curiously, the Brazilian case, contrary to France, the UK and the USA 
(which have the largest portions o f their R&D funds devoted to military related 
research), has not managed to benefit from this relationship as successfully as it did with 
aircraft and other conventional weapons. These ideas will be dealt with in Chapter Four 
below.
The experiences o f NICs with industrial policy and other forms o f state 
regulation will be explored at the end o f the chapter.
The next three sections compare the experiences o f the NICs looking closely at 
three aspects o f the development o f informatics: technological transfers, changing labour 
markets and regional development policies. In the first case, the problems NICs face to 
appropriate, adapt and develop informatics technologies are discussed. The second case, 
looks at how changing social divisions o f labour in the industry have benefitted some 
industrieSyîo% o^^K ^d in their quest to participate in world markets. The last section 
examines regional policies that have been put together to attract investors and capitals 
to particular localities in the world.
3.4 Technological Transfers between AICs and NICs
Common to all policies discussed in Chapters Two and Three is the notion that 
industrial development policies have to em power national industries to gain greater 
knowledge, understanding, development capacity and control over key informatics 
technologies. This view is undisputed amongst development theorists and critics o f the 
development process of informatics industries (Forbes, 1984; Henderson, 1989).
Despite this widely accepted opinion, NICs are faced with concrete barriers to 
achieve their goals o f technological autonomy and industrial competence in many sectors 
o f the electronic complex, including informatics. These barriers touch on but are not 
reducible to a) technology development, ownership and transfer; b) the development of 
national S&T and R&D structures, and c) skill level o f the national labour force. The 
definition used in this thesis for technology
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"has to do with certain kinds of knowledge which allow the adaptation of means 
to ends. Part of this knowledge is embodied in machines, but most of it is not. 
It is embodied elsewhere -in the brains of people, in organizational structures 
and in behavioural patterns, which in turn, are conditioned by the strategies of 
different social factors and their patterns of conflict and cooperation." (Ernst & 
O’Connor, 1989:20)
The NICs discussed in this chapter are heavily dependent on technologies 
developed by AICs and controlled to a large extent by TNCs. TNCs are the most 
important actors in the process of technology transfer. These TNCs together with their 
home countries are at the forefront of the development process having financial, 
technical and human resources to carry out the basic and applied research and 
development which keep the industry going. Furthermore, there is a clear dispute 
between leading producers and consumers of technology and how each group plans to 
use technology.
NICs have been able to appropriate foreign technologies using different channels. 
These include: FDI, licensing, reverse engineering, OEM contracts, disembodied 
technology and of, course, indigenous developments resulting from the transfer. These 
channels have been used differently by different countries and have changed through 
time. While the channels have facilitated many successful technology transfers^ 
appropriation has been limited amongst the NICs. South Korea (digital switches and 
RAMs) and Brazil (digital switches) have managed to develop appropriate indigenous 
systems suitable to satisfy internal demands. Equally, countries which have been able 
to develop internationally competitive industries (first-tier Asian NICs) have adapted and 
developed production and organization processes to achieve these high output levels. 
International competitiveness, on the other hand, has been possible for these countries 
through effective control of production costs and pricing policies (Henderson, 1989).
Technology as a part of a country’s social relations of production demands the 
existence of a social structure that is capable of perceiving its own needs, and securing 
the means of its own reproduction. As a technical activity it demands the availability of 
research and development facilities and the resources (human and financial) to undertake 
and pay for experimental and innovative work, and to transform ideas into products. As
Cho demonstrated in his comparative study of labour markets in the USA and Korea,
. . .  "
these conditions cannot be easily reproduced in a Third World country including / 1 most 
developing countries like Korea (Cho, 1985). The reasons for this are
manifold.
I l l
The patterns of capital internationalization analyzed in the previous chapter 
indicated that TNC’s internationalization strategies from the 1960s onward did not 
include the internationalization of the social aspects of technology in the countries where 
TNCs chose to invest. TNCs activities included the relocation of parts of the productive 
activity (e.g., assembly), or the setting-up of factories to produce for export, or the 
setting up of joint venture agreements with local producers. R&D activities and 
investment have been kept well inside the AICs, as illustrated in table 2.1 above. It was 
therefore up to the host country to seek the resources to invest in the development of 
national science and technology programmes, in the training of national scientists, the 
fitting of research laboratories and so on.
To complement production activities set up by TNCs, nationally based 
companies, in turn, enjoyed a better chance of developing in-house technologies and 
adapting foreign made systems to local conditions. These companies and the policies 
developed by governments to promote national industries tend to choose a more 
independent path of technological development with a view to  achieving a degree of 
technological competence. The results of these strategies have been mixed. India, for 
example, in 1978 launched a programme to build semiconductors. Problems in the 
completion of the project caused a delay of several years in the commercialization of 
the Indian chip rendering them obsolete even before they came out (Vasquez & 
Zimmermann, 1988:48). Brazil’s first choice of technology to build a mini computer 
was sold by the British manufacturer, Ferranti. Already obsolete in Europe, the first 
nationally made computer, the Argus, was an industrial and commercial fiasco. Other 
attempts, like the development of electronic banking in Brazil, have been extremely 
successful in the country, and others are extremely controversial, like the case of the 
‘SOX operating system’ developed by Cobra (Marques, 1988).
An alternative to the arduous and expensive road towards indigenous 
development is to become industrially and commercially competent in production of 
nationally made computers with technology developed elsewhere. South-East Asian 
countries have opted for this strategy relying on licencing, reverse engineering, OEM 
contracts and basic assembly of products for TNCs in order to obtain the necessary 
technical, production and process skills to make their companies commercially feasible 
in national and international markets.
NICs face other problems regarding the development of indigenous technologies
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in addition to being able to develop and master technology in its three facets. As 
discussed in the introduction, technology development is an expensive business open to 
very few players. The interdependency between different sectors of the electronic 
complex almost demands the presence of different industrial sectors so that one can 
benefit from the other’s technical and commercial developments.
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in technology and industrial development 
programmes is practically absent from the experiences of NICs in developing their 
national industries. As historically established connections link developing countries to 
AICs, NICs have found it very difficult to break this North-South flow of knowledge 
and technological transfer and to initiate NIC-NIC technical cooperation programmes.
To summarize, developing countries who have made a decision to enter the 
informatics sector face barriers in the quest to achieve high levels of mastering, 
development and control of key technologies, in addition to bottlenecks particular to the 
electronics complex (already discussed in the Introduction). NICs depend on TNCs to 
sell them basic production and process technologies that will allow them to enter the 
informatics sector. As discussed in Chapter two, TNCs’ profit oriented objectives, 
associated with relocation of part of%iractivities to locations outside the AICs, do not 
include the relocation of R&D facilities. NICs must seek the means and resources to 
fully develop the three dimensions of technology, that is: social, creative and technical, 
in addition to seeking technology transfer agreements with leading TNCs.
Intrinsic to successful and effective technology transfer is the development of a 
class of national high skilled labourers and of an adequate S&T and R&D programmes 
to complement the transfer process. In the next section I examine changes in the labour 
markets of industries located in the NICs.
3.5 Capital Internationalization and Employment: a NICs view
So far it has been shown that, in order to enter a turbulent, global, and highly 
competitive informatics industry, countries must establish development policies, support 
from national capitalist groups, S&T funds, R&D facilities and a labour force with the 
necessary level of skills. This section focuses on the experience of certain NICs to 
develop a national labour force technically competent in research, development, 
production and marketing of informatics products domestically and overseas.
Employment in the informatics industry both in the AICs and NICs has
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undergone quantitative and qualitative changes since the advent o f digital technology in 
the 1950s.
In a study of employment trends in informatics industries located in the OECD 
economies, one observer identified three distinct trends:
1) a phase o f job creation during informatics infant stage;
2) a period o f job stagnation or decline following a period o f industrial maturity and 
geographical expansion of leading world companies; and
3) a phase o f shifts in employment from less skilled, assembly type workers to more 
skilled R&D, marketing, etc. employees (Hewitt, 1988).
In the NICs patterns o f employment change parallel employment changes in 
AICs based industries.
With respect to the first trend - iob creation, the experience o f NICs based 
informatics industry can be divided in two periods, one starting in the early 1960s and 
one starting in the 1980s.
Job decline in AICs countries during the 1960s (described in section 2.4 above), 
were compensated by job growth in the NICs when branch plants o f TNCs arrived in 
many countries. The types of labour demanded were docile, politically inarticulate, low 
skilled and low-wage workers, mainly women, to work on large scale, labour-intensive, 
assembly type jobs.
Comprehensive data on current levels o f employment in the subsidiaries of 
semiconductor, computers and peripherals TNCs located in the NICs are not easily 
available, and if  so, are difficult to compare. Still, it is possible to observe this trend 
o f job  creation in the NICs. Taking Singapore as an example, in 1971 there were 28 
firms employing 11,847 workers, ten years later, in 1981 there were 182 firms and 
67,858 workers (UNCTC, 1986:403). In the Philippines employment grew 20 fold 
between 1974 and 1981 (40,000 employees). South Korea experienced an increase of 
120,000 jobs between 1973 and 1984 (UNCTC, 1986:364). Patterns o f job  growth and 
the NICs were soon to change.
A fter 1980, employment in the United States semiconductor corporations in East 
Asia declined by several thousands due in part to the global recession, in part to rising 
labour costs and to  political uncertainties. However, i t  seems tW t job  losses in 
AICs and NICs occur for entirely different reasons. Job loss in the NICs were linked 
to changes in business strategies of TNCs and rising tensions inside NICs. The ghost of
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world recession called for a massive restructuring of North American and European 
industries to recover the path of capital accumulation. Restructuring relied heavily on 
the introduction of new technologies to raise the levels of productivity both inside 
offices and factories via automation. Thus, by the late 1980s employment levels in the 
NICs were first affected as a result of introduction of modem techniques inside plants.
The introduction of automation made redundant hundreds of manual workers 
involved in assembly work replaced by error-free machines. In 1982, Control Data 
closed its South Korea subsidiary after serious labour resistance to the introduction of 
automated lines. The corporation justified its action because of technological 
advancements in the production process \  Along with these changes in the process of 
production and others problems related to unionization, labour unrest and wage 
demands, as well as concern over workers’ housing and basic reproduction of 
community and family life. According to an international manager of MotoroUa 
Semiconductor group, "the trend for the future is for more and more assembly to take 
place in the United Sates or Europe" (Business Week 15/03/82).
The impact of these shifts in production trends varies across sectors and 
countries. Countries occupying what Henderson identifies as the periphery of the NICs, 
inside East Asian regional divisions of labour, have been more vulnerable to changes 
in TNCs investment in these countries. These lay-offs are more likely to occur when the 
control of capital is outside the country, that is in the hands of TNCs. In South Korea, 
employment by foreign-owned electronics firms decreased from 47,300 in 1976 to 
27,200 in 1982 (UNCTC, 1983a) whereas that of its national electronics manufacturers 
remained the same, and even increased after 1981, after their investments in the USA 
(Cho, 1985:193).
In Latin America, Mexico was more directly affected by changes in TNCs 
strategies than Brazil or Argentina given the significant presence of American TNCs. 
(Fadul, 1987). In Brazil, the restructuring imposed on TNCs activities as a result of 
the introduction of the national informatics policy in the early 1980s led to a decline in 
TNC jobs. Employment by foreign-based corporations located in Brazil dropped from 
11,797 in 1982 to 7,383 in 1988. In the domestic companies, employment rose from 
12,598 to 26,344 for the same period (SEI, 1989:24).
Asia Monitor, 1982, 1st. quarter, in Cho, 1985:193.
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The third employment trend identified by Hewitt referred to shifts in 
employment. In the AICs this shift is associated with a rise in the number of white 
collar workers involved in R&D, management, marketing, human resource 
development, customer support systems, software development and so on. Hewitt and 
Henderson have identified a parallel process in the first-tier Asian and Latin American 
NICs (notably in Brazil and in the Gang o f Four nations), associated with the 
development of national industries (Hewitt, 1988, Henderson, 1989), and with support 
to developing national skills and labour training.
To conclude, the impact of technological changes on employment in the NICs 
can have negative effects on labour supplies if  labour protection and support 
mechanisms are not in place to cope with these changes. The literature discussing the 
impact of capital internationalization and employment in the NICs is limited (Cho, 
1985, Hewitt, 1988; Henderson, 1989). Very little is known on how existing social 
relations and social innovations introduced by informatics firms affect labour and 
employment. Judging from the literature, some countries have managed to provide 
protection and support to their national labour forces and to upgrade their skill levels 
to attract technologically-intensive industries (Henderson, 1989). Along similar lines, 
Hewitt identifies a transition from a model o f employment based on the intensive use 
of semi-skilled assembly labour to one that emphasizes the employment of skilled 
engineering and technical labour in certain sub-sectors of Brazil’s electronics industry. 
This transition is, among other things, a result of favourable political, economic and 
technological conditions surrounding the national computer industry (Hewitt, 1988). 
Lastly, Cho, advancing the debate to focus on the impact on labour of more recent 
capitalist strategies in South Korea, illustrates a case o f difficult articulation of interests 
between AICs and NICs. There, changes in the international movement of capital in the 
electronics industry parallel a change in the nature of the labour process in the AICs and 
NICs. This has eroded the latter’s comparative advantage in labour costs and cannot be 
reproduced in the NICs.
3.6 Competing Regional Policies and the Development of 
Informatics Industries in the NICs
Capital internationalization from the AICs to the NICs during the 1960s and 
1970s was not only associated with a particular set of production activities, and labour
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profiles, but with particular localities within the host countries. The spatial preferences 
of both foreign capital (1960s onward) and at a later date, national capital (mid 1970s 
onward) include locational patterns which can be roughly grouped under three social- 
spatial arrangements: export processing zones (hereafter EPZs), in and around 
traditional industrial centres, and science parks. These have occurred between the 1960s 
to mid 1970s (EPZs), 1970s to mid 1980s (traditional industrial areas) and mid 1980s 
to the present (science parks).
These social spatial arrangements can also be associated with different types of 
policies used to fulfil a country’s target to upgrade labour, technological know-how, 
skills and industrial capacity. The lack of substantial data on industrial location in most 
of the Third World make construction of informatics industrial geographies a difficult 
task. Taking that into account, this section examines the characteristics of these three 
periods including the nature of socio-spatial arrangements, and matching policies that 
have been developed in the NICs. This section will provide a framework of analysis of 
the Brazilian experience in Chapter Seven.
a. Export Processing Zones
The export processing zones (hereafter EPZs), characterized much of the 
electronics development from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. This periodization, used 
simply as a model o f understanding the industrial geography of informatics in 
developing countries, does not exclude the development and creation of EPZs in many 
developing and Third World countries to date.
In 1975 there were a total of 79 EPZs in 25 countries. In 1980, there were 116 
EPZs in operation, in 55 Third World countries (UNIDO, 1985). They employed 
approximately 840,000 people whereas the EPZs of seven countries (South Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Mexico and Brazil) accounted for 62% of this 
employment.
The principle of the EPZs was to offer foreign investors the infrastructure, 
labour and import/export tariffs and benefits (e .g ., fiscal and tax exemptions, subsidized 
infrastructure., favourable terms of profit repatriation, etc.) to carry out their 
operations. Most of these zones were set up to host the activities of multinationals first 
in electronics (semiconductors and consumer electronics) along with textiles, and 
clothing. However, electronics remained the largest employer in the EPZs (UNCTAD, 
1978:34; Hewitt, 1988:6). EPZs also functioned indirectly as an instrument of
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development that operated at a macro (national), meso (regional) and micro (local) 
levels.
EPZs had a different appeal for governments, TNCs and the labour force. From 
the perspective o f government, the EPZs were a functional institutional and 
geographical feature attracting trans-national corporations in the host country. These 
firms had the potential to develop new electronic industrial activities, to create 
employment, to bring in dollars through exports, and even to have some positive impact 
on skills and the reduction of the technological gap.
For the second group - TNCs, EPZs brought together the necessary requirements 
for investment. They provided the infrastructure, support and know-how of a free zone, 
to make the life of TNCs easier. As labour costs had to be kept low at all times, the 
EPZs made sure that the companies would have the necessary labour supply at the 
desired price. EPZs also help TNCs to pre-empt or circumvent protective barriers to 
uncertain key markets (e.g., Mexico and Brazil in particular). This is part o f the 
Japanese experience in consumer electronics and most recently in computers to 
overcome barriers inside the USA and European Community (Morgan & Sayer, 
1988:116).
For the last group - labour, EPZs provided labour intensive jobs to a large 
number of workers. These jobs were predominantly performed by semi-skilled women. 
Young women in 1980 accounted for 88% of employment in EPZs in Sri Lanka, 85% 
in Malaysia, 75% in South Korea, 74% in the Philippines, 80% in Taiwan and 77% in 
Mexico (EIU, 1985:3; Hewitt, 1988:8).
The perceived spatial development advantages of the EPZs worked out 
differently in practice. First, the EPZs provided an institutional background to enhance 
the inequalities between the foreign investor and host countries. They concentrated their 
activities around a highly fragmented labour process in a limited range of final assembly 
activities which limited the possibility of technological spin offs (discussed above in 
section 3.4). Second, "the absence of strong linkages has not only reduced the 
possibility o f indirect employment generation (e.g., from input supplier), but it has also 
inhibited the learning process which local firms might undergo through interaction with 
electronics multinational corporations" (Hewitt, 1988:7). Third, the relationship of 
dependency described in the concept of the EPZs made them very vulnerable to changes 
in the international market. During periods of recession, the zones suffered severe
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labour retrenchment confirmed in the figures given in section 3.5 above.
By the 1970s the idea of EPZs began to be questioned together with the
assumptions associated with the NIDL and their relevance to Third World development.
"There are grave misgivings as to whether EPZs can any longer be regarded as 
assembly structures which can make lasting contributions to the net export 
earnings o f developing countries, or serve as vehicles for the transfer of 
technology by TNCs to developing countries even in industries like electronics, 
to which zones seemed particularly well suited at the start o f the decade (of the 
1970s)" (UNCTAD, 1978:33, quoted in Hewitt, 1988:7).
b. Traditional Industrial Areas
The second social spatial arrangements characteristic o f  the newly emerging 
national industries in Latin America and East Asia moved away from the institutional 
(i.e., fiscal incentives and labour dormitories) and spatial (i.e., proximity to ports and 
airports) rigidities o f EPZs to locate themselves in and around more traditional industrial 
centres. In Latin America, these localities attracted new informatics and electronics 
firms primarily for their historical agglomeration of electronics and mechanical 
industries whose diversifications may have led them to enter the electronics sectors. 
These firms were also better served by larger and higher skilled workers and labour 
force whose employment choices were enhanced near these industrial clusters. Other 
locational advantages tended to include better transport networks and communication 
systems, proximity to centres o f decision making (e.g., governments associations, lobby 
groups) and of course the tight linkages with other economic sectors, the proximity of 
suppliers and consumers - i.e. the market. The EPZs instead maintained a relationship 
with the export market expressed by its location near costal zones or airports.
In terms o f the types o f policy applicable to domestic companies, these tended 
to be characterized by a greater level of protection, including import restrictions, market 
protection, more generous subsidies for activities such as R&D and labour training and 
education, which were not possible, or desirable, in the EPZ model.
The last and most recent social spatial arrangements characteristic of electronics 
complex and informatics is the science park.
c. Science Parks
Science parks are not necessarily a new phenomenon. The first university related 
research park of note was at Stanford University in California, in 1952 (Money, 
1987:29). According to the International Association of Science Parks, the terms used 
to describe a property based initiative which:
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“-has formal and operational links with one or more universities, research 
centres, or other institutions o f higher education;
-is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge based 
industries and other organizations normally resident on site;
-has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of 
technology and business skills to tenant organizations.” (Dalton, 1987:13).
In addition to these features, science parks are perceived by both developed and 
developing countries as a catalyst in regional development. The meaning, implications 
and feasibility o f the catalyst to contribute to a country’s development process vary 
enormously from developed and developing contexts.
The experience of science parks in Europe show that there have been three 
phases o f development. The reason for using the European example is because the US 
and Europe have gone further in the development of these regional industrial 
development schemes. Most attempts in the developing world are at a too infant a stage 
to allow any concrete evaluation of results (Anais, 1987).
The first phase of science park development started in 1972 with the opening of 
the Harriot-Watt Research Park in Edinburgh and the Cambridge Science Park of 
Trinity College. Both parks were set up by universities in very prestigious and affluent 
areas.
A second period began 10 years later from 1982/83 when a new wave o f parks’ 
initiatives were set up as a part of a broader solution to problems o f de-industrialization 
and economic decline (Dalton, 1987:17). These were to appear in backward areas of 
Wales, Scotland, Ireland, France and Spain. These partnerships involving typically a 
higher education institution, a local authority and a financial institution. They were 
located in areas o f traditional industrialization which were, in varying degrees, suffering 
from recession and overall economic decline (e .g ., Provence in France, Bilbao, Madrid, 
Barcelona, Malaga and Sevilla in Spain).
A third wave o f parks began in 1985, when over 20 new parks were created in 
Great Britain alone and another 25 in continental Europe. These new investments were 
based on a mix o f incentives, policies and organizational structures to valorize new 
enterprises through the transfer of technology and research experience, innovative ideas, 
and expertise into new products and processes. At a much later date, the late 1980s, the 
first concept o f science parks appeared in South Korea and Brazil.
The regional impact of these parks, and the industrial activities located in them, 
is significant. The prime objective o f science parks is to offer the most favourable
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location in which new developments can be undertaken, either by new companies or by 
divisions o f existing firms. But often, rather than being a potent instrument to ameliorate 
social and economic conditions of work and growth, parks are perceived as an effective 
conveyor of free enterprise liberal ideas particular, in the case of Britain, to the 
Thatcher era:
"The least tangible, but possibly the most important benefit [of the park] is the 
perception given to the public, both lay and industrial by the presence of a park. 
It can be seen as a concrete example of faith in the future and in local expertise 
and enterprise." (Dalton, 1987:23).
Parks do favour a greater interaction between university and industry. They are 
meant for the development of knowledge-based industries and, to an extent, they are 
more conducive environments for innovation, technological transfer, and development 
than the previous model based on EPZs. Parks also differ from EPZs in their 
relationship with governments. In Europe, national governments both individually and 
collectively have been extolling the virtues of new business creation. In the UK 
investments in science parks have been made without the intervention of central 
government, being fully supported by local initiative. The motivations for such local 
initiatives may vary, as they do in reality from park to park. The relation with a local 
business, social, or political community link the park to local issues and problems rather 
than tie them to the international business strategies of TNCs (as in the case of the 
EPZs) or subject them to cuts in federal government spending such as sectoral subsidies 
given to particular industries.
In short, the experience to date in the UK (Dalton, 1987), continental Europe 
(Lafitte, 1987) and the USA (Money, 1987) shows an array of possibilities for the 
creation and development of parks. Individual country reports demonstrate that the 
experience is successful, and cross comparative examination offered by the International 
Science Parks Association help the spread of ideas to develop these enterprises more 
successfully.
The success of parks in helping the de-industrialization crisis in Europe, attracted 
attention from Latin America and East Asia which were also trying to find more 
effective ways to narrow the social, economic and technological gaps between haves and 
have nots. Thus the idea of the science park, in Latin America, was developed to fit a 
particular context of development bottlenecks, as argued by one observer:
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"The appearance of science parks in Latin America occurs in the context of on­
going deep political, economic and social changes characterized by the 
exhaustion of a development model based on import substitution and subsidized 
manufacturing for export. The saturation o f this model calls for a restructuring 
of society and economy with the introduction o f new technologies to modernize 
the economy and equipment, to make them internationally competitive. " (Pereira 
et al, 1987:3).
Policy markers see in the science park concept a multiplicity o f agents and the 
dynamic profile of the enterprise inducing economic and regional development based on 
the generation of new technologies. These ideas do not always match reality.
If the performance o f science parks is difficult to measure in an European 
context, similar experiments in Latin America and East Asia have to be looked at 
qualitatively, due to an almost total absence of any useful quantitative data. Chapter 
Seven examines the Brazilian experience and how effectively science parks contribute 
to attract knowledge-based industries, universities and a community to generate new 
firms, exchange ideas, development processes and products and ultimately aid in the 
process of regional and industrial development.
3.7 Summary & Conclusions
This chapter has dealt with the experience of NICs in developing national 
informatics industries. First, it looked at the position o f NICs in the international 
division of labour. Second, summarizing national policies designed to support the 
development of national industries in these countries and following different classifica­
tions, the chapter has focused on the first-tier Asian NICs and on the first-tier Latin 
American NICs, both regions with a well developed production capacity in informatics 
and other sectors of the electronics complex. Third, it looked at issues related to 
technology transfer, employment and regional development in these areas.
This conclusion summarizes the main findings of the chapter and compares and 
contrasts the experience of these selected NICs against the experiences o f the AICs 
discussed in Chapter two above.
It has been demonstrated in these two chapters that there is a clear division 
between AICs/NICs with respect to their industrialization and overall development. 
Economies in the AICs have a longer history o f industrial development with interna­
tionally strong and competitive capital goods industries. The development o f the 
electronics and informatics industries in these countries benefitted from the existence of
1 2 2
a solid industrial foundation with producers of components and suppliers, support 
services (equipment repair, maintenance), and well-established subcontracting networks 
between producers and markets. It has been shown in Chapter two, however, that the 
AICs are not an homogeneous block of countries but a mosaic of developed and less 
developed regions where intra-regional differences are substantial (Chapter two, section 
2.5).
In informatics, TNCs originatiV  ^in the United States, Japan and Europe control 
product markets and technologies, and have exported these technologies and products 
to all developing countries. These TNCs have benefitted from an early process of 
internationalization of their productive structures and are now present in almost all 
informatics producing and consumer markets worldwide. NICs, on the other hand, as 
we have seen, are still overwhelmingly dependent on generic technologies and product 
standards originated in the AICs.
The NICs, in turn, share common characteristics of latecomer industrialization 
including very fast industrialization histories of less than 40 years. As a result, more 
fully developed industrial foundations are needed for an orchestrated development of 
national informatics industries. In the quest of developing whole national industrial 
sectors, NICs have suffered from small (first-tier Asian NICs) or ineffective/disorgan­
ized (second-tier Asian and Latin American NICs) capital goods industries (as in the 
case of first-tier Latin American NICs) which are important suppliers and consumers of 
informatics. As a result, other important industrial and social linkages (suppliers, 
support services, subcontracting relations, skilled labour, S&T) are poorly developed 
or absent (Ernst & O’Connor, 1989).
In spite of late industrialization and partial development of an industrial base, of 
a well developed international industrial complex, and of the oligopolistic structures of 
TNCs and dependency on foreign technologies, it has been shown in this chapter that 
many NICs have managed to develop national informatics industries.
These relatively recent developments, (most informatics industries in the NICs 
have been around for less than 20 years), challenge propositions put forth by depen­
dency theorists that the Third World and NICs function as suppliers of cheap inputs 
(raw materials and low valued added manufactured goods) and markets for the AICs. 
Also, as discussed in Chapter two, the experience of the AICs with electronics and 
informatics have started and developed as a response to internal needs for new systems
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to collect, store and process information and from competition between these countries 
(US, Japan and Europe) independently from events taking place in the rest of the world. 
The very complex processes leading to the development of informatics as an industrial 
sector in many parts of the developed and developing world call for a theoretical 
framework that recognizes the role of other agents in the development process which 
dependency theory cannot provide. This point is discussed again later.
The role of the state is an important theme permeating the discussions of AICs 
and NICs. Chapter two demonstrated that the state has had a distinct and explicit 
participation in the development of electronics and informatics industries in all three 
country/regional cases studied. From a very explicit form of state intervention 
characteristic of developments in Japan, France and at a later date the European 
Community, to a lesser involvement of the state in the case of the United States and 
Great Britain, the history of informatics cannot be told excluding the political concerns 
in the countries involved. State role in the AICs has been both active (United States in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Japan in the 1980s) and responsive to strategies being developed 
by competitors (France in the 1970s, the EEC in the 1980s).
The participation of the state in the development of informatics industries in the 
developing world is no different. As demonstrated above, countries in Latin America 
and Asia have designed policies to promote the development of national industries. 
Policies range in varying degrees from extremes o f protectionism to liberalization, and 
have been used as a valve to respond to both external movements (TNC movements and 
strategies, technological trajectories, regional political alliances), and internal needs 
(rising demands for informatics goods, strategic concerns, poorly developed industrial 
structures, lack of skilled labour). However, the involvement of the state as an industrial 
policy-maker in many NICs is in response to aggressive marketing strategies o f leading 
TNCs, and as a means to break the oligopolistic structure of the world informatics 
industry. As shown in this chapter, it is clear that those policies that have been most 
sensitive to the international structure of the industry worldwide, and to continuous 
changes in technology and markets have managed more successfully to achieve degrees 
of independence and autonomy (as it is the case for first-tier Asian NICs).
Regulation theory is useful-for understanding the role of the state as a key agent 
in the development process. Regulation framework also looks at other criteria (labour 
force, national S&T structure, structure of the demand for industrial products, industrial
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linkages, subcontracting networks, international competitiveness, etc) providing a focus 
which has been practically absent from theories of capital internationalization (NIDL). 
The result of state intervention in the development of informatics industries in the NICs 
are mixed.
Section 3.2 looked at the position of NICs in the international division of labour 
of the informatics industry. Comparisons are difficult and made even more challenging 
given the limited available data on the subject. NICs continue to play a relatively small 
role as producers o f informatics goods. First-tier Asian NICs and Mexico have 
developed to become important producers of low value added parts, components and 
finished products to be sold in the international markets. Much of the production is 
linked to TNCs international divisions of labour (branch plants, subcontracting 
networks) rather than national firms.
NICs are an important and growing market for informatics goods. In many parts 
of the world (amongst least developed economies and second- and third-tier NICs) the 
public sector continue to be the most important consumer for these new equipment and 
systems. In countries with more developed capital goods and services industries, 
informatics is increasingly being introduced to modernize, restructure and optimize 
production processes and services (section 3.2.1 above).
With respect to industrial policy, the experience o f the NICs covers a wide 
spectrum from import substitution led to export promotion led developments encom­
passing tight market protection (Brazil) to less regulated domestic markets (Argentina), 
and different graduations of export led promotion for the first- and second-tier Asian 
NICs (section 3.3 above).
Countries in South-East Asia have opted for an articulation with the global 
industry based on export promotion which has been described in terms of a two step 
system. In the first step these countries started their activities in informatics by turning 
themselves into assembly platforms to leading TNCs (cheap labour comparative advan­
tage). At a second stage, they gained some expertise in selected aspects of production 
and later on, the mastering of certain technologies (Henderson, 1989).
The NIDL theory explains these developments in South-East Asia and to some 
extent those in Latin America, as a result of capital internationalization initiated in the 
1970s in the AICs, and based on the search for cheaper labour costs as well as for new 
profit opportunities outside the AICs. Investors (TNCs) found in most of these countries
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the necessary social and political conditions they needed to solve the bottlenecks of 
growth emerging in the late 1970s, and they did so with a great deal of success (see 
Chapter Two, section 2.3 above).
Until very recently, capital investments in East Asia were and still are 
overwhelmingly directed towards the production for US markets (UNCTC: 1986). This 
is illustrated by the flow of exports coming out of SE Asia into the United States 
(US$5,200m in 1982). Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea accounted for US$1,312m, 
US$2,453m and US$1,5 17m respectively).
Mexico is also an important producer for American markets, a process that has 
been aided by geographical proximity to the United States and, more recently, by new 
developments in the North American region to include Mexico in a common northern 
market. In 1987, 85% of Mexico’s exports were microcomputers sold by IBM and HP 
(Fadul, 1987:225).
In the case of the first-tier Latin American NICs the situation is different. The 
arrival o f TNC branch plants was primarily aimed at enlarging regional markets of US 
based corporations. TNCs activities in these markets are restricted to larger sectors of 
the computer markets (mainframes), which are significant (40% in Brazil and 62% in 
Argentina), and more sophisticated peripherals and communication devices where 
indigenous producers have not the technology and/or production capacity to operate 
(Cline, 1987).
The trajectory of a NIC from an initial position of assembly platform of parts 
of electronics products to one of world producer o f informatics goods is not linear and, 
is not accessible to all countries. For the past 20 years of development of national 
industries a complex regional division of labour has emerged between countries in 
South-East Asia. These regional divisions of labour, like those that have already 
emerged inside Europe and even inside the United States, are quite uneven as illustrated 
by Henderson
" a distinct regional division of labour has now emerged with its own (albeit 
crudely defined) ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’. The emergence o f these cores has not 
been associated with their supplies of cheap manual labour, but if anything, with 
their increasing ability to provide good quality engineering and technical labour, 
with the development (in sometîiough not all cases) of their own production 
complexes, and finally, with particular forms of state intervention. ” (Henderson, 
1989:49).
The transition from assembly platform to a strategy of gaining greater control
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o f the development and production process described in the experiences of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong has unquestionably been associated with the promotion of  
programmes to raise the skills of national human resources and to alter a comparative 
advantage of these countries initially based on cheap low skilled labour.
While these regional divisions of labour are often associated with different 
productive structures and markets, there are distinct levels of social unevenness inside 
the factories and offices producing and using new computer and other informatics 
technologies. These inequalities are much harder to pinpoint, they refer to what Smith 
has described as shifts in the detailed divisions o f labour inside factories and work 
places as a result of the introduction of new production processes, new forms of 
organization and marketing. To address some of these differences I looked at technology 
transfer and changes in the labour market in the informatics industries in the NICs.
The main findings of these two sections (also based on limited available data) 
disclose different levels o f unevenness between the experiences o f the NICs and AICs 
and between different NICs. With respect to the first theme technology transfer, NICs 
are still heavily dependent on generic technologies developed in the AICs to start and 
develop their productive structures. The channels used for technology acquisition and 
the ability of individual countries to absorb new technologies vary over time within 
countries. These have included FDI, OEM contracts, licensing, reverse engineering and 
others. Many countries have managed to develop internationally competitive industries 
producing and marketing standard technologies. Success cases o f indigenous develop­
ments exist but are quite limited. NICs still face very high barriers to developing 
indigenous technologies and these are likely to increase with the growing concentration 
of R&D inside the AICs under new schemes of industrial collaboration described in 
Chapter two above (section 2.5.1). Programmes o f technology transfer cannot be 
dissociated from support of national S&T and R&D programmes, labour training and 
labour skill development.
The transition from the first stages of industrial development o f the informatics 
sector to more advanced ones have been paralleled by qualitative changes in labour skills 
and employment throughout the developing world. Section 3.5 described how 
employment trends characteristic of the AICs have manifested themselves in the NICs. 
Selected countries have managed to move one step further in the skill levels o f their 
national labour forces. With this asset in hand these countries are better prepared to
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bargain with TNCs to attract industrial investments. .As for providing for the 
development of human and scientific resources, differences in government and financial 
support reveal that most NICs to a certain extent have failed to devote the necessary 
attention and resources to developing and strengthening national S&T capacities, to 
fostering R&D in universities and industries and to raising the quality of education. The 
existence of a solid army of researchers, technicians, engineers and scientists are directly 
related to a country’s technology absorptive capacity. A highly skilled labour force helps 
countries move from industrial activities based on labour intensive, low value-added, 
task-oriented assembly production. It is no surprise therefore, that countries which have 
managed to develop and commercialize higher value added products are also those with 
higher numbers of scientists and engineers (first-tier Asian NICs).
The last part of this chapter has dealt with regional development and informatics. 
This section also followed a discussion initiated in Chapter two about the experience of 
the AICs with regional development policies linked%r having an impact on electronics.
NICs share with the AICs experiences of the development of EPZs and the more 
recent version of regional industrial development based on science parks. The EPZ have 
served and benefitted TNCs by offering these companies a convenient environment 
(abundant labour supply, security, proximity to ports) to carry out their operations. 
They have not, however, contributed to successful and sustainable regional development 
in many NICs.
The science park approach is a more recent AlCs-based experiment which for 
the last ten years has attracted the attention of regional policy makers in many 
developing countries. Most initiatives to develop science parks in the NICs have not 
gone beyond the planning stage and therefore cannot be fully evaluated. Very little has 
been done in support of industrial collaboration and cooperation amongst NICs. 
Experiences to date are limited and reduced to events organized by international 
organizations fostering South-South exchanges (Beer-Gabel & Conquy, 1984).
To conclude, the experience of the NICs in developing national informatics 
industries is extensive. Over 15 countries have designed some form of production and 
market-related policy to support these national initiatives. The results, it has been shown 
in this chapter, are mixed. Complex regional divisions of labour have emerged both 
inside and between Latin America and Asia. The shape of industrial structures, 
production organization, technology and labour markets are diverse and quite uneven.
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The next four chapters take up many of the points raised so far to examine the 
development of the Brazilian informatics industry, and these will be later brought 
together in Chapter eight.
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CHAPTER IV
IV Brazilian Informatics: Development of what? 
Development for whom?
4.1 Introduction
Article 2: The objective o f the national informatics policy is the development o f a national
capability in informatics activities to the benefit o f the social, cultural, political, technological
and economic development o f the Brazilian society.
Chapters four to seven focus on the Brazilian informatics industry. These 
chapters complement the analyses of global industrial development processes occurring 
in the AICs (Chapter two) and in the NICs (Chapter three), to focus here on the 
national level.
The in-depth study of the Brazilian experience is based on secondary and 
primary sources collected during three years of research (late 1986 to late 1989) and 
field work carried out in Brazil on two occasions in 1987/88 and in 1989.
Following a structure used in the previous two chapters, this analysis starts with 
a review of Brazilian industrialization from the early 1930s to the present. It then 
examines the national informatics policy, paying particular attention to the role of the 
state, the support given by the state to other sectors o f the electronics complex and to 
science and technology programmes in the country (Chapter four).
Chapter five looks at the structure and performance of the national industry, 
focusing on sales, employment and computer installations. Particular attention is paid 
to the case o f electronic banking. The chapter also examines the position of Brazil in 
the industry’s international division of labour, looking at legal and illicit import and 
export flows.
Chapters six and seven focus on the empirical research carried out in the field 
to examine the relationships between producers and consumers of informatics goods and 
services in selected parts of the country. This study aims to reveal different levels of 
social and spatial unevenness inside the national territory.
Together these four chapters substantiate the arguments put forth in this thesis 
about the links between the Brazilian industry and the global one, the need for the state 
to formulate policies which support the informatics industries internationally, and the 
different stages o f development or underdevelopment of the national industry throughout 
the country.
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The national industry referred to here includes both Brazilian owned, (domestic 
companies) and Brazilian based TNC subsidiaries, producing computers, parts and 
peripherals.
Chapters two and three demonstrated that the oligopolistic structure o f the world 
informatics industry has forced developing countries to seek ways to integrate their 
national industries with AICs based industries. A successful articulation o f developing 
countries* needs for informatics with the world industry determines the ability of 
national industries to benefit from technical developments occurring where leading 
corporations are, and the extent of their inclusion in and/or partial exclusion from the 
industry’s international division of labour (Delapierre & Zimmermann, 1986:111). 
Given the increasingly transnationalized structure of informatics total exclusion (or the 
notion o f industrial self-sufficiency) is practically impossible.
From a theoretical point of view, the possibilities o f a successful social, 
economic and political development of Third World countries vary. For the proponents 
o f dependency theory, development is essentially truncated and even ultimately 
impossible, as AICs depend on the existence o f less developed countries to supply them 
with raw materials (Chapter one, section 1.2). The proponents o f the NIDL theory 
associate the intensification o f capital flows into the Third World as a way out of 
underdevelopment, drawing data from the international movement o f electronics and 
textiles industries to prove their thesis (Chapter one, section 1.3.2). According to the 
NIDL thesis these patterns of capital internationalization revolutionized development in 
many parts of the world. The world wide crisis o f Fordism which lasted over ten years 
from the early 1970s to the 1980s (Scott & Storper, 1986), questioned the sustainability 
o f development in many parts of the world including Europe and the United States. 
Regulation theory’s greatest strength is to focus on the role o f the state as an actor and 
regulator of the development process. This theory offers an adequate framework to 
examine a complex web of regional divisions of labour between and within AICs and 
NICs’ informatics industries. The Brazilian initiative is analyzed within the framework 
o f regulation theory, looking at historical regularities and national accumulation 
strategies.
4. L I  Structure of the Chapter
This chapter focuses on the policies designed to support this industry. It begins
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with a historical review of Brazilian industrialization (section 4.2.1), and o f the 
battle between diverging political forces within the government (section 4.2.2) to 
provide the contextual background to explain (section 4.2.3) and critique (section 
4.2 .3 .1) the national informatics policy - Poltiica Nacional de Jnformâtica (hereafter 
PNI).
The political and industrial bottlenecks of the Brazilian initiative include, among 
other things, a conceptualization o f the electronic complex that is fragmented, i.e. 
different policies (or no policy) for each sector o f the complex (section 4.3), and 
insufficient and often inadequate national support for science and technology (hereafter 
S&T) in the country (section 4.4). Section 4.5 summarizes the main points o f the 
chapter and concludes by looking at key aspects of the policy and the national support 
given to this sector.
4.2 Development of Brazilian Informatics
4,2,1 Brazilian Industrialization: The Articulation of Strategies
The informatics model developed by different coalition groups inside and outside 
the government fits into a broader context of Brazilian industrialization, and is very 
similar to other industrialization strategies pursued in Brazil.
To a large extent Brazil’s social and economic structures are a result of state-led 
industrialization programmes employed from the 1920s onward. These uneven layers 
of social and economic development shaped the possibilities and constraints for the 
success o f individual industrial policies such as the national informatics policy.
State-led industrialization programmes, like the one developed to support 
informatics, have been used in Brazil for the past 50 years. For the most part, and 
independent o f the typology used to define models, development approaches in Brazil 
have favoured a growth path oriented from top to bottom where investments are made 
in key infrastructure and geographical areas, which are expected to cause a surge of 
backward and forwards linkages to promote the growth o f other industries, services, 
and therefore regions.
Brazilian industrialization began in the 1930s after the 1929 crash, the world’s 
first over-production crisis. The crash revealed the fragility of the country’s 
agricultural based economy and made industry appear an attractive sector for 
investment. At the same time the government made its first attempts to design a national
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industrial policy (Suzigan, 1978).
Industrialization which started with the First Vargas Presidency (1930 to 1945) 
was characterized by growth oriented economic development.^ Industrialization during 
this period aimed to develop a capital intensive consumer goods industry in a country 
that was also heavily dependent on the imports o f capital and intermediate goods from 
foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations located in Brazil (Cano, 1985).
Government actions included the application of a wide range o f fiscal and 
monetary policies to lure potential capital investments. These included, for example, 
the reduction of custom tariffs, exchange rate systems to favour imports of basic goods 
and raw materials, exchange rate benefits to foreign capital, public financing of selected 
projects, regional fiscal incentives, etc (Suzigan, 1978). TNCs benefitted the most, 
finding the country’s development programme sympathetic to their expansionist 
movements.
From a technology^ point of view, the immediate outcome o f this 
industrialization approach amounted to a limited transfer o f technology, little support 
and emphasis to the development of a national skilled labour force, and a restricted jobs 
creation plan to absorb a rising national population.^ In the long run this emphasis on 
the development of a capital goods industry had an instrumental role to play in the 
creation of markets for computers and other information systems and as suppliers of 
parts and components for the informatics industries. Less than two decades into the 
growth oriented development plan, Brazil became a net exporter o f TNCs profits.
An import substitution industrialization model (hereafter ISI) dominated Brazilian 
industrialization programmes from the mid 1940s to the mid 1960s. After this, the 
bottlenecks of the system undermined its reproduction. The Brazilian economy went 
through a recession and inflationary flights never before experienced. Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 illustrate the fluctuation of the GNP and inflation rates over a 50 year period. They 
reveal two big slumps o f the economy, one just prior to the military takeover in 1964,
‘ in "Brazil Survey" The Economist 25/04/87. Getulio Vargas governed Brazil twice. First was from 
1930 to 1945, followed by the second presidency from 1950 to 1954.
 ^The definition of technology used in this thesis is provided in Chapter 3:113.
 ^In 1940 the Brazilian population was 40 million. Twenty years later it was 70 million. "Brazil Survey" 
The Economist 25/04/87:5
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and the other coinciding with the second oil crisis in 1979. Since then the country has 
experienced a succession of crises (Barros de Castro & De Souza, 1985). The more 
recent period of economic distress will eventually undermine some of the successes of 
the national policy.
Figure 4.1 
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The early 1960s were also marked by a radical change on the political agenda, 
a civil government gave way to a military one, with the support o f the middle class. 
Under a military government, the armed forces openly participated in the country’s 
industrialization process by making explicit their preferences over where to allocate 
national resources. The new government’s development programme emphasized new 
investments, expansion and recovery of an industrial capacity, and the expectation that 
economic growth would trickle down to lower sectors of the economy and society.
The outcome was a broadening of the industrialization process into intermediate 
and capital goods, and a new wave of foreign direct investment that came in to profit 
from Brazil’s competitive advantages. In 1983 the country received 17% of the total 
stock o f FDI (foreign direct investments) in the developing economies, as compared 
with Mexico (10%), Singapore (6%) and Indonesia (5%). 48% of this FDI came from 
companies located in the USA, 13% in the Netherlands, 11% in the UK, and 9% in 
West Germany (World Bank, 1987:117).
Production was geared to external markets, enhancing a dependency on foreign 
suppliers and buyers at the expense of less profitable industries. National capitals, that 
in the previous model had their activities consolidated and whose interests then 
coincided with the activities of leading industrial sectors, were given the same support 
as Brazilian based foreign companies.
From 1967 to the mid 1970s a new export oriented industrialization model 
(hereafter EPI), replaced economic stagnation with economic boom: this period was 
known as the Brazilian miracle. From 1967 to 1973 Brazilian industry grew at an 
average o f 13.4% year. The country’s exports expanded 27.8% average yearly growth 
from 1969 to 1973, see figure 4.1 above (The Economist, 25/04/87). In the domestic 
terrain, supply (plenty o f fixed capital and an industry with idle capacity) and demand 
forces (fiscal and monetary policy, expansion of credit lines for the purchase of 
consumer durables) boosted the economy. At a world level, the economy experienced 
a period o f growth with a rise in foreign trade, and notably a rise of international 
liquidity from oil revenues. This last aspect enlarged the circulation of financial capital 
from oil producing countries to major world financial centres and on to the NICs. After 
1974, Brazil became a net importer o f financial capital.
As with the ISI, EPI strategies had concrete limitations. The bottlenecks o f the 
top to bottom approachiothesocial, economic and political development of Brazilian
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society became evident as economic trickle-down effects never materialized.
ISI and EPI unquestionably contributed to accentuate and deepen Brazilian 
industrialization through a greater concentration o f wealth around selected industrial 
sectors, and located in the traditional growth centres in the south east. At the same time 
it also magnified regional imbalances inherited from the colonial period through a 
steady growth of Brazilian population and their continuous concentration in selected 
areas of the national territory.^ Problems o f uneven development accrued. Regional 
development agencies such as Sudene, Sudeco, Sudesul and Sudani were set up to tackle 
historically created regional discrepancies. These served to legitimate military interests 
across different areas and national regions. They also seemed to separate the country’s 
regions giving them different strategic spatial values.
The so called high technology industries emerged in a period of worldwide 
economic instability, however, in spite o f the geo-historic conditions, they have 
developed with some success.
The current economic period is characterized by a series of localized crises and 
booms worldwide, which, as indicated in Chapter two, suggest that the world economy 
is in transition to a new regime of accumulation, one with its own particular 
configuration, and which will have distinct potential effects on national and regional 
economies (Harvey, 1989; Lipietz, 1985; Scott & Storper, 1986).
Chapter two described the main features of these new realities of capitalism 
(Chapter two, section 2.2), and some of the strategies available to AIC based industries 
to cope with an increasingly complex process of accumulation (e.g., industrial 
collaboration, section 2.5). Chapter three described the situation of NICs based 
industries, where the opportunities for successful participation in the international 
division of labour are even more demanding and complex.
Brazil’s economic situation in the late 1970s was characterized by moderate 
industrial growth as compared with the years o f the miracle. The average annual growth 
rate for manufacturing between 1976 and 1980 was 6.1%, with the capital goods sector 
growing 2.6% per year, and durable consumer goods growing at 11.6% per year. In 
1981 the economy went into a recession, with an average negative growth rate o f -
‘ By 1970 the SE region of Brazil (which occupies 10% of the national territory and includes four states 
of the Federation) housed 40 million residents.
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5.9% per year (Hewitt, 1988:53).
In addition, Brazilian industrial competitiveness was, and still is, a result o f very 
low wages, an over exploitation of natural resources (e.g., energy), and an excessive 
subsidy for exports (which are vital for the repayment o f the external debt), and not a 
result o f a modem and productive industrial complex (Suzigan, 1989). In the 1980s, 
and probably most o f  the 1990s, the country is a net exporter o f  financial capital. It 
is within this context that the national informatics industry has developed.
4.2.2 State and Military Roles in the Formulation of the National 
Informatics Policy
The Brazilian informatics industry began to develop with the support of the state, 
the military and of a national capitalist class. The National Informatics Policy and the 
institutions the state created are not extraordinary in Brazilian history.
The purpose of this section is to review the model to demonstrate that, on one 
hand, the PNI is part o f the country’s policy tradition; and on the other, it has been 
organized according to the interests and ideologies of its promoters, producers and 
professionals (Schwartzman, 1985).
Brazil has the oldest informatics policy in South America. In the early 1970s, 
the local industry was restricted to import activity of TNCs subsidiaries located in the 
country. Some equipment was assembled locally, but there was no local involvement 
in the production of data processing equipment.
Demands for the modernization of Brazilian military machinery, the desire of 
aspiring Brazilian capitalists to use the nation’s engineering skills, and a rising public 
sector demand for informatics equipment contributed to the formulation o f the policy 
(Evans, 1986:753).
In the late 1960s, the navy purchased six British frigates equipped with what was 
then state-of-the-art electronics navigation equipment. Fearful of a possible dependence 
on the British manufacturer, Ferranti, for technical support in operating and maintaining 
the machines, the navy insisted On sponsoring a project to develop a national technical 
capacity in electronics (Piragibe, 1985:117). Military interests converged with the 
intentions o f the National Economic Development Bank (hereafter BNDES) to stimulate 
technological self-sufficiency in the Brazilian industry. The Navy created a special 
working group, hereafter named GTE, to formulate a plan for the creation of a national
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computer industry. The Ministry of Planning, in turn, also set up its own agency in 
April 1972, CAPRE, the predecessor of SEI, in charge of the rationalization of 
computer purchases, the inventory of existing computer equipment in the country, the 
financing o f data processing activities, and the training of technical personnel.^
Concurrent to military developments, electronics engineers were emerging from 
national universities. Opportunities were available for some to leave the country to 
complete their training in American institutions, and for others, to work as sales 
persons for IBM or Burroughs (Dantas, V, 1988:32). Many o f these were later to 
become key figures in the defence of national capitalist interests.
In the early 1970s, these engineers developed and built a computer prototype and 
other digital equipment. The first Brazilian computer (the Patinho feiol was built in the 
Digital Science Laboratory of the University of Sao Paulo’s Polytechnic School. The 
project took two years to complete (July 1972). The machine had a memory capacity 
of 4K (Dantas, V, 1988:52).
Indigenous technological development did not stop with the computer prototype. 
Researchers at the Institute of Applied Economic Planning (IPEA) designed a special 
software system to read and reject incorrect census data, and the Special Projects Group 
of the National Data Processing Centre (SERPRO) developed a data communication unit 
with 32 monitors and interface boards to input the inland revenue data (Dantas, V, 
1988:62).
These products however were simply not manufacturable in Brazil. Local 
producers, that is TNCs subsidiaries located in the country, were not interested in 
converting local developments into commercial products but preferred to produce and 
distribute their own. This strategy pursued by Brazilian based TNCs was similar to the 
operations of other TNCs located elsewhere in the NICs, as described in Chapter two 
(section 2.3, and table 2.1).
The third element of pressure came from a growing public demand for data 
processing equipment. Prior to the informatics law, the supply o f those demands were 
met mainly with imports of systems produced by leading TNCs. In 1965 there were 89 
installed systems in the country 2/3 of which were IBM, followed by UNTVAC, 
Burroughs, NCR and two from Bull. By 1969 there was already a demand for
 ^ Decree No. 70.370 of 08/04/1972.
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informatics goods in Brazil which rose 27.9% a year between 1969 and 1981 (SEI, 
1982). As there was no local production, by 1974 informatics goods valued at US$ 94 
million, were third on the import list, surpassed only by airplanes and heavy 
agricultural tractors (Tigre, 1978:121). From 1973 to 1978, the national foreign debt 
went from US$5.8 to US$31.6 billion. This increase forced the reduction of the 
country’s imports, including that o f informatics goods.
The demands o f these three interested groups culminated in the announcement 
of two general recommendations. In the civil sphere, it was recommended that a 
production oriented policy be formulated to coordinate the creation of a national 
informatics industry, including the creation of a national computer firm. In the military 
sphere, the group recommended the support o f a research programme to build a 
computer and the necessary software to be used in naval operations, also known as 
Projeto GuaranySy to be financially supported by the FNDCT/Finep and Funtec/BNDES 
(Piragibe, 1985:118).
The company was to be set up through the association o f the government, a local 
firm and a foreign manufacturer. The idea was at first difficult to implement. Major 
TNCs were not interested in sharing their technology with a company in which they 
would have only a minor control, nor was local capital enthusiastic about the idea of 
sharing triangular business arrangements, that is an association o f state, national capital 
and foreign capital (Evans, 1986:793). It is worth mentioning, however, that the 
creation of companies owned and run as part o f the state’s administration has been a 
constant feature in the country’s approach to industrialization (e.g.,Volta R edonda ’s 
steel mill in the 1940s and Petrobrâs in the 1950s) (Schwartzman, 1985:3).
Cobra, the national state company created in 1974 was the outcome of a tripe' 
(three way) arrangement between Digibrâs (the state owned holding, in turn, owned by 
BNDES), EE Equipamentos Eletronicos (a small electronics components firm) and 
Ferranti, the British manufacturer.
Cobra was to play a leading role in the national effort to develop technologies, 
to form and train a capable labour force, to develop products and processes and, 
ultimately, to prove to Brazilian capitalists and other interested groups that it was 
technically possible to produce informatics goods in the country. At the outset of its 
operations, the company encountered innumerable difficulties. Cobra's first licensed 
product was an already obsolete Ferranti computer, \he Argus 700, sold as C-700 which
139
proved inadequate and difficult to sell in the Brazilian market (Evans, 1986:793). As 
a state company, Cobra also developed the government’s G-10 computer prototype 
project into a commercial product, the minicomputer C-500. This investment was a 
success. Sales of the C-500 consolidated the company’s role in the industry (Tigre, 
1987).
Opposition to the national informatics development plan came from both within 
and outside the state structure. Within the state apparatus the dispute between the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) and the Ministry of Communications 
(MINICOM), heated up in 1985 over differing views on policy.
MINICOM refused to separate the electronic data transmission activities from 
the non electronic ones, undermining SEI’s responsibility for the entire national 
automation policy. MINICOM defended an alternative national informatics policy that 
stood halfway between total market freedom and total autonomy. Moreover, it 
condemned SEI for prohibiting IBM from producing its system 32 in Brazil, for having 
lost the production of HP’s 30(X) machines to Mexico, and for having paralysed the 
microelectronics activities of Motorola and Philco (Gazeta Mercantil, 16/07/85).
These political differences contributed to the fragmentation of the desired 
integrated o f policy, and still affect present day initiatives to bring together diverging 
points o f view inside the state structure.
From outside the state, opposition to the policy came from TNCs located in 
Brazil, such as IBM. In 1979 the firm tried to launch its system 32 minicomputers in 
Brazil. The proposal, based on an import substitution industrialization scheme, went 
against policy restrictions on TNCs business in the mini and micro computer sector. 
IBM’s proposition was rejected and replaced by independent proposals from Brazilian 
firms. The pattern of the conflict appeared to be one where IBM tried to inflict a 
worldwide logic on the Brazilian political and industrial fabric, open it to the 
international market, and place the country in the company’s international division of 
labour.
Despite the obstacles hindering the formulation of a national informatics policy, 
electronics was becoming more and more important within the military. As a result with 
the support of the armed forces CAPRE was closed and substituted by a new agency 
in 1979 - the Special Informatics Secretariat, under the National Security Council.^
* For a detailed account on the political development of the national policy see Dantas, V. (1988)
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Prior to the democratization process, the agency could and did "interfere in all 
branches of government having to do with data processing - which means all o f them" 
(Schwartzman, 1985:6). In 1985, SEPs authoritarian power became incompatible with 
the new democratic ideals o f the Republic. To alleviate the situation, the agency’s 
activities were institutionalized into a law (Brazil: National Congress, 1984; Dytz, 
1987: chapter 5).
4,2,3 The National Informatics Policy
The previous section summarized some o f the key features of the political battle 
fought to establish a national informatics policy. This section examines the policy.
The national informatics industry development model was formulated to give 
priority to the development of a national technological and industrial capacity in 
informatics and other high technology sectors. The plan also hoped to improve the 
strategies earlier used in the previous ISI and EPI schemes regarding the incorporation 
o f learning aspects of technology and industrialization.*
The national model is a mesh o f mixed developmental strategies with wide 
ranging implications. It is anchored on the idea that informatics is strategically 
important for the country and because of that, national capital ought to be able, given 
the necessary support, to develop and accumulate technological know-how and 
competitiveness in digital information processing technologies (Dytz, 1987:15).
Figure 4.3 below is a diagrammatic representation of the government’s 
informatics industry policy. The idea is that the market reserve works to lower 
otherwise high entry barriers into a highly internationalized industrial complex for 
Brazilian owned firms that lack technology, by protecting infant Brazilian owned firms 
from the predatory attitude of transnational corporations whether based in Brazil or not.
The government chose the minicomputer sector to be the first one to operate 
under the new policy because at that time the mini systems sector was the most relevant 
to the demands of the Brazilian navy. But other sectors were to be developed later 
(Helena, 1981:83). SEI has the power to grant production licences to firms, and to 
oversee the distribution of products per firms and per technology areas. Without the 
presence o f TNCs, these firms could operate in a protected market environment and.
* Dantas, M. "Trabalho Oualificado é a safda para atrair investimentos" in Informe Abicompt no.27 
Set. 1988. See also, Dantas, M. "Urn novo desafio" in Informe Abicomp, no.28 Oct/Nov. 1988.
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should in theory be able to compete amongst themselves, gain the necessary experience 
and competitiveness, expand their product and technologies to, later on, confront 
transnational contenders in both foreign and national markets.
In this model, technology is obtained through transfer agreements with TNCs 
to reduce usual market entry barriers and minimize project and production problems 
which firms would probably encounter if  undertaking an indigenous product 
development themselves (Piragibe, 1985:110). Imports are also controlled by SEI and 
import quotas determined so as to monitor the process o f import substitution and 
accumulation of national technical expertise in the various product areas.
The model can be compared to a type of technological/product cycle. That is as 
national companies move through time (arrow "A"), they achieve technical competence 
in a particular product (i.e. micro computers, serial printers, etc.), new ones are opened 
up (that is protected from foreign imports) to indigenous development (super-mini 
computers, hard disk drives, laser printers, etc..), until most products complete the 
technological migration cycle. Technology complexity increases as companies migrate 
through the technology cycle (represented by Arrow "C"). Protection is ultimately 
removed when national corporations achieve a command over their technologies and 
international competitiveness, and it is not enforced in the markets for mainframes 
where TNCs hold the largest shares. With growing utilization of digital technology 
in many other industrial sectors, the national informatics policy expands its market 
protection to encompass micro, peripherals, microelectronics and suppliers sectors, 
industrial automation, digital instrumentation, and most recently super minis and 
software.^
 ^Informe Abicomp, no.23 May 1988 "Software law no. 7646.'
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4.2.4 A critique of the model
This techno industrialization cycle is structured around a set of prerequisites that 
must be met in order to maintain its continuous movement towards technological 
autonomy, international competitiveness and overall industrial development.
The first set of prerequisites concern the role of TNCs strategies as including 
a pre determined trajectory. 1) TNCs are providers of state-of-the-art technologies to 
national firms. 2) These companies, located in Brazil or not, must be willing to 
transfer authority to national companies over the use and sale of technological know­
how. 3) These transfers will allow the development of indigenous technological 
capacities within the country.
What, in fact, occurs is rather different. Changes in the patterns of capital 
internationalization, discussed in the Introduction, and in Chapters one, two and three 
indicated that both earlier and more contemporary migration of TNCs to Third World 
countries have never favoured the export of technological know-how, but the export of 
vertically disintegrated assembly plants (Chapter three). This strategy makes difficult,
Obsorb
if not impossible, -for national firms to product and process technologies
developed by TNCs. Instead, the model, gives no condition for the development of 
technologies as a process endogenous to society. Also locational approaches of TNCs 
no longer rely on earlier comparative advantages of many of the sites in the developing 
world, and now favour a return to locations within AICs, and the introduction of new 
process technologies (i.e., automation) to the NICs assembly plants.
Changes in the nature of the technologies used in products to dedicated 
components with closed architectures make their purchase and utilization by competitors 
quite limited. These barriers set limits to the ability of Brazilian firms to achieve the 
desired technological independence and industrial competitiveness in a number of 
hardware product areas available to them earlier. They certainly affect the fulfillment 
of the cycle’s future paths as Brazilian owned companies move through time, 
technologies, products, and so on.
The second assumption is that Brazilian companies will be able to acquire 
control over the use and sale of technology know-how. In Chapter three (section 3.4), 
the definition of technology used in this thesis goes beyond seeing technology as a 
product. Technology includes certain kinds of knowledge which allow the adaptation
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of means to ends. This knowledge, in turn, is embodied in machines, in technical 
experience/know-how/skilled labour, in organizational structures and behavior. Thus 
it is critical to have access to national resources to develop and expand local R&D 
capacity, a skilled labour force (or alternatively the resources to fund labour training, 
formation and re-skilling) and a commitment to develop local solutions to facilitate the 
arduous of technology transfer.
Brazilian policy and Brazilian companies operating in this sector have not 
recognized the importance of building a solid scientific and technological base from 
which to develop indigenous technologies, and companies operating in the sector 
overlooked and played down R&D activities at the expense of ‘safer’ (already tested 
elsewhere) and more marketable products. To demonstrate this section 4.4 below 
reviews government support given to science and technology programmes and illustrates 
that policies did not meet national needs and capacity.
The third assumption is that firms achieve productivity increases and become 
internationally competitive in their product markets. These two suppositions touch 
closely on the structure and extent of the development of capitalist social relations in 
Brazil. There is no indication of how productivity level can be raised. Brazilian 
labour is poorly remunerated and productivity levels are below international levels 
(Suzigan, 1989:21). Between 1980 and 1987 productivity gains in the S. Paulo industry 
averagecL14% per year, whereas during the same period Japan experienced gains of 
70.5%, 58.9% in Italy, 41.1% in Great Britain and 43.2% in the USA (USA Labour 
Office, in Folha de S. Paulo, 8/9/88).
Unless attention is given to introduce social innovations at the plant level such 
as new forms of organization of production, new worker-management relations, 
equipment and investments these productivity gains will not be obtained.
Brazilian firms could, nevertheless, become internationally competitive by 
following a strategy already used in the export sectors in the country. That is, one that 
relies on the low wage levels of the national labour force, which exploits local resources 
and receives heavy subsidies from the government to make products internationally 
price competitive. This strategy, needless to say, poses serious limitations to a more 
substantive social development at the local, community level, even if results amount 
to a positive balance of trade.
The model not only assumed too much about too many crucial issues but.
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according to congress persons (at the time supportive o f the PNI), confirmed during 
interviews that legislation drafted at the time of the approval o f the law covering aspects 
of R&D and human resource development was vetoed by the president during the 
approval o f the informatics Law in 1984. Vetoed articles included securing 0.8% of 
the national budget for R&D (Cz$ 960 bi in 1985), and providing resources for 
programmes on the impact o f informatization on firms productivity.
4,2.5 Summary and Conclusions
This section examined how the informatics development strategy fits into a 
broader context of Brazilian industrialization. The argument made here is that the model 
is similar to other sectoral industrialization approaches used in the past under the import 
substitution and export promotion industrialization strategies.
While the PNI has been seen as innovative by devoted nationalistic supporters, 
the model falls short o f promoting the necessary development o f social factors (e.g., 
a labour class, skills, etc.) which are essential for a successful economic performance. 
This limitation is present throughout the process o f Brazilian industrialization and in the 
country’s social economic structure.
One should keep in mind, however, that industrial policies and instruments are 
historically determined. The Brazilian approach was developed in 1979 and 
institutionally approved in 1984 when technologies differed substantially from now.
Many policy reviewers, including the government itself, tend to focus on the 
successes so far achieved using loosely articulated criteria that refer to the state of the 
industry in 1979. Or as a leading government officer remarked when asked how he 
would evaluate the national performance: "In 1979 we had only a handful o f firms and 
some 7 thousand salesmen working for IBM, now we have 300 firms and 50,000 jobs, 
isn’t this enough?" ^
From interviews and contacts carried out during field work in 1987-88 it is 
possible to surmise that inside the government and SEI in particular, amongst members 
of the industrial community, and amongst industry analysts, a feeling prevails that there 
is a need to improve the criteria o f evaluation and assessment, a criteria that can 
identify real strengths and weakness o f the national model and that could be applied to
 ^Personal interviews , SEI, Brasilia, Jan. 1988.
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make it more dynamic and flexible to technological, political, and market changes. The 
task of making the national informatics policy flexible and innovative, however, seems 
to be a real problem for Brazilian policy makers.
Responses given during the first round o f the company survey carried out in 
1987 give a mixed picture about industrialists’ perception o f the policy and the market 
protection.
Two questions focused on technology  ^ and market reserve. The first question 
asked firms to explain how much information (if any) they had about technological 
developments occurring in informatics worldwide and how they got this information 
(e.g., magazines, trade fairs, visits abroad, licensing agreements). The second question 
was about their reliance on foreign technologies, and if  positive, which type of 
technology (e.g., parts, components, software) they depended on. Firms were also 
asked about their opinion of PNI and in which way the policy helped or hampered their 
businesses.
With respect to technology, all respondents acknowledged that they were 
familiar with technological developments worldwide. Most recognized that their 
dependency on generic and proprietary technologies produced abroad obliged them to 
keep abreast with events occurring in the global industry. The extent to which many of 
these firms kept up with innovations elsewhere varied. Most mentioned the specialized 
literature and travel abroad as two ways to receive that information. Four firms referred 
to their licensing agreements with foreign producers as their vehicle to learning about 
new developments.
The general perception of the policy was a positive one. Many firms were 
formed after the policy was approved by government, and these firms could only 
operate under clear market protection. But, more important, firms argued that they were 
in the business to make a profit, the policy facilitated this profit making exercise as it 
removed foreign competition giving many firms the shelter they needed to operate in 
the sector.
Senior managers of large national companies were aware of technological
 ^ In the particular context of the letter survey I deliberately restricted the notion of technology to 
knowledge embodied in machines (parts, components, systems). This was done to facilitate the 
respond^ts’ task and to get a higher rate of replies. More extensive discussion about technology as a 
process, organizational structure and behaviour was left for direct interviews and field observation.
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innovations % and with many of the risks associated with excessive protectionism on 
the long term future of their enterprises. They referred to lack o f competitiveness, low 
production scale, limited capital, poor sourcing, scarcity o f trained labour, economic 
instability, to name a few. These survey replies were cross checked during field 
interviews carried out with industrialists, policy makers, industrial analysts, and 
researchers.
The convergence of sectors within the electronics complex is one crucial 
contemporary feature of the informatics sector in particular, and o f the electronics 
complex in general (Arnold & Guy, 1986). The implications o f this convergence are 
already felt at a world level, with a movement towards greater technological integration 
and multilateral cooperation in cost shared R&D programmes (Chapter two, section 
2.5).
Yet, technological convergence and greater interdependence between informatics 
and other sectors and spheres of the socio-economic life have not, in the case o f Brazil, 
been facilitated by an institutional convergence of the agencies in charge. As already 
demonstrated, their activities contain instead the frictions o f a very loosely arranged 
national science and technology programme marked by diverging national interests and 
ideologies. The following section examines the organizational structure of three other 
sectors o f the electronic complex and where their structures intersect with the 
informatics (computer and peripherals) production sectors.
4.3 Technological Convergence - Informatics and the Electronics 
Complex
In the mid 1970s, activities in the electronics complex were split both in 
production process and use of goods produced. Technological developments have since 
brought whole sectors together (e.g., the convergence of informatics and 
telecommunications), opened up new ones (e.g., automation, commercial, industrial and 
financial), and reshuffled the technological and strategic position o f sectors around 
(e.g., the software/hardware ratio). The restructuring of the electronics complex affects 
the strategies of the world’s industry leaders (TNCs), which in turn affect these sectors
 ^ From survey responses and interviews it was clear that senior and middle managers of large national 
firms were familiar with the introduction of new products in world markets, and were aware of new 
production and process technologies such as just-in-time systems, flexible production, industrial 
automation, and so on.
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at national levels.
The Brazilian electronics complex is very uneven both in terms o f its 
output/employment ratios, the origin of capitals in each sector (TNCs and Brazilian 
capitals), product and technologies, and the policies that regulate them. Super-imposed 
on this unevenness at the industrial and institutional national levels is an equally 
heterogeneous international structure.
This section comments on the situation o f telecommunications, consumer 
electronics and microelectronics to show key points of political friction in the national 
electronics complex. Table 4.1 below briefly summarizes: first, the capital structure 
of each sector at a world level; second, the types of articulation that exist between 
Brazilian and TNC capitals in the country by industrial sector; third, the origin of 
capital in each of the national sectors and, lastly, the nature of the industrial processes 
in Brazil by sector.
Table 4.1
Articulation of Brazilian Interests in Transnationalized Industries
Industry Type o f world 
industry
Forms o f capital 
articulation in 
Brazil
Origin o f capital 
in the national 
industry
Production
structure
INFORMATICS Transnational
Oligopoly
Partial exclusion 
of national logic
40% Brazil 
60% TNCs
product design 
assembly
TELECOM
MUNICATION
State
Monopolies
Partial exclusion 
of national logic
Mainly TNCs assembly
imports
CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS
Japanese TNCs Exclusion of 
national logic
Mainly TNCs. 
Supremacy of 
Japanese 
industrial 
strategies
assembly
imports
MICRO
ELECTRONICS
Transnational
oligopoly
Exclusion of 
national logic
Mainly TNCs imports
SOFTWARE Japanese TNCs Exclusion of 
national logic
National
production
copy
Each sector described in the table reveals a specific structure o f capital 
ownership in and outside Brazil. These differentiations have made the formulation of 
a single coordinated policy for the electronic complex a difficult, if  not impossible, 
task. Table 4.2 gives the value of sales position o f each sector vis-a-vis the whole 
complex, in US$ million.
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Table 4.2
Gross Profit of Different Sectors of the Electronics Complex, 1980-88
Sector
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
Consumer 
Electronics *
2174 1845 2101 1903 - - - - -
Telecoms @ - - - - - 437 636 617 1004
Informatics @ 860 1040 1608 1487 1728 2115 1126 2578 2465
Industrial
Automation
- - - - 86 101 199 294 309
Instrumentation - - - ■ - - 19 25 55 74
Microelectronics @ - - - - - - 209 242 348
* Geicon, 1984 in Piragibe (1987:128)
@ Brazilian National Firms and Brazilian Based TNCs 
Source: SEX (1989:13)
4,3,1 Telecommunications
From the early 1960s, the Brazilian telecommunications industry opted for a 
strategy with regard to TNCs which excluded potential national industrialists from 
participating in this sector and from developing a national digital technology capacity. 
The strategy was to open up to international investments in the sector. The government 
wanted to refurbish the national telecommunications structure to connect the entire 
country, and to satisfy military strategic concerns over the territorial and cultural 
integration o f Brazil. TNCs seemed better able to undertake the task. The idea was to 
build a modem, efficient telecommunications infrastructure which from the start planned 
to adopt fully digital technology in the Brazilian systems. A state company Telebras was 
created and given monopolistic power over the sector. The government also set up the 
national research centre CPqD, linked to Telebras to undertake R&D in all major areas 
of digital technologies from telecommunications (Hobday, 1985:28).
Telecommunications is an important sector of the electronics complex. In 
contrast to the informatics case, four leading Brazilian based TNCs practically control 
the national market for these products (Ericsson, NEC, ITT and Siemens) (Hobday, 
1985). TNCs also employ a greater number o f people than Brazilian firms, even if  
employment in the national companies has almost tripled in the last five years. In 1984, 
the Brazilian owned companies employed 5,250 people. In 1988 the number rose to
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13,526 (SEX, 1989). Brazilian owned firms concentrate mainly on the production of data 
concentrators, transputers and parts and components. The public sector is the major 
client (67.27% in 1987) followed by industry (13.36% in 1987) (SEX, 1989:42).
The national telecommunications base is the most developed in I^tin America 
(Hobday, 1985). From the user’s point o f view, this has helped the introduction of 
other services within the present network, making the first steps o f a convergence 
between telecommunications and informatics viable (e.g., the explosion o f local area 
networks, the connection of Brazil in the Bitnet system, the intensification of electronic 
banking throughout the country). On the other hand, from the point o f view of industry 
and production the antagonistic relations between informatics and telecommunications 
with regard to foreign capital, imports and structure of the sector’s labour force, put 
in jeopardy not only the existing links between the two sectors but the enlargement of 
the national companies’ share of the total Brazilian telecommunications market.
While the power of the state may have contributed to a greater participation of 
national capital in the sector, the dependency on the single public market raises 
problems any time there is a recession. Xn 1980, cuts in government expenditure rocked 
firms and threatened their position (Piragibe, 1986:129). Xn 1987 again, government 
procurement declined by 13%, causing a slump in sales of most sectors of the 
electronics complex. The concentration of purchases in the hands of Telebras was used 
to put pressure on Brazilian based TNCs to locate more manufacturing and R&D 
facilities in the country, and to demand greater technology transfer from these TNCs 
to local producers.
4,3,2 Consumer Electronics
Consumer electronics is the largest sector o f the electronics complex with a 
market with an estimated value of US$1930 million in 1983, or 56% of the total 
electronics market in the country (US$3430 million) (Piragibe, 1987:128).
Baptista, in one o f the best studies of this industry, describes how the television 
production sector has been restructured to accommodate the arrival o f foreign 
companies and new industrial policies (Baptista, 1985). Up to 1973, the sector was 
controlled by national capital. There were 20 firms producing black and white television 
sets in the country and all firms were located in the South east. Xn 1972 with the change 
to colour broadcasting, and the government’s decision to implement its regional policy
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project to create a free trade zone in the Amazon (Zona Franca de Manaus, hereafter 
ZFM), the position of indigenous consumer electronics industry deteriorated 
dramatically (Baptista, 1985). By 1978, 65% of colour television sets, 85% o f stereo 
systems and 90% of electronic calculators consumed in Brazil were produced in the 
ZFM. The number of television producers was reduced to eight (one national, two 
wholly TNCs and five joint ventures) (Baptista, 1985:23).
Leading companies in the sector (Panasonic, Mitsubishi, Semp Toshiba, Philco, 
Hitashi, Phillips, Sanyo, Gradiente and CCE) have, under the scheme in the Manaus 
import zone, enjoyed a business bonanza. In 1988, the sector sold US$3 billion worth 
of radio cassettes, compact disc players, colour televisions, and camcorders to a 
restricted group of Brazilian consumers who can afford items costing US$3500 (Semp 
Toshiba’s latest television assembled in the country), and are prepared to buy 
technologies developed seven years ago (Exame, 10/10/90). This success is, however, 
very tenuous. The consumer electronics sector caters exclusively for the country’s 
domestic market. Thus, any changes in the health o f the national economy (as opposed 
to changes in the international competitive arena which regulates consumer electronics 
sectors throughout East Asia), can directly affect the stability of the sector. The present 
market focus, production structure and heavy dependency on foreign technologies of the 
consumer electronics sector does not aid the formation of a solid and well linked 
electronics complex in Brazil.
4,3,3 Microelectronics
The presence of TNCs engaged in the production of components in Brazil dates 
back to the 1970s when Burroughs had a assembly line to assemble integrated circuits. 
In 1981 two Brazilian firms (Elebra and Itaucom) obtained government permission to 
enter the sector. In 1982 the Centre for Informatics Technologies (hereafter CTI) was 
created, to develop productive activities in the sector. CTI bought the technical 
equipment from Burroughs to start the encapsulation, assembly and testing o f integrated 
circuits (hereafter ICs), and began research activities to produce photographic masks 
from ICs (Piragibe, 1985:133). In 1986 the inter-ministerial industrial policy group 
decided to invest Cz$1.2 billion in R&D in informatics (including microelectronics and 
software) allocated to CTI between 1987 and 1989 (Folha de S. Paulo, 14/08/86:9).
Two empirical findings confirm the weakness of Brazilian activities in this
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sector. Microelectronics represented 14.47% and 22.07% of the total import bill in 
1985 and 1986 respectively.^ At the same time Brazil is not a key location for TNCs 
assembly activities, as indicated in table 4.3.
Table 4.3
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
LOCATIONS OF SEMICONDUCTOR 
ASSEMBLY, 1983
Country Value o f OECD imports o f  
semiconductors (US$mi)
Malaysia 1066.4
Singapore 820.6
Philippines 482.1
Republic o f Korea 385.1
Taiwan 359.4
Hong Kong 202.7
Mexico 145.2
Thailand 85.5
Indonesia 62.5
El Salvador 49.3
Brazil 30.7
Barbados 14.0
Total 3793.0
SourceiUNCTC (1983:35)
Despite the limited participation of Brazil in the international division of labour 
for microelectronics, some Brazilian firms have entered the market carrying out the first 
steps of ICs production (assembly, burning and testing). There are 23 companies in the 
sector. Thirteen o f these are Brazilian and 9 and subsidiaries of TNCs. Most o f the 
these companies are located in the Manaus export zone where they benefit from import 
subsidies of key components which are not deemed profitable to be produced in the 
country. As a result the import content o f microelectronics products produced in Brazil 
was very high (SEI, 1989).
On the demand side, semiconductors are crucial in the assembly o f other
 ^ "O Mercado de Bens de Informatica: Evolucao das Importacoes Autorizadas em 1985 e 1986. Volume 
I: Fabricantes e Fomecedores. Rio de Janeiro: Abicomp, 1988:25.
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products. The consumer electronics sector uses 61% of the total volume of imported 
components, followed by informatics (12%) and communications (10.8%) in 1983. 
Informatics, in turn, consumes 52% of the total volume of imported ICs (Piragibe, 
1986:130).
The ready availability of standard ICs on the market made it possible for many 
Brazilian firms to engage in computer production. National manufacturers of 
informatics goods did not see a need to develop a national capacity in the 
microelectronics sector, considering the ease with which these components could be 
imported. Also, national producers did not receive promised incentives and financial 
resources to enlarge their R&D capacity and activities in microelectronics.
Internationally, producers have moved to using new types of ICs, the so called 
ASICs with embodied manufacturer technologies, which make reverse engineering more 
difficult. At the same time, there is a growing competition between leading world 
producers of generic and proprietary ICs. Producers have increasing risks and 
development costs before they can launch a new product in the market.
The growing importance of microelectronics in the Brazilian industry has 
prompted the government to consider reformulating the national informatics policy to 
include the microelectronics sector (Rosenthal, 1987).
The new policy aims to create an oligopolistic structure where three companies 
are given total control of the sector. Itaucom, SID Microelectronica and Elebra have 
been chosen to lead the national plan. The import of finished components demanded by 
the Brazilian market will be controlled by this oligopoly as will the importation of 
components for their own assembly/production activities, and the commercialization of 
these imported and locally produced ICs in the domestic market. To facilitate this 
oligopoly becoming established, SEI will discourage the direct imports of components 
by Brazilian firms and re-direct the demand to the three national firms in control of the 
commercialization of ICs. Increased demand should allow the producer to achieve a 
needed scale to carry out their industrial activities in the area. The governments’ ability 
to offer this new type of market protection demands in exchange from the firms 
themselves a commitment to invest in R&D. The usual tax subsidies are included in the 
package.
Hence the national microelectronics policy follows a model similar to that of the 
PNI. The linkages between the two will jeopardize the success of the former even
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before the latter takes off. For example, the national microelectronics policy focuses, 
as in the previous case, on the production of IC hardware. The existing industrial 
activity uses imported machinery and wafers that are assembled, tested and sold in 
Brazil. The PNI gives no support to the production o f ICs in the country. The 
bottlenecks created thereby have hindered the transition of Brazilian firms from 
production of standard products to more sophisticated equipment. There are assumptions 
also regarding the role of TNCs in participating in the model as suppliers of 
technology. In 1983, US$30m of imported semiconductors from OECD countries in 
Brazil reflect the extent of TNCs assembly activities in Brazil, and not of exporting 
Brazilian firms.
The PNI is also weak with respect to the support it gives to development of 
S&T in the country. The section below reviews the national S&T programmes over the 
last 15 to 20 years.
4.4 Science & Technology in Brazil
Chapters two and three showed that in addition to having explicit industrial 
policies to support national informatics industries, both AICs and NICs must have a 
parallel support to developing national S&T programmes. In the case of the AICs, the 
existence of a fully developed capital goods industry and a high level of science 
education have facilitated this objective (English & Watson Brown, 1985). All countries 
discussed in Chapter two have devoted large sums o f money to support both basic and 
applied research.
While both first-tier Latin America and Asian NICs have developed national 
programmes to support S&T, the results are mixed. With respect to Brazil, a review 
of the available literature* and direct interviews carried out during field work in Brazil 
in 1988 with Brazilian professionals working in national S&T and R&D centres (CTI, 
NIT, NPCT, UFRJ, USP, UNICAMP), in the National Research Council (CNPq) and 
with the Ministry of Education (CAPES) show that S&T objectives have received 
inconsistent support from the government.
The first time the Brazilian government offered direct support to invest in a 
national technological capacity was in the 1960s through a BNDES funded S&T
* Klein & Delgado, 1988; Schwartzman, 1985, 1989; Schwartzman & Mora Castro, 1986.
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programme. This plan involved at least three agencies who would coordinate national 
efforts in this area. These agencies included the National Fund for the Development of  
Science and Technology (FNDCT), the National Research Council (CNPq), and the 
Ministry of Education Centre’s of Personnel Development (CAPES). This dissemination 
of resources between three agencies involved risk. On one hand if  properly coordinated 
it could benefit different target groups managed by each institution. On the other, it 
could have a weaker role with the dispersal of limited S&T resources amongst too many 
players.
From 1970 to 1978, it was the turn of the FNDCT together with its executive 
secretariat (FINEP) to flourish as the key agency to coordinate S&T in Brazil. New  
post graduate programmes were created, old ones were reformed and expanded, the 
national research infrastructure was modernized.
The results of eight years of support were quite significant. Investments were 
made in numerous areas, including computer science and electronics. A 20,0(X) strong 
team of researchers directly and indirectly benefitted from that support, and one 
thousand graduate programmes in most fields of knowledge were created during that 
period. In 1985, Brazil was second only to India in the number o f researchers and 
graduate programmes in the Third World (Schwartzman, 1985:6). Both the FNDCT and 
the executive secretariat FINEP enjoyed a privileged position within the restricted 
nucleus o f policy making, while at the same time there were plenty of resources around 
and political power within the state to mobilize those resources (Klein & Delgado, 
1988:28).
The situation changed after 1978. From that year to 1984 the FNDCT and 
FINEP experienced a marked political and institutional decline. Government funds for 
S&T were redistributed to other agencies including the National Research Council 
(CNPq) and the Ministry o f Education (CAPES). During this period "support was 
provided to research groups deemed competent with a minimum of bureaucratic 
complications and by passing both the university administration and peer review 
procedures" (Schwartzman, 1985:6).
A few specific programmes received generous subsidies. In 1985, for example, 
the Coordination of Post Graduate Engineering (COPPE) received 29% of all FNDCT 
resources. In 1976, the Rio de Janeiro Catholic University (PUC-Rio) received 40% of 
the year’s budget. In 1977 eleven institutions received 70% of the FNDCT funds (Klein
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& Delgado, 1988:30).
The decline of FINEP and the rise of CNPq and CAPES represented both a 
transfer of financial resources from one group of agencies to another and a shift in 
political power from the Treasury (which oversaw the FNDCT) to the Secretariat o f 
Planning (Klein & Delgado, 1988:31). By 1983 CNPq had fought to become the national 
agency for S&T. Figure 4.4 indicates the fluctuation o f resources made available to the 
FNDCT from 1970 to 1988. After 1980 the fund lost its political and economic power, 
which is has not recovered since.
Figure 4.4
National Fund for S&T - Resources Available 1970-1988
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H  Cz$ billion
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Source: FINEP (1987) in Klein & Delgado (1988:31)
Table 4.4 compares the distribution of resources between CNPq, CAPES and 
the FNDCT from 1980 to 1986. By 1985 the FNDCT received a limited 19% of the 
total S&T funds available while CNPq received 64% of them.
Table 4.4
Expenditure with S&T in CNPq, CAPES and FNDCT 
1980-1986 (% values)
Agency/
Year
80 81 82 83 84 85 86
CNPq 41.9 53.4 52.2 60.3 60.8 64.0 48.8
CAPES 4.6 11.2 12.6 14.9 16.2 16.2 18.7
FNDCT 53.5 35.4 35.2 24.8 23.0 64.0 32.5
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Government concern for S&T was institutionally quite specific. Under the 
newly formed New Republic in 1985 a Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) was 
created. The Ministry’s role was to concentrate otherwise dispersed efforts and to 
restructure the national S&T system. This aim, however, has never been achieved.
Other areas of the administration which had control over agencies involved in 
S&T reacted against the idea of concentrating all S&T under a new body. Interviews 
carried out in Brasilia in early 1988 with MINICOM’s staff confirm this. The Ministry 
of Communications refused to renounce its control over telecommunications systems. 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry reacted to keep control over its Secretariat of 
Industrial Technology (STI). Both ministries argued that MCT would not have the 
necessary political and institutional connections with the end-users (the industries and 
consumers) of these new technologies.
MCT, as result, was given fewer centres to manage. SEI was moved from being 
under the auspices of the national security council as \jJect the Council for Informatics 
(CONIN), the national laboratory (CTI), the export promotion zones (ZPEs) and the 
national research council (CNPq) (Folha de S. Paulo, 24/05/85).
S&T in the New Republic faced new problems, in addition to having a ministry 
with limited power to oversee and coordinate national programmes. According to 
Schwartzman from 1985 to 1988 the outlook for S&T in Brazil was negative. On a 
positive note, ideological discrimination and political restrictions imposed earlier on 
research were eliminated, cadres who had previously been nominated by politicians 
were now nominated by the scientific community, the mechanisms of selection, 
assessment and approval of research proposals and fellowships were made more 
transparent (Schwartzman, 1989:70).
Professionals working in the two largest grant giving/funding institutions in the 
country (CNPq and CAPES), concurred with these views during interviews carried out 
in 1988. It was acknowledged that both agencies had been able to enlarge their 
scholarship programmes', add new modalities of training (short and medium term 
training programmes), new areas of concentration (including all areas deemed to be in 
new technologies^), raise the levels of remuneration of researchers and university
' CNPq was able to increase the total number of fellowships (in-country and abroad) from 12.921 in 1985 
to 18.829 in 1987 (a 45% increase).
 ^These included: new materials, automation, informatics, biotechnology, telecommunications, software, 
and the social implications of technology.
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professors and launch ambitious programmes of fellowships abroad.
The national budget for S&T during the New Republic, which theoretically was 
to increase, became totally unrealistic under the prevailing conditions o f inflation and 
hyper-inflation of the national economy. In 1987 the total budget for S&T was Cz$17 
billion representing 3.07% of the national budget. The breakdown of budget activities 
is described in table 4.5. In 1970 S&T received 0.84% of the national budget. In 1984 
the figure increased to 3.2% and in 1986 it corresponded to 2.8% (Schwartzman, 
1989:64).
Table 4.5
Breakdown of 1987 Budgeted Expenditures in S&T in Brazil
(Total budget Cz^l? billion)
Areas/Activities %
Small stand alone projects & 
administrative function
40
20 large projects/activities @ 60
@  Breakdown of expenditures in large projects %
Military research purposes 36.6
Agriculture research 18.7
CNPq operations
(including the FNDCT and all research 
institutes under CNPq)
28.4
Energy research 6.7
CAPES 5.8
This increase, however, has not been consistent. Both CAPES and CNPq have 
suffered from economic constraints faced by the country at large (inflation, lack of 
funds to invest, state bureaucracy), and have failed to develop comprehensive 
programmes to maximize the rates of return on new investments.
Events in CTI under SEI were no different in 1988. Set up 1 1  in 1982 with an 
explicit mandate to promote the development of scientific and technological research in 
informatics^ six years later, the Centre was facing financial difficulties, lacking basic
 ^ CTI has four institutes. The first is responsible for R&D in the area o f industrial automation 
(CAD,CAM, robotics); the second is responsible for R&D in digital instrumentation; the third in 
microelectronics (encapsulation, mounting and testing o f ICs) and the last is responsible for R&D in
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research funds to acquire new equipment deemed vital for research activities in the four 
areas of operation.
One area that has suffered is the human resource development programme 
(Programa de Formacao de Recursos Humanos). This programme included training, 
institutional support to universities and research centres, development o f effective 
monitoring and evaluation of training programmes and absorption of fellows who have 
completed their programmes in-country and abroad.
The quality and quantity of Brazilian scientific and technological capacity is 
therefore heterogeneous. While there is a large contingent o f engineers and technicians 
in Brazil vis-a-vis other developing countries, both personnel and facilities are 
concentrated in the south east o f the country. In 1985 the region accounted for 62% of 
all researchers, 65% of all research and teaching institutions, 66% of places in the 
universities, 74% of all masters programmes and 92% of all doctorate courses in the 
country (Schwartzman, 1989:65).
In addition to national programmes in support of S&T, individual states have 
devoted resources to research. The agencies with greater power and influence include 
the Foundation in Support of Research of the State of S. Paulo (FAPESP), a similar 
outfit for the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ), established in 1988, and one for Minas 
Geraes. The first obtains resources from state taxes, which in 1986 represented a 
meager 0.36% of the collection (Schwartzman, 1989:65). The former, has been forced 
out o f business due to the lack of political support from state leaders.
In 1986 the World Bank initiated a programme in support of the development 
of science and technology in the country (PADCT). At the time of this research there 
was little information about the programme, which according to some was already 
facing problems with the payment of cost sharing contributions from the national 
government and with increasing external restrictions by foreign governments and 
manufacturers in the procurement of imported equipment and technology (one of the 
strong points of the original plan).
In 1988 the permanent scientific commission to the MCT, in a report presented 
at the 40th Annual Meeting of the Brazilian Society for the Development o f Sciences 
(SBPC) affirmed:
computer architecture and software.
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"By late 1988 the MCT was already debilitated, politically marginalized and 
susceptible to political party influences. The ministry was not always in tune 
with the interests of the Brazilian research community, and it was impotent to 
preserve and protect Brazilian research institutes and institutions from the 
impact of the national economic crisis." (Schwartzman, 1989:65).
In January 1989 the Ministry of Science and Technology was abolished by the
Samey Government. As one observer argued, the New Republic reduced and dispersed
S&T resources amongst competing lobbying groups and political interests. The creation
of a ministry was just not sufficient to give the sector the political weight it needed to
continue suppodiiÿ&T in Brazil (Schwartzman, 1989:63).
To conclude, the fragility of the national system of S&T results from a
fragmented and uneven support of S&T in the country. The absence of a more
orchestrated programme covering S&T, human resource development, science
education, R&D, interface industry/university has undermined and weakened the
achievements made during periods of relative success of the national S&T policy. S&T
suck
also competed for limited resources with other mgjor issues as the national debt, urban 
crises, poverty and social pressures, labour strikes, indebted state enterprises, etc, and 
it has lost.
4.5 Summary & Conclusions
This chapter is the first of four to focus on the Brazilian informatics industry. 
The chapter examined primarily the National Informatics Policy (PNI), the context in 
which is has been formulated, the links (or absence of) with other sectors of the 
electronics complex, and the support for science and technology in the country.
The Brazilian experience, is however, hindered by obstacles created by the 
policy itself. Four areas of concern have been identified:
1) The high level of disarticulation of the national economy, industry and 
policy with the global context;
2) The closed circuit shape of the policy and its institutional rigidity 
represented by the law;
3) The disarticulation between informatics policies and other sectoral 
policies for the electronics complex;
4) Poor and inadequate support given to science & technology (S&T). 
Firstly, the Brazilian experience with the development of informatics
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over the last 25 years has gone through periods of economic growth and expansion 
(1970s) which naturally and positively influenced the events in the early years of the 
industry, and through periods o f economic decline and extended crisis (the so called lost 
decade o f 1980s). During these 25 years Brazil continued to rely primarily on import 
substitution strategies, to protect the national industry and markets from international 
control.
Import substitution did not favour the integration of national production systems 
with those in AICs and prevented national producers from becoming competitive 
abroad, and at the same time, it did not bring about the expected results (social and 
economic developments), which is visible in the 1990s.
Secondly, the focus for the policy. The main pillar of the PNI is the market 
protection of selected product/components markets which functions as a gauging 
mechanism to regulate technology transfer, to control the operations of foreign investors 
in Brazil, and to promote the development of indigenous technologies, firms, products 
and markets. In addition, the policy focused strictly on the production of hardware. SEI 
opted to consider software an immaterial technology, easily transportable, that could be 
copied onto disks or magnetic tapes and which was not to be protected by copyright 
laws (Piragibe, 1985:134). This position gave the green light to Brazilian producers to 
pirate all sorts o f software and be protected by the absence of regulation. The decision 
also discouraged potential companies from seeing software development as a strategic 
and potentially profitable market.
Departing from a situation of disarticulation with the international logic, the 
experience o f Brazil in bringing about a successful articulation o f different industrial 
sectors (part of the electronics complex) and segments of society (government, 
universities, professional organizations), has been quite limited.
Digital technologies have brought together different industrial sectors into a 
single electronics complex (see in the Introduction). Leading TNCs have, in the course 
of their development, brought together these different sectors to gain further control of 
products and markets and to stay at the forefront o f the technological race. In the 
review of AICs countries Chapter two indicated that Japan, France, and later the 
European Community, have constructed institutional mechanisms to facilitate this 
needed convergence o f industrial sectors. In the United States the convergence has not 
been explicit from an institutional point of view, but has been organized around leading
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American corporations. More recently, industrial collaboration and other forms of 
cooperation between companies, countries and regions have emerged offering new ways 
to facilitate the vital need for convergence of resources, expertise and capital.
The Brazilian experience has worked against convergence. It has been shown 
in this chapter that different policies were formulated for different sectors, the lack of 
a coordinating body to oversee the various policies contributed to that.
Lastly, the quality of support given to S&T in the country has had an impact on 
the sustainability of the policy and of the achievements made so far. Brazilian S&T has 
suffered from an uneven and fragmented institutional framework and inconsistent 
financial support. It has also faced the dilemmas of a country going through a long 
period of economic crisis and decline.
The next chapter focuses on the performance of selected sectors o f the 
electronics complex. The chapter will provide further evidence about the Brazilian 
experience and substantiates the discussion on the interrelationships between the 
Brazilian and global industries.
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CHAPTER V
V Structure & Performance of the Brazilian Informatics Industry 
5.1 Introduction
Chapter four has focused on the political aspects of Brazil’s informatics policy 
and industry, and on those of other countries (NICs and AICs). The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the linkages between the Brazilian informatics industry and 
foreign ones looking at the level and competitiveness o f the former. Three criteria of 
industrial performance are examined here: sales, employment and computer 
installations. Competitiveness is also measured by cost, quality and technological 
advancement of Brazilian-made products vis-a-vis international producers (external 
competitiveness).
In contrast with most product markets, performance in the electronic banking 
sector stands out. Using both primary and secondary sources of data, this sector is 
examined in this chapter for its unique and demand driven growth (section 5.2.4).
The data used in this chapter comes mainly from secondary sources in both 
government (SEI), industry associations (ABICOMP), business reviews (Gazeta 
Mercantil and Conjuntura Economica) and industry studies^ The type of data 
necessary to measure international competitiveness is export performance, but this is 
scanty. Since Brazilian producers have a limited export capacity and there is limited 
information on costs^, this chapter also focuses on the internal competitiveness between 
Brazilian firms (including TNCs operating in the country), and at import flows (section 
5.3). Another salient feature of the Brazilian industry is contraband and how it affects 
internal competitiveness. This issue is rarely addressed in the literature given its nature. 
Section 5.3.2.3 focuses on this theme. Finally, section 5.4 summarizes and concludes 
the chapter.
5.2 Structure and Performance of the Industry
This section examines sales, employment and computer installations.
 ^Hewitt, 1988; Piragibe, 1985; Tigre, 1983, 1987.
 ^At die time of this research only two studies had been carried out looking at microcomputers (Tigre & 
Ferine, 1984) and printers (Piragibe, 1984).
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5.2.1 Sales
Over a period of ten years from 1979 to 1988 the national industry (including 
the activities of Brazilian based TNCs) rose to be among the top ten largest industrial 
sectors in the country. In 1988, the industry experienced a growth of 14.6% above the 
national average of 31 sectors of the economy (Tigre, 1988:6). At the same time profits 
of Brazilian owned firms have increased steadily from 1979 to the present. In 1987 
profits exceeded those of Brazilian-based TNCs by US$ 444 million.^
Figure 5.1 shows the growth of total sales of Brazilian^janS^TNCs in US$ million 
for the period indicated. Recapitulating from the previous chapter, the reasons behind 
this steady increase in sales lie behind the creation o f a protected market in Brazil for 
the manufacture of small scale computers. The selection of the mini market as the 
starting point was a timely coincidence with technological developments occurring in 
computer architecture (reduction of machines and increase in processing capacity) (mid 
1970s) and later on with the appearance of the microcomputer. Both developments 
opened new markets and found an untapped demand in Brazil.
TNCs operating in Brazil have experienced a more gradual increase in sales. 
TNCs operate in different product markets (mainframe and support systems) and have 
had their operations regulated by the market reserve policy.
Figure 5.1
Sales of Brazilian and Transnational Companies 
US$ million
1750
1500
Brazilian
TNCs1250
1000
750 -
500 -
250 -
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Source: SEI (1989:13)
Informe Abicomp, Encarte no. 18, no. 25/26 Aug 1988.
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5.2.2 Employment
Brazilian firms have generated more jobs than their TNCs counterparts. Figure
5.2 demonstrates that employment in nationally-owned firms went from 50 in 1977 to 
26,344 in 1988. Employment in the Brazilian based TNCs increased from 2,450 in 
1977 to 7,383 in 1988 (SEI, 1989:34).
Figure 5.2
Employment Change in the Brazilian Informatics Industry
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Source: SEI (1989:14)
Employment growth parallels company growth. In 1987 there were 3(X) 
domestic firms and 31 transnational corporations operating in the sector. Eight years 
earlier there were only 37 domestic and three TNCs operating in the sector. Most of 
those firms were created after 1976.
The position of informatics in the electronics complex in significant. In 1988 
there were approximately 3(X),(X)0 people working in the Brazilian electronics 
industry \  In 1988, informatics, telematics, industrial automation, digital 
instrumentation, and microelectronics sectors absorbed 68,264 employees, software and 
informatics services (e.g., maintenance, sales, software houses and training, 
consultancy) sectors accounted for 257,(XX) employees. From 1981 to 1986 employment 
grew by 330% in the domestic sector of the industry.^
Figure 5.3 shows this increase in five selected sectors, indicating the 
development of new sectors such as automation and instrumentation.
1 Informe Abicomp no.25/26 Aug 1988, and in "Recursos Humanos: o novo desafio a polftica de 
informitica". Ciência Hoje, vol.6 no.33, p.70-71.
 ^ Informe Abicomp no.25/26 Aug 1988, and in "Recursos Humanos: o novo desafio a polftica de 
informatica". Ciência Hoje, vol.6 no. 33, p.70-71.
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Figure 5.3
Employment Change in the Brazilian Electronics Industry
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R&D jobs as a proportion of total employment is also an important criterion for 
measuring the quality of employment and nature of the productive activity within 
companies. SEI does not offer a definition o f R&D in its industry survey. Tigre (1986), 
in turn, has classified R&D in terms of activities resulting in imitation, modification, 
design and innovation.
According to government sources, Brazilian-owned firms employ more R&D 
personnel than their TNCs counterparts (in 1988 16,184 and 5,300 respectively) (SEI, 
1989:15). This not only has been confirmed by the survey but, echoed in interviews 
with managers of two of the largest TNCs in the country, who justified their limited 
focus on R&D as necessary to their corporate strategies (which are primarily concerned 
with marketing and effective customer support services). In 1983, TNCs employed 
1,204 people in their marketing divisions, the equivalent to 42.8% of their university 
level employment. In 1987 there was a slight decrease to 36% of white collar jobs (SEI, 
1989:25).
In the questionnaire I asked firms to list different sources of technology (direct 
import of parts, cloning, licencing, training) used in their operations, and different 
categories of R&D activities performed in their plants (as a production process, as a 
product, investments, market and managerial strategies). With respect to the first part 
of the question, most firms answered that they used direct import o f parts and licensing 
as a way to gain access to imported technologies. Few firms admitted having 
heard/practiced cloning and other forms of industrial espionage and illicit practices to 
gain access to new technologies and/or to increase the value added o f their products. 
R&D activities were difficult to measure given the different ways to classify R&D 
occupations. Responses given in interviews indicate that firms tended to group
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employees who had technical and university education under R&D or product 
development categories. This was done to satisfy, in part, SEI’s standard survey 
questionnaire. Firms admitted, however, that in practice workers might not be directly 
involved in any activity linked to R&D (e.g., product and process development, 
adaptation and testing). Many firms did not have a proper research and development 
division but carried R&D activities along with production. Only two companies stated 
that they had a separate R&D division.
Table 5.1 shows the proportion of higher education employment for Brazilian 
firms affiliated to Abicomp over three years. This table, however, clusters under the 
‘technicians* heading both those who might be involved in R&D (e.g., engineers 
working in process and product development) as well as tecnicos. or workers who have 
studied in technical vocational schools (e.g., electronics, electric engineering).
Table 5.1
Informatics Employees with Higher D^rees
year/category 1986 1987 1988*
Technicians 6730 6489 6448
Sales Persons 3227 2592 2922
Administration 3815 2664 2591
Total 12772 11745 11961
Source: Informe Abicomp, no.23 May 1988, no.28 Oct 1988
SEI monitors skilled employment by the quantity o f university professionals 
employed and their activities according to five areas (production, marketing, product 
development, services, administration and human resources). According to this 
classification, in 1983 Brazilian firms employed 1,177 professionals in product 
development or 30.3% of the total number of university level employees. In 1987 they 
employed 1,818 or 25.2% (SEI, 1989:25).
TNCs in turn have fewer people engaged in R&D activities. In 1983 they 
employed 121 people in product development or 4.3% of their total white collar 
employment. By 1987, R&D employment totaled 213 jobs or 5.6% (SEI, 1989:25). 
Managers working in these firms confirmed that most of these posts were filled by 
engineers working on the adaptation of foreign made products and production processes 
to local conditions.
To conclude, Brazilian-owned firms have experienced a positive growth in sales 
and employment since the approval of the national informatics policy. In both criteria
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they have had a better performance than their TNC counterparts.
This positive performance has to be seen in some perspective. Growth in sales 
by domestic firms have been possible by changes in computer technology and in market 
protection. While there has not been any significant change in the quality (value-added) 
of products sold by Brazilian owned firms, the types of products (product 
diversification) have increased.
Employment has grown in absolute terms in the Brazilian owned sector and it 
has stabilized in the TNCs. It has been shown that TNCs have maintained their focus 
on marketing and customer support services, which explains their limited number of 
R&D occupations. In the case of the Brazilian-owned sectors, employment has 
experienced a qualitative change with the upgrading of labour skills (Hewitt, 1988). 
The next criterion is computer installations.
5.2.3 Computer Installations
The first computers installed in Brazil were imported mainframe systems. In 
1960, the first electronic computer was installed at the Catholic University of Rio de 
Janeiro. Following the inauguration of the PNI the first Brazilian built computer - the 
Cobra C530 came onto the market in 1979. Still, it was only after 1982, when 
nationally assembled micro computers hit the market, that the Brazilian owned industry 
began to grow.
Computer installations in Brazil are grouped, according to SEI’s classification, 
into six different categories varying in size and power. Class 1 computers comprise the 
smallest machines produced in Brazil (8-bit), and Class 6 are mainframes. This 
classification has become obsolete as hardware technology has changed. SEI was aware 
of the problems with its data base but, at least during the time of the field work, it had 
not plawieito reformulate its compilation system.
Table 5.2 indicates the increase in computer installations in Brazil from 1970 to 
1987. Figures represent absolute numbers.
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Table 5.2
Computer Installations in Brazil, 1970-1987
Class
/yr
70 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 86 87
1 - 586 2143 3846 4791 8756 76289 352146 545285 707553
2 - 19 173 356 1015 2719 4133 5132 6772 8019
3 378 639 1057 1296 1494 1858 224 2710 3554 4585
4 122 250 327 353 377 408 430 660 717 827
5 2 45 82 122 226 374 711 866 1008 1147
6 4 33 61 87 97 134 232 198 299 453
Total 506 1572 3843 6060 8000 14249 80019 361736 557673 722649
SEI - Boletim Infonnativo, various issues
According to the table, the sharp rise in installations o f computers in classes 1, 
2 and 3 can be in part justified by the technological innovations in microelectronics 
which opened up new product and market frontiers. The first Brazilian produced micro 
computer came two years after their launch in the USA. National market protection led 
Brazilian firms to become focused and highly dependent on local sales. This national 
market, although large enough to accommodate a range o f product lines, is still 
relatively limited in terms of scale. There are also far too many manufacturers, 
especially of micro computers (37 in 1985 and 25 in 1988) whose licence to produce 
has been given by SEI. Consequently, most of the products are produced on a batch 
process and with low levels of automation.^ That, coupled with a rather inefficient and 
poorly structured final producer-supplier relationship; the absence o f a well developed 
nationally-owned electronic supply industry (the consumer electronics sector is 
dominated by Brazilian based TNCs); the dependency on crucial imported components; 
and unfavorable exchange rates make even batch production a rather irregular activity.
The table of computer installations has to be looked at selectively. The number 
of installations increased from 506 in 1970 to 722,649 in 1987, as has the value of the 
existing installed capacity. The Brazilian owned sector is also increasing its share of 
the total value of installed capacity. However, Brazilian participation is based on the 
commercialization of standard low-technology systems (16 bit micros, serial printer and 
5.1/4 drives). Top selling products in 1987 were printers (92,796 units), drivers
‘ in Personal interviews, company questionnaires. See also Frischtak, 1986:1.
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(61,637 u), 16 bit micros (59,239 u), 20MB hard disks (32,222) and modems 
(30,532).:
It is difficult to determine the type of application given to these systems. 
Financial sectors and industry lead in the number of installed systems, followed by 
commerce, government and the services industries. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of 
demand among sectors of the economy. This point will be further discussed in Chapter 
six.
Table 5.3
Demand for Informatics Goods by the Different Sectors of the Economy
1980 to 1987 (%)
Economic Activity 1980 1981 1982 1983 . 1984 1985 1986 1987
Government 17.7 15.9 11.9 9.0 13.2 12.5 16.24 15.87
Commerce 34.5* 37.9* 19.6 16.8 19.4 18.3 21.47 19.2
Industry 26.2 25.6 29.1 28.2 27.7 32.5 31.79 33.03
Financial Sector" 20.7 19.4 29.6 30.4 29.5 28.0 21.61 21.07
Services - - 9.8 15.6 10.3 8.7 9.89 10.83
* Includes services 
Includes both public and private financial sectors 
Source: SEI (1989:23)
Many different sectors of the economy now use computers in Brazil. In most 
cases these systems comprise large mainframe systems to perform large scale 
computations.^
During visits to offices and plants, I was able to observe that the introduction 
of Brazilian built informatics systems was, to some extent, replacing manual tasks by 
automated or partially-automated ones. These included a range of office work, 
inventory control, equipment testing. This was also quite evident in the banking and 
commercial sectors. The existing product/application structures were, however, far from 
allowing users to utilize informatics systems as tools for knowledge production. The 
simplicity of nationally-built systems, the strict regulations on imports of the most 
sophisticated equipment, and limited resources for R&D, hampered the process of 
modernization of user sectors both in terms of their access to state-of-the-art 
technologies (from abroad), the low quality/performance ratio of Brazilian-made
‘ Informe Abicomp, no.23, May 1988:3 "Produtos comercializados pela indüstria nacionaP 
 ^Dados e Ideias, no. 126, 1988 "As 500 Maiores Empresas Usuarias de Informatica".
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products, and the manufacturers’ poor customer support and maintenance infrastructure. 
Furthermore computer installed capacity should not necessarily be related to economic 
growth. In 1988 the number of Brazilian large computers installed (9203 units) was 
five and a half times larger that of Korea (1646 units) and the latter enjoyed a more 
stable and promising economic life than Brazil (Tigre, 1988:3).
To conclude, these criteria (sales, employment and installed capacity) are useful 
in measuring industrial performance as the figures unquestionably confirm the merit of 
the PNI in creating a sector that did not exist and making it into what it is today. One 
must, however, be cautious when looking at the aggregate data available on industrial 
performance in terms o f its credibility and representation and in what it conceals about 
the present industry structure. The efforts to desegregate the indicators chosen - sales, 
employment and machine installations - run into issues of confidentiality and firms’ 
secretiveness about revealing information or disclosing corporate strategies that conflict 
with policy principles. An area often referred to during interviews was the growing 
volume o f illicit importation of parts and components as a way to bypass import barriers 
and to reduce costs. Chapter seven returns to this point looking at spatial concentration 
and dispersal of firms, users and sales in different parts of the country.
One subsector o f the national informatics industry that has performed well is 
electronic banking. This success has not been analyzed by the literature, which, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, has focused on aggregate performance in the sector as 
a whole. Successes in electronic banking bring together many elements o f the 
development o f the industry and these are discussed below.
5.2Â Breaking Technological Barriers: Electronic Banking
The purpose of this section is to examine one sub-sector of the informatics 
industry which has performed significantly well, driven by growing demands from 
users, in this case the banks. Many banks, in turn, own or have large stakes in some 
of Brazil’s largest informatics companies. What is particularly interesting about this 
sub-sector is the successful match of bank’s informatization needs with the level of 
technological capability of national firms.
Brazilian banks have used new information technologies to assist them in 
restructuring their internal financial operations to keep up with volatile changes in the 
Brazilian economy. Rising inflation and indexation o f the economy forced banks to seek 
new more effective data management mechanisms, and to develop new customer-user 
interface to give clients access to vital information.
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The information used in this section was collected during field work in 1987 and 
1988 from primary sources (interviews with managers of 3 banks - Itau, Bradesco and 
BNDES, and with companies owned by these banks) and secondary sources (articles in 
the press and government data).
In the early 1970s banking automation was unknown in Brazil. Industrial activity 
in this sub-sector was insignificant and a potential market was to be developed. 
Table 5.3 above demonstrates the increasing demand from the financial sector for 
informatics goods. Between 1980 and 1984, when sales of equipment peaked, the sector 
increased its participation by 9.5% points. This demand, coupled with a strong 
campaign to promote a national informatics industry, attracted financial and other 
capitals to enter the sector. The market protection artificially lowered entry barriers and 
gave nationally-owned companies a guarantee of return on their investment.
According to managers in three of the largest banks in the country, banks found 
in the government offer an opportunity to diversify their investments into areas 
outside its financial sector, while at the same time enabling them to introduce 
informatics into the banking system.
Research shows that banks entered into partnerships or became sole investors, 
in many national companies. Some of these banks have a long tradition in industry. 
Group Itau SA, a conglomerate with stakes in the financial sector (Itau Bank), the 
industrial sector, the informatics sector (Itautec), and microelectronics (Itaucom, and 
later Itaucam). Others, like the Bradesco Bank, started solely as a financial and 
insurance company with no experience in industry. Bradesco began the introduction of 
on-line access to its network by purchasing custom-made equipment from Sid 
Informâtica and Digilab. In 1983, it increased its control over the latter. Ownership of 
Digilab gives the bank direct access to activities in the electronics sector (Veja 
5/05/89:99). Elebra Eletronica, another giant, has subdivisions in all sub sectors except 
consumer electronics and is partially owned by the national development bank, 
BNDESPar (29.53%) and City Bank (22.96%). Cobra Computadores is owned by three 
banks: Banco do Brasil (31.1%), BNDES (31.5%) and Caixa Economica Federal 
(31.4%).^
Once the first banks began to automate part of their activities other financial 
institutions felt the need to modify their conventional systems to keep up with the
'The remaining 1.4% belongs to Digilab, which in turn is controlled by Bradesco.
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competition. Today the three national banks (Banco Central, Banco do Brasil and 
Caixa Economica Federal), ten state banks (or 41% of the private commercial state 
banks in the country), 25 private commercial banks and 6 development banks (including 
the BNDES) are extensively equipped with electronic facilities. Informatization levels 
vary from case to case.
Banks’ investments in electronics have concentrated in two areas, the 
development of customer support services and back office automation. With respect to 
the first area, these services include various levels of branch automation, on-line 
processing of current/deposit accounts, automated teller machines, on-line account 
information, etc. Banks are also investing in data communication via satellite and on­
line connection o f the banks net-works. In 1989 the State Bank of Pernambuco invested 
US$ 2 million to link its 142 branches and to triple its processing capacity. Itau and 
Bradesco use communication via satellite to monitor their national networks. Bradesco 
has the largest installed computer capacity in the country with 29 mainframes and 
superminis connected into a network of 41,000 terminals and some 2,000 micro 
computers. According to the Bank, by the end of 1988, 77% of its 1,692 branches were 
connected on-line.
After 1986, banks began to diversify the informatization of their back-office 
operations to improve efficiency. Machines are now also being used for pay roll, branch 
inventory and other administrative tasks.
The demand for digital equipment by banks and other financial institutions is on 
the increase. In 1986, 11,586 pieces o f equipment were sold. These included teller 
machines, cpu/concentrators and banking terminals. In 1987, total sales decreased to 
10,228 units, only to double in 1988 (24,477 units sold) (SEI, 1989:33). Major 
producers are companies owned by the banks. SID and Itautec are the largest producers 
of ATM’s (automated teller machines) and banking terminals (9000 units sold in 1988). 
They also produce central processing units (CPU’s) and automated deposit teller 
terminals.
Producers of electronic banking equipment have been plagued by the economic 
problems affecting the country at large. These include poor sourcing, unfair competition 
practices, economic instability and lack of qualified labour (SEI, 1989:37). On the 
other hand, banks have been sheltered by their financially strong holdings and, as a 
result, have additional mechanisms to cope with some of these difficulties. Itautec, for 
example, invests in job training schemes which include specialization courses in and 
outside Brazil. The company invests in R&D to cope with the bank’s increasing demand
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for complex and sophisticated equipment and software. At the Itau Research Centre, 
computing personnel are currently working on specialist systems such as SETS (System 
Installations Support) and on the development of management specialist systems to 
perform risk analysis. Banks are also working on applications to cope with and respond 
to a continuous change in economic indexation including inflation.
On the whole, banks have done quite well both as industrial actors and as 
consumers of digital equipment. Electronic banking in Brazil began at the customer 
level, firstly restricted to those who had access to bank services and accounts; secondly 
to make customer use of selected services easier with fast and efficient access to 
information and transactions. The banks managed to become almost the centre of the 
country’s economic life in periods of high inflation, and to be reservoirs of financial 
investment and transaction for a sizeable portion of the national population. 
Informatization allowed some of the national commercial banks to compete more 
efficiently at the level of customer services and data processing of their transactions, 
increasing an already concentrated national banking structure.
With the rapid changes in the country’s economy from the early 1980s onward, 
electronic banking technology has become a strategic tool to cope with complex 
indexation systems and a volatile financial market. Financial investments become one 
of the most attractive areas for operation under Brazil’s high inflation system. In 1988, 
two of Brazil’s largest banks, Itau and Bradesco,achieved profits of 54% and 75% over
1987. Again, the success in this particular niche should indicate that they were more 
a result o f banks’ capital liquidity aided by a protective policy, rather than a result of 
the policy itself.
5.2.5 Summary and Conclusions
According to the above criteria the Brazilian informatics industry has performed 
well during the first six years o f the policy. Both the number of firms and the levels 
and quality of employment have increased. Sales by national companies have surpassed 
those by TNCs. National capitalists control 61 % of the domestic market (or US$ 1505 
million in 1988), and Brazilian-made equipment forms the bulk of the country’s 
installed capacity.
The apparent dynamism of the national industry described by the government 
and other industrial analysts does not make clear the position of Brazil’s domestic 
industry vis-a-vis the international one.
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5.3 Brazilian Informatics and the International Division of 
Labour
53 ,1  National Versus International Capital
This section examines the position of Brazilian firms vis-a-vis TNCs operating 
in Brazil, and identifies the role of national companies in the international division of 
labour. This is done by examining trade patterns.
The logic pursued and defended by the world’s industry leaders percolates 
through the Brazilian case via the activities o f Brazilian-based TNCs. In spite of the 
market reserve instrument, TNCs have managed to maintain a foothold in most of the 
Brazilian electronic sectors. TNCs control the majority o f business in consumer 
electronics, telecommunications and microelectronics. They are key providers of 
technologies to Brazilian companies: their product, design and basic technologies are 
cloned by local hardware producers, and they retain 40% of the total national market. 
The mainframe market reproduces the oligopolistic and concentrated structure of the 
world industry. IBM controls 60% of this market alone, as shown in Table 5.4
Table 5.4
Mainframe Market Shares of Brazilian Based TNCs 1976-1982
Firms (%) 1976 1978 1980 1982
IBM 64.9 65.6 63.2 61.8
Burroughs 17.1 16.6 14.5 14.3
CII-Honeywell Bull 6.4 5.8 6.8 6.9
DEC 3.0 3.2 3.7 3.8
Univac 2.3 3.5 3.9 2.9
H. Packard 3.1 1.7 4.2 2.8
Fujitsu 0.8 1.5 1.9 2.6
Other US firms (1) 1.6 1.5 0.2 2.4
Other European firms (2) 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.1
Brazilian firms (3) - - - 2.3
(2) ICL, Thon^son
(3) Sisco, Cobra, Labo, Medidata
Source: SEI reproduced in Piragibe (1985:61)
Foreign direct investment by TNCs operating in the informatics sector is not 
new in Brazil. IBM started production operations in the country in 1939, Burroughs in 
1953, and up to 1981, other TNCs continued to choose Brazil as a site for their 
activities (See Table 5.5) (Piragibe, 1985:111). As there was no domestic production
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of informatics equipment in the country, Brazilian based TNC subsidiaries dominated 
the national market for those goods, maintaining the oligopolistic structure characteristic 
of the world industry. Thus, rather than argue that "the national industry was bom 
internationalized" (Piragibe, 1985), I suggest that as early as the 1960s Brazil was 
already part of the international division of labour for informatics. After 1979, 
however, when Cobra launched its first Brazilian made computer and state intervention 
was already consolidated, the structure and performance of the sector began to change.
Table 5.5 
Subsidiaries of TNCs based in Braril 
First Year of Activities and Origin
Company Year Country
IBM 1924 USA
Burroughs 1924 USA
Sperry 1950 USA
Olivetti 1952 Italy
NCR 1957 USA
Honeywell 1960 USA
Hewlett-Packard 1967 USA
Fujitsu 1972 Japan
Control Data 1974 USA
Digital 1974 USA
Data General 1975 USA
Datapoint 1981 USA
Source: Piragibe (1985:11)
TNCs interviewed during the field work and asked to comment on the impact 
of the policy on their operations confirmed their opposition to the changes brought by 
the national policy, and they have decreased their presence in the last fifteen years on 
many fronts. One example is Olivetti, which restricted its activities to non-digital office 
equipment after long battles with SEI to obtain a licence to produce digital equipment 
locally. IBM and Unisys, in turn, opted to adjust their products and market strategies 
to fit into the narrow but profitable medium and large frame market sectors. They also 
produced parts and components for the domestic and, most importantly, export markets.
TNCs were also uneasy about the future o f their operations in Brazil prior to 
approval o f the law. However, once the period of turbulence passed, TNCs gained 
through the political campaign to approve the law and educate groups of society of the
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importance o f informatics.
According to interviewees, the national campaign to promote the new policy 
helped to develop an informatics image and the implications it had on people’s lives and 
work patterns. In the absence of a nationally-made computer, Brazilian firms involved 
in production opted to develop clones of IBM’s and make national machines compatible 
with the IBM system. IBM clones and the reproduction of the company’s brand by 
Brazilian firms helped IBM’s corporate image, quality and reputation. IBM compatible 
machines also use a range of existing software produced for the original machine.
Another area in which TNCs benefitted from the policy was in the sole control 
of the mainframe market. These systems require for their functioning an infrastructure 
of peripherals provided by local producers. Thus, TNCs concentrate their resources on 
the provision of high quality product and services and leave to the national sector the 
difficult task o f developing a local market, o f educating potential consumers to use 
computers, and o f interacting directly with users o f their equipment.
The lack of experience of Brazilian firms in providing extensive and efficient 
customer/machine support services has forced local producers to endure the difficulties 
of leaming-by-doing as they are confronted with crucial aspects of systems analysis and 
design, customer support and machine maintenance. TNCs, on the other hand, focus 
on marketing products with which they are fully familiar.
In short, the Brazilian strategy has not threatened the positions o f the TNCs 
already established in Brazil. The challenge to alter the existing international division 
of labour in the informatics industry is enhanced by the diverging trajectories of 
Brazilian-owned companies and Brazilian-based TNCs. While the formerai surrounded 
by protective mechanisms, the latter have not only found a place in the national 
markets, but have benefitted from the existing policy to reproduce the current 
international division o f labour domestically. In many ways the TNCs have a market 
reserve controlling the mainframe markets and technological tendencies in the country. 
IBM defines business in Brazil as "an opportunity for further growth where profits in 
data processing equipment are only 1 % of the gross domestic product, and where the 
current economic volatility and crisis is managed with short term business plans and
with a 25% growth in 1988" (Dados e Ideias, Aug 1989:30). One o f the few firms able 
to think of strategic planning (IBM) has^Miind the national subsidiary corporate support 
to back an investment of US$ 100 million in 1988 (Dados e Ideas, Aug 1989).
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5,3,2 Trade Patterns
Trade patterns in this industry show the nature o f internal and external 
competitiveness, the divisions o f labour between Brazilian-based overseas subsidiaries, 
Brazilian-owned firms and the latter’s relationship with the international informatics 
industrial complex.
Brazilian-based TNCs have chosen Brazil as a location for their activities as part 
o f their worldwide market expansion strategy. Domestic firms, on the other hand, are 
heavily dependent on the internal market to sell their products and on the external 
markets to obtain key components not yet produced domestically. Small scales of 
production, feeble product quality and prices above most other international competitors 
make their export activity virtually nil.
5,3,2,1 Imports
Aggregate import figures show that imports of informatics goods have suffered 
an overall decrease since the appearance of Brazilian owned companies in the local 
informatics industry. Prior to 1979 the country was a net importer o f informatics goods, 
with both domestic firms and TNCs subsidiaries accounting for this demand.
While total imports o f informatics decreased from US$ 600m to US$ 300m, the 
imports from Brazilian based companies have gradually risen. Between 1981 and 1987 
Brazilian firms brought in over US$ 600 million of imports, discounting the large 
smuggling trade that goes on un-declared. The presence of Brazilian firms in production 
contributed to a decrease in imports o f computer systems while the demand for 
components, both from informatics and other sectors continued to rise. A study done 
by ABICOMP in 1988 demonstrated that national firms’ greatest demand was for 
electronics components, corresponding to 67% of total imports in 1985/86.^
Brazilian-based TNCs were more secretive about their transactions in responding 
to questionnaires and interviews. Over 50% of imports o f Brazilian-based overseas 
firms consisted of parts and components for electronic machinery, devices (e.g ., for 
printers, disk drives, etc), since the quality and standard o f Brazilian made mechanical 
devices were below international levels.^
From the user’s point o f view the public sector continues to be the biggest 
consumer of informatics goods. During the 1985/86, the government authorized US$482
' Informe Abicomp, no. 21 Encarte 14, Feb 1988 "Importacoes: Nacionais e Multinacionais. ' 
 ^Informe Abicomp^ no. 21 Encarte 14, Feb 1988 "Importacoes: Nacionais e Multinacionais.'
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million in imports. The trade and services sector accounted for 31 %, followed by data 
processing services of 30%, the banking sector o f 16%, and 23% divided between 
agriculture, education, and social programmes. Industrial demand was highest in the 
mechanics sector, 31%, followed by telecommunications 29%, energy 9%, and steel 
7%. Table 5.6 gives government figures on authorized imports between 1982 and
1988.
Table 5.6
Authorized Imports of Informatics Goods, 1982-1988 
US$ million
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Br. Firms 50 49 90 96 93 106 110
TNCs 208 179 187 174 187 216 268
Total 258 228 277 270 280 322 378
Source: SEI (1989:34)
5.5.2.2 Exports
Export activities measure external competitiveness, that is the ability of firms 
to operate in international markets and to succeed. There is a clear distinction between 
export activities of Brazilian based TNCs and Brazilian owned firms. Up to 1989 the 
export activity in informatics was almost entirely restricted to the activities o f Brazilian 
based overseas firms. Domestic firms, on the other hand, have shown a mediocre 
performance in export markets. Those firms that have exported admitted having done 
so to try their luck in foreign markets.
Table 5.7 compares export performance o f Brazilian firms and Brazilian based 
TNCs over three years. The table shows IBM’s overwhelming dominance of the 
international markets, followed by TNCs and national firms.
Table 5.7
Exports of Informatics Equipment, 1986-1988 
US$ million
Year 1986 1987 1988
Brazilian Firms 1 2 5
TNCs 204 161 226
IBM 175.1 135.6 183.0
Total 205.0 163.0 231.0
Source: SEI (1989:35)
IBM first started to export in 1955, selling its electronic classifiers IBM-082 to
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eleven Central and South American countries/ In 1967, 50 years after the company 
set up in Brazil, 94% of its total output, worth over US$ 9 million, was exported/ The 
approval of the policy has forced IBM to alter its outward-looking profit repatriation 
strategy to focus on Brazil. By 1982 IBM enlarged its share of the domestic market, 
keeping one third of its production in the country and exporting the rest to its many 
worldwide subsidiaries. There has been little change since then. In 1987 the company 
exported US$ 135.6 million, reflecting a sizable decline from 1986 (US$ 175,1 
million). In addition, the company created IPO (in 1985) an International Procurement 
Office to buy-in local components, parts and sub-systems to supply IBM’s international 
demands.
The experience of Brazilian firms in international markets has been limited. 
Elebra Informâtica for example, opted to do subcontracting work for American-based 
TNCs who provided them with the necessary technology. In 1984 Brazilian firms 
exported US$ 4.1 million worth of magnetic disk circuit boards to Control Data (Tigre, 
1987:76), but this represented only a small percentage of the company’s business. 
According to interviewees’ responses, these subcontracting arrangements were not, 
however, a guaranteed source o f revenue. Alternatively, firms have tried to penetrate 
regional markets of South America hoping to benefit from the geographical proximity. 
Microdigital, a micro computer producer, between 1984 and 1987 sold US$ 3.5 million 
worth of its TK product line to various LA countries. Digitel, on the other hand, was 
not so successful exporting peripherals to the United States. Its modems and other 
communication equipment were often returned with faults and the packaging was not 
adequate for the American transport systems. The company preferred to concentrate on 
the domestic market rather than risk their survival in the highly demanding and selective 
American environment.^ Even producers of banking automation systems have tried to 
test their products abroad. Digirede sold systems to Interbanco in Paraguay, Itautec to 
the Banco Português do Atlântico, Portugal and Sid to the Banco del Sud in 
Argentina. Some application software is now being sold to North and South American 
markets.
The reasons behind this weak performance o f Brazilian-owned firms go back to 
the industrialization period. The import substitution model used to promote Brazilian
‘ IBM Brasil, "70 Anos" Brochure produced by IBM do Brasil in celebration of its 70 years of activities 
in the country.
 ^IBM Brasil, "70 Anos"
 ^Dados e Idéias, Sep 1987:55 "For Mares Nunca Dantes Navegados. "
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industrialization curtailed most efforts to develop an export capacity in the country. 
Under this scheme, the domestic market has been sheltered from foreign competitors 
while it favours local capital. Companies wishing to produce for external markets have 
had to bear the burden o f domestic production costs and yet offer a product at a 
competitive international price. There has been an emphasis on subsidizing production 
for domestic rather than external markets. This was true in Brazil until the late-1960s 
when government officials realized the importance of export markets as an additional 
source o f revenue. In spite of the emphasis put on the export sector during the ‘miracle’ 
years, it has not been sufficient to strengthen the country’s fragile export base. This has 
affected the Brazilian informatics sector, and the other sectors of the electronics 
complex.
On a more recent note, the decline in the industry’s average profit rate from 
28 #10% in 1985 to 8.19% in 1987, and the uncertainties o f the Brazilian economy, have 
led industrialists and government officials alike to turn towards external markets.* On 
the macro scale, the government began a mini-currency devaluation programme to make 
Brazilian products cheaper abroad.^ On the micro-scale, based on previous export 
experiences, industrialists felt the need to invest in original products and niche markets 
in order to survive the toughness of foreign markets. As already discussed above, the 
banking sector was a good example of niche strategy that worked.
It is not only historical reasons connected to the import substitution models 
which make exporting difficult. The lack o f significant industrial activity in the 
informatics sector throughout Latin America has led to a widespread market dominance 
by leading TNCs. As a result, Brazilian products often have to compete against better 
quality and lower priced brand-named products. In the countries where there is some 
export activity, its situation is further aggravated by the presence of high import tax 
restrictions. Brazil and Colombia have the highest tariff on informatics imports (45%), 
while the rest o f Latin America average a 20% tariff (Correa, 1988:40).
Brazilian owned companies, as has already been demonstrated, depend on their 
international suppliers for the provision of those components they cannot produce 
locally or for which local production is not feasible (small markets, limited 
technological capacity, etc.).
• Informe Abicomp, no.31, May/Jul 1989 "Faturamento da Indüstria Nacional de Computadores.' 
 ^Dados e Idéias, Sep 1987:54-56 "For mares nunca dantes navegados. "
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Export activity, on the other hand, offers an alternative to declining domestic
rates of return and to the saturation of national markets for specific products. That in
itself can be a driving mechanism to force Brazilian firms into the exports market as
an alternative to the domestic ones, specially during periods of recession. Responses at
interviews with companies that have exported confirmed this point. The possibility of
profit squeezes was the main motivation for Brazilian firms to test their performance
on foreign markets. In addition to discouraging export activity amongst Brazilian firms,
oa
the market reserve and the conditions it rtnyosei firms affiliated with SEI, created the 
conditions for ‘back door’ activities such as traffic in contraband and the development 
of unfair industrial practices in the industry. These two processes jeopardize the 
national commitment to develop a national indigenous technological capacity, Ihey are 
reviewed below.
5,3,2,3 Contraband and Other Forms of Unfair Competition
It has already been pointed out that the Brazilian informatics policy offers 
protection and incentives to local informatics firms. In return for these benefits it 
demands a degree of commitment from industry to abide and conform to  tough 
restrictions put on their business activity. Import restrictions, high costs (and risks) of 
R&D, lack of skilled labour and the country’s overall economic uncertainty can damage 
companies’ economic health and alter the otherwise positive corporate business attitude 
towards the national targets. Smuggling and unfair competition offer ways around 
some of the difficulties imposed by the policy.
The purpose of this section is to look at the these activities and try to determine 
to what extent and how they have affected production and marketing activities in Brazil. 
The primary data used in this section was collected during field work in Brazil in 1987- 
1988 in interviews with manufacturers, consumers, computer repair shops in S. Paulo, 
SEI staff and staff at the Federal Police. Secondary sources used include articles from 
the press and data from the Federal Police.
By and large, Brazilian firms have used contraband as a solution to import 
restrictions. Measuring the volume and impact o f contraband on the local industry is 
very difficult given the nature of the activity. However, estimates for 1987 value 
smuggled merchandise at between US$ 50m and US$ 300m or anywhere from 15% to 
100% of the industry’s authorized imports for the same year (US$ 320 million).*
^Informatica Hoje, Set. 1985; Jornal do Brazil, 21/04/87, and Exame, 08/07/87.
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According to field research carried out in 1988, the simplest way of purchasing 
illegally imported equipment in Brazil was by responding to advertisements or by direct 
telephone orders. Local newspapers advertised state-of-the-art personal computers and 
peripherals for prices given in US dollars or in Cruzados reflecting a price anywhere 
from 25 to 100% above those quoted in the American market. Alternatively, those 
demands could be made directly to well-established smugglers. Their prices also 
included sums to cover special service and enhancements added to the product or other 
services including home or office delivery. Products available through smugglers were 
not solely limited to micros. These organized smugglers could supply CAD/CAM 
equipment, components, laser printers and even mainframes. Goods came primarily 
from Korea and Thailand, who supply primarily cheaper and higher quality peripherals 
and components; and from state-of-the-art manufactured equipment in Japan and the 
United States.^ Whatever variety of contraband and its origin, in 1987 there were
14,000 Apple Macintosh machines installed in the country. This installed base 
represented over half of the total sales o f CCE, a Brazilian Apple clone producer up to 
1986 (25000 units sold).
The ways to monitor and punish those who break the law were multiple. SEI had 
made available to the Federal Police its detailed records on how many, by whom, when 
and where every computer system, components and peripherals were legally imported 
into Brazil. The Customs Division of the Police referred to these whenever it held one 
of its "Contraband prevention and suppression raids". In 1987, during one of these 
operations, Cz$ 48.8m worth of equipment was apprehended in 213 firms out of a total 
of 2141 firms visited. Integrated circuit boards were the most abundant smuggled 
product found, followed by memory chips and printers. Although the name of the firms 
were kept secret the operation included equipment inspections in large banks, TNCs 
offices and others (see table 5.8).^
* Information provided by the Secretaria da Receita Federal - Federal Police, interview.
 ^Jom al do Brasil^ 24/04/87 "Receita reprime contrabando de equipamento de informatica.
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Table 5.8
Smuggled Products Seized by the Federal Police 
Selected List - March 1987
Product Quantity Product Quantity
Hard disks 48 Video terminal 65
Key board 126 Microcomputers 181
Printers 216 Disk drives 223
1/4 Diskettes 1938 Memory chips 1269
ICs 11922 - -
According to the Federal Police, contraband tended to increase when producers 
were faced with profit squeezes and reduced returns. It was a strategy o f technological 
appropriation that gave smugglers a leading edge over competitors without the risk, and 
above all the cost, o f initial investments on R&D. The government was obviously 
disturbed by these practices and took initiatives to curtail them. From the firms’ point 
of view smuggling was a way to evade import taxes even if it interfered with national 
objectives to induce local companies to develop their own product technologies.
From the industry’s point of view contraband was a double edged knife. ‘Loyal’ 
producers found themselves sharing their markets with smuggled products which 
performed the same functions but cost less. At the same time substituting national for 
foreign technology secured them a stable market and cut comers and investments in 
home made technological development. Users had yet another view on the matter. 
Smuggled goods satisfied most users’ demands and spared the user from struggling 
with Brazilian producers and Brazilian products.
The usually advantageous price/quality ratio of foreign goods stood behind the 
rationale of smuggling. Even with the 20-30% profit added to the product’s price tag, 
smuggled goods were often cheaper than Brazilian manufactured ones. A local producer 
admitted having lost a sale option because its product was more expensive and had a 
90 to 120 day longer delivery wait than a smuggled one.* While no other firm was 
able to provide concrete information on this subject, interviewees did not discard the 
possibility that this could occur vis-a-vis their competitors. Table 5.9 compares the 
market price of smuggled and nationally made goods.
‘ Information obtained through interviews
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Table 5.9
The "Best-sellers" of the Parallel Market, March 1987
Products Average Price in Br. Cruzados
Cost o f national product Cost o f  smuggled product
Hard disk 20MB 125,000 28,000
Microcomputer 16b 
(+ 2  drives, no monitor)
70,000-150,000 60,000 - 250,000
Memory chips 120 - 500 5 0 - 6 0
Printers 70,000 40,000
Source: "A porta aberta do Contrabando" Exame, 08/07/87:62
Another informant argued that his firm had smuggled goods into the country as 
a way of avoiding the intricate bureaucracy to obtain import permissions, of bypassing 
high costs and time investment to train workers and of the lack of capital to develop 
new products and markets. This was the case of hard disks. These products were first 
produced in Brazil in 1989. The demand for them, however, was already high, given 
the size o f an already solidly established base of installed microcomputers. As local 
demand exceeded production, and production rigidities made flexible production 
impossible, the industry was prepared to accept smuggling to make up the gaps.
Brand names and companies’ credit-worthiness also work in favour of 
contraband. Owners of Brazilian-made equipment often had to put up with precarious 
and inefficient customer support services as Brazilian producers have not yet developed 
a sound distribution and marketing strategy. Still, smuggled foreign goods are 
preferred, despite the greater risks involved in the purchase of more technologically 
sophisticated equipment where little or no technical assistance is available. A local 
computer technical assistance shop in S. Paulo declared that, out o f the 1000 machines 
examined each month 100 to 200 were foreign made. If the product could not be 
repaired owners were usually prepared to send for additional parts or even ship the 
machine itself to be mended in the United States.^
To conclude, contraband jeopardized companies that opt to follow the guidelines 
o f the national policy as they became subject to the predatory competitiveness of firms 
that didn’t. During field work in 1989 ABICOMP, the producers’ association, was to 
launch an ‘Ethical Code o f Practice’ to alert consumers to the problem. The hope was 
that informed consumers would deter themselves from buying products from companies
 ^Exame, 08/07/87:64 "A porta aberta do contrabando".
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who failed to follow the code.
On the whole, trade patterns discussed here reveal the inabibb/_ o f the national 
informatics policy and of the industry itself to alter the existing international division 
o f labour between companies and countries producing new ideas and concepts, and the 
countries assembling them. The criteria chosen so far to respond to this question (sales, 
employment, computer installations, and trade patterns) provide a macro view of the 
industry including its relationship with the external world. Chapter six takes a closer 
view looking at how the criteria selected have shaped the evolution o f the industry in 
Brazil.
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
This section summarizes the main findings o f Chapters four and five. The 
purpose o f these two chapters has been to examine the national policy, to compare and 
contrast it to policies designed to support other sub-sectors o f the electronics complex, 
and to measure the outcomes of the policy by looking at sales, employment, 
installations and trade.
As a general rule, attempts to evaluate the performance of the informatics 
industry have given approval to government initiatives. The relevant literature offers 
substantial evidence that past policies have been instrumental in fostering the 
establishment and growth of a sizable number of national firms engaged in the design 
and assembly of computer systems and peripherals. However most do not adequately 
examine the political environment in which these policies function: they tend to conceal 
the views of interest groups, and neglect to examine how these may constrain future 
developments in the sector.
This chapter has illustrated that achievements so far are not sufficient to 
guarantee the technological independence and autonomy that Brazilian owned firms need 
in order to compete in domestic and international markets. This is confirmed by the 
volume o f imports and export of Brazilian companies. The policy gave national capital 
significant advantages in investing in a fast-growing and highly profitable new industrial 
sector. It hoped to reproduce the necessary conditions to allow them to operate in a 
‘free’ market. Despite this support, the nature of institutional regulation contained the 
rigidities of a state structure and stood in direct contrast with the fast and volatile 
changes and the technological dynamism found in digital technology and electronics at 
large. Thus, expectations regarding the scope and extent of technical/ technological and 
industrial development exceeded the outcome. The initial objectives of the policy were
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ambitious to the Brazilian scale and insulated with political not industrial, technical or 
scientific power. Also, the priorities set limits of concrete commitment and Brazilian 
companies opted to take the quickest path to achieving their targets.
But far more important than re-addressing the issues already dealt with by the 
existing literature, is to see the Brazilian case through the lens of a trans-national 
industrial complex. This takes Brazil out of the centre of the debate and places it in a 
framework of a global industrial system, more useful for analytical purposes. This focus 
reveals that by banning TNCs from operating in selected industrial sectors the national 
articulation works against the world logic. At the same time, poor support offered to 
S&T, lack o f capitalization and poor coordination of policy programmes for the 
electronics complex restrain Brazilian firms from the opportunity to become 
technologically and commercially competent domestically and abroad. Furthermore, 
given the criteria used in defining the boundaries between national interests and 
international participation in the Brazilian industry, there is today in Brazil a double 
market protection. One exists to ‘protect’ local companies from the multinationals, the 
other secures for TNCs a monopoly over a large and, in value terms, significant share 
of the market (the mainframe sector). This double market protection has had different 
meanings for each side. TNCs are free to carry on doing their business in Brazil and 
strengthening their foothold in the national market. They faced little increased 
competition to threaten their position as world leaders (in particular IBM). National 
companies were left instead with the task of re-inventing the wheel, or rather the micro!
The national electronics and informatics complex is vulnerable on many fronts. 
Technological vulnerability is serious. The informatics industry has experienced drastic 
product and process changes every time a new technological achievement in component 
production or digital technology is made. These transformations have been summarized 
and discussed in the thesis Introduction. This discussion demonstrates that rapid 
technological transformations stretch the technological gap between producers (leading 
firms and the companies which have access to them) and consumers (countries which 
do not have the technological capacity to reproduce them) neutralize many leap-frogging 
strategies pursued by developing countries that are unable or unprepared to sponsor 
similar development programmes. Brazilian-owned companies, in general, have not 
been able to go beyond increment innovations within well known and relatively open 
technologies.
Companies have acquired some technological capability in the design and 
manufacture o f systems and peripheral equipment which confirms policy priorities.
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given first to the mastering of design and assembly o f informatics systems and, in a 
later stage, the move to the design and manufacture o f components and software. The 
introduction of incremental innovations tends to take place during the initial effort at 
reverse engineering, enabling companies to copy open architecture products, or once 
technology is transferred through licencing and by modifying foreign design and 
specifications to fit local conditions (Frischtak, 1986:23). However, Brazilian firms do 
not command the resources needed to raise them to new technological levels, through 
small or significant innovations in system design, components, software, or product 
processes. Furthermore, when these resources are available they are rarely pooled 
because of the lack of cooperative ventures among Brazilian firms. The situation is 
further aggravated when technological dynamism is not followed but is diffused through 
the institutional framework. Brazil is in many ways at the intersection o f these two 
trajectories. Industrial and institutional restructuring is necessary to cope with economic 
turmoil — plant closures, over-production and market saturation — as well as to 
overcome the rigidities of national institutional structures. The technological 
convergence trends in the informatics and other sectors explained in the first part o f this 
thesis demand an equal convergence of national efforts to preserve the existing 
successes and carry them way into the future. To aggravate matters further, diverging 
development plans of the Ministry of Communications and Science and Technology, 
aided by earlier regional development polices to boost the Amazonian economy, are 
slowly changing the configuration o f the sector and accentuating the socio-economic 
imbalances in the regions where it is found.
Multiple backward and forward linkages tie the informatics sector with other 
branches o f the electronics complex and make it an important input for a number of 
other ‘traditional’ user industries. If this view is accepted, and evidence for it is 
convincing and accumulating, countries are forced to confront and revise emerging 
conflicting options (Arnold & Guy, 1986). The first problem is how best to use, absorb 
and implement informatics products and processes to improve productivity and how to 
make informatics a tool for economic prosperity. Secondly, having chosen to be 
involved in the production o f informatics goods to decide where to concentrate national 
resources and maximize national control over technology. Thirdly, to revise, formulate 
and implement strategies that take into consideration the dynamic technological 
transformations occurring.
The Brazilian model addressed some of these issues. But it has done so in a 
passive manner, resting on the assumption that a partial commitment to technological
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development would suffice and secure the country technological independence.
As to the role of the state, it is certainly true that state intervention (in the form 
of the market reserve policy), has re-defined the industry’s structure and 
competitiveness from the late 1970s onward. But current concerns have changed and 
challenged the efficacy o f the given policy to achieve its targets.
The following two chapters focus on the local level to examine changes in the 
geography of Brazilian informatics tied to both global and national political, 
technological and industrial trends.
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CHAPTER VI 
VI The Geography of Brazil’s Informatics Industry
6.1 Introduction
This chapter, together with chapter seven, examines the geography of Brazil’s 
informatics industry. The aim of these chapters is to offer an alternative view of the 
impact o f the Brazilian Informatics Policy (PNI) on the development o f the Brazilian 
informatics industry. This intersection of policy targets (that is political goals of social 
and economic development) and existing outcomes (industrial location) gives evidence 
on "whether regional development amounts to development o f a region, or merely 
development in a region." (Morgan & Sayer, 1988:6). This difference in development 
depends not just on the level of industrial activity in a region but also on the character 
of that activity. Thus, the focus of these chapters is the firms, and the data used is firm 
based. "Firms create a spatial division of labour between different regions and they 
perform differently in each context. They have different regional impact in terms of 
local purchasing and subcontracting, and lastly, different agents benefit in the localities 
in which firms are set up. It is therefore the combination o f all these factors that 
amounts to a differentiated and highly uneven regional development" (Morgan & Sayer, 
1988:7).
The focus of this chapter is the historical development and present social and 
economic characteristics o f Brazilian informatics at a local level. The purpose of the 
chapter is to reconstruct the industrial geography of the country’s informatics and 
electronics industries illustrating the spatial division of labour between different regions. 
Four a5gect$ of Brazilian informatics* industrial geography are examined: industrial 
growth, industrial distribution o f producers, regional distribution o f users and regional 
sales and employment.
6. L I Structure of the Chapter
The chapter has three parts. Section 6.2 analyzes historical patterns of industrial 
concentration of electronics companies in Brazil in four different periods from the mid 
1970s to 1989. These industrial growth patterns are illustrated in maps 1 to 4. Section 
6.3, using available firm based geographical data, examines the aggregate distribution 
of electronics companies (section 6.3.1), the distribution of industrial users of
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computers (section 6.3.2), and regional sales and employment (section 6.3.3). Section 
6.4 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
6.2 The Industrial Geography of Brazilian Informatics
This section reconstructs the geography o f Brazilian informatics illustrating 
changing patterns of industrial agglomeration from the mid 1970s onward in four maps. 
To carry out this task a data base of firms operating in all sectors o f the electronic 
complex including mainframes, super mini and minicomputers (group 1), 
microcomputers and other systems (group 2), peripherals (group 3), parts and 
components (group 4), microelectronics (group 5), telecommunications (group 6), 
consumer electronics (group 7), industrial automation (group 8) and instrumentation 
(group 9) was needed.
The analysis of data including all firms in the electronic complex illustrates the 
links and complementarities between informatics (producers of computers, peripherals 
and parts) and other sectors of the electronics complex. This follows a discussion 
initiated in the Introduction about the electronics complex (section 1.3) and corroborated 
in the discussion of different national informatics policies (e.g., in France, Japan, the 
EEC experience).
The data used in this section merged three large data bases including 368 
companies (of which 168 are in the informatics sub-sector) and relevant information on 
six variables: year of creation of company, type of capital (foreign, national, joint 
venture), industrial activity, geographical location, employment, and subcontracting 
relations (i.e ., number of subcontractors). Information was also available on output. 
However, this variable could not be used given the difficulty of comparing values given 
in at least three different currencies.
The first data base, compiled and managed by SEI included all firms that have 
registered with SEI to operate in the sector \  SEI also provided an updated 1989 list, 
which included only those firms that replied to SETs 1989 company survey. To cross­
check the accuracy and completeness of the data I compared SEI’s information (data 
base and 1989 list) with the ABICOMP’s and Gazeta Mercantil data bases on industrial
 ^Only firms registered with SEI are authorized (or can legally obtain import licenses) to import electronic 
components, parts and software needed for the production o f products using digital technologies.
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producers o f electronic products.
The series of maps attached were produced using the data. They show the 
distribution patterns of electronics companies throughout the national territory prior to 
1974, and in three periods after that. Two reference maps are included in appendix 5.
In what follows each map is explained, describing changes in the geography of 
the industry which have been discussed so far. This discussion o f changing industrial 
patterns illustrates the unevenness o f sectoral industrial development in Brazil. 
According to Smith uneven development is a result o f a continuous capitalist search for 
profit. It will be shown here, however, that in addition to profit seeking motives 
investors move in and out o f different sectors and regions as a result o f other equally 
relevant factors such as technology changes, industrial policies, regional development 
policies, etc.
Map 1 - The first map describes the concentration o f electronics firms operating 
in Brazil prior to 1974 when there was no explicit industrial policy for the informatics 
sector. Firms were located primarily in the South-East of Brazil and in and around the 
cities o f Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This concentration followed historical and 
existing patterns of industrial agglomeration that started in the South-East.
The first companies to develop in Brazil were transnational corporations who 
saw in the country an opportunity to explore local and regional markets. These firms 
went to Brazil in search of new markets and business opportunities, following a 
development pattern put forward by dependency theorists like Wallerstein (Larrain, 
1989). Table 5.5 in the previous chapter gives the date o f creation o f most TNC’s 
located in Brazil. The table shows that by 1970 most of Brazilian based TNC’s had 
already opened commercial outlets and/or factories in Brazil.
IBM was one of the first companies to arrive in Brazil. The first industrial 
operation of IBM, in Benfica, RJ, established in 1939, marked the beginning of 
informatics activities in Brazil. This was IBM’s first industrial plant outside the US, and 
it assembled industrial clocks, tabulating machines and typewriters (Piragibe, 
1985:108). By 1976 the company was assembling its 360/148 systems.
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Map 1
Brazilian Electronics - Regional Patterns of Distribution prior to 1974
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Map 2
Brazilian Electronics - Regional Patterns of Distribution between 1974-1978
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Most TNCs, including IBM, opted for a vertically integrated structure of 
operations where assembly of products was done inside the company using a high 
proportion o f imported components. Production activities were part o f the corporation’s 
international division of labour, thus not favouring either the transfer nor the 
development of local products and process technologies. These strategies inhibited the 
diffusion of growth through local purchasing and subcontracting, as investors purchased 
components from their overseas subsidiaries instead. At the same time, TNCs located 
in the South-East region did not contribute to any significant increase in the number of 
firms operating in the sector nor to the development o f backward and forward linkages 
between TNCs and Brazilian suppliers.
National firms operating in Brazil before 1974 were involved in the production 
of electric components and consumer electronics (radios and TV sets). According to 
Baptista, these firms operated in the national market and had well developed linkages 
with other sectors o f the economy (Baptista, 1985).
This pattern of industrial development based on the activities o f a handful o£ 
vertically integrated TNCs dependent on the import of parts and components and their 
assembly in Brazil, and of national companies equally dependent on key imports 
coupled with the absence of any form of state intervention to regulate TNC’s activities, 
explained, in part, the slow growth of the Brazilian sector prior to 1974.
Map - 2 This map illustrates changes in industrial concentration from 1974 to 
1978 showing an increase in the number of new firms located in the Rio de Janeiro - 
S. Paulo area, the emergence o f the Minas Geraes - Brasilia industrial centre, and the 
appearance o f new firms in the South and in the North.
The increase in the number of new firms was the result o f four interrelated 
factors: 1) the creation of Cobra; 2) the establishment of the Manaus Development Zone 
in 1967; 3) technological innovations in the manufacture of colour televisions, and 
lastly, 4) a rising capital liquidity coupled with economic growth.
The creation of the national computer firm Cobra coincided with the passing of 
government restrictions on imports of informatics goods after 1976. These two events 
forced TNCs to limit their expansion plans and to consider strategies to circumvent the 
new regulations. As discussed in Chapter three, these TNCs would probably have 
followed a model of growth pursued by TNCs in the 1970s which included the location 
of an assembly plant in a developing country and the commercialization o f imported
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equipment.
The creation of the Manaus export promotion zone (hereafter ZFM) in 1967 (and 
the creation o f the industrial district in 1972), and changes in the use of solid state 
technology in television production (1972), affected the structure, composition and 
industrial location of the national consumer electronics sector. It also paved the way for 
a new spatial division of labour in the consumer electronics sector in Brazil (Baptista, 
1985). The establishment of the ZFM led to a migration of consumer electronic 
companies from the South-East to the North o f the country and the arrival of new firms 
in the North. Few firms opted to shut down plants in the South-East. However, there 
is no evidence of any significant deindustrialization on a national level during the period 
1974 to 1978.
The creation of an import production zone in 1967 also coincided with the 
beginning o f a period o f internationalization of American, Japanese and European
consumer electronics companies. These events have been described in Chapter two.
ard.
Some o f these companies like Toshiba, Philco Phillips found an opportunity to enter 
the Brazilian market via this import protection zone, and eventually to control the 
national market.
The fourth factor affecting industrial location during the four year interval 
(1974-1978) was the changes in the political economy of this sector. From a supply 
side, the government offered protection of selected product markets; it restricted the 
activities o f TNCs to operate only in the mainframe market and in the production of 
other goods for exports; and lastly the government offered a range o f fiscal benefits and 
development grants to national capital to enter the sector.
From a demand side, the market for computers went into a total revolution with 
the appearance of microcomputers in the early 1980s. Internal demands from both 
public and private sectors rocketed. A greater financial liquidity, the result o f years of 
economic abundance (the Brazilian miracle) followed by first signs of exhaustion of the 
development model in the late 1970s, pressed national capitalists to look for new 
investment opportunities (i.e., the case of Brazilian Banks, Chapter five, section 5.2.4). 
The combination of both external and internal conditions led national capitalists to see 
in informatics a" risk-free investment opportunity.
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Map 3 - A sharp increase in company registration and employment occurred 
between 1979 and 1983, as shown in this map. The reasons for this increase in firm 
registration were^ es in the previous period political, technological and market led.
By 1979, the political campaign in favour of the policy (PNI), and the creation 
of SEI, formally lowered entry barriers, enabling Brazilian capital to enter the mini and 
microcomputer markets. Newly formed domestic companies were spin offs from 
universities and other institutes, or they were new divisions of existing companies 
operating in the mechanical and electric sectors. These companies tended to locate 
themselves in the South-East of the country, regardless where they originated, to benefit 
from a well developed industrial infrastructure. 82% of companies created after the 
policy (PNI) were located between the S. Paulo and Rio de Janeiro area. Over a period 
of five years, 52% of the 168 electronics companies established in the country were in 
the informatics sector alone. Between 1979 and 1986, Brazilian domestic companies 
grew at an average of 30% per year. Employment, in turn, rose from less than 5,000 
in 1979 to over 11,500 in 1986 (SEI, 1989:24).
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Map 3
Brazilian Electronics - Regional Patterns of Distribution between 1979-1983
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Map 4
Brazilian Electronics - Regional Patterns of Distribution between 1984-1988
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Map 4 - From 1984 to 1989, the informatics industry continued to experience 
new challenges with new actors coming onto the scene. A large number o f firms were 
set up in all seven geographical regions, with S. Paulo metropolitan area leading the 
way in number of registrations (56 new firms). At the same time, the institutionalization 
of the policy, profit decline, increasingly inter-regional competition, and the instability 
of the national economy, all affected industrial location during the four-year period.
In the political sphere, the institutionalization of the policy (PNI) into law 
strengthened the protection and market position of domestic companies vis-a-vis foreign 
producers. Opposing the stability offered by the policy (PNI) conflicting regional 
policies such as the export processing zone plan threatened the existing industrial 
structure, and the regional competition continued between Manaus and the rest of the 
country.
In the national economic sphere, a succession o f crises and booms (described in 
Chapter four), rising inflation, increasing internal and external debts, made themselves 
felt in the informatics sector. Economic problems brought down the sector’s high 
growth rates experienced up to 1986. In 1987, profit rates decreased by 15% (Senhor, 
26/05/87:48). Employment in the informatics sector alone experienced a slight decrease 
from 31,021 (1986) to 30,947 (1987), of which national employers were responsible 
for 1000 job losses (SEI, 1989:24). Companies like Cetus, Embracom, Polymax, 
Flexidisk in the South-East, and Dismac in the North filed bankruptcy, and capital 
investments were greatly reduced (Veja, 24/06/87:115).
In the technological sphere, unrealistic promises to support and train a national 
labour force, the scarcity of S&T resources (Chapter four, section 4.4), the difficulties 
of developing indigenous products (reinventing the wheel), high costs with process and 
product development production costs\ and illicit industrial practices, such as 
contraband (Chapter five, section 5.3.2.3) decreased the possibilities o f Brazilian 
domestic companies achieving many of the desired technological goals set out by the 
law and the informatics plan - Planin.
The newly established science parks influenced regional distribution o f firms 
throughout the country. Santa Rita do Sapucaf, in Minas Geraes, Campina Grande in 
Parafba, and Fortaleza in Cearâ, emerged as new industrial zones catering to
^Tigre & Ferine, 1984:4. For more on price differentials see Piragibe, 1984 and Hewitt, 1988.
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technology intensive industries. Other traditional areas (e.g., Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, 
Campinas), adopted the concept as a mechanism for industrial restructuring, trusting the 
potential for growth o f the industry and its multiplying effects on the region’s 
economies (Pereira, 1987).
6,2,1 Summary
In short, these maps illustrate the contributions o f the PNI on Brazilian 
industrialization. In absolute terms, and shielded by the national informatics policy, 168 
informatics companies were established, and over 30,000 jobs in informatics created 
with multiplier effects throughout the country, and another 2(X) plus companies and
90,000 jobs were created within other sub-sectors of the electronics complex \  The 
maps portray a positive and significant growth o f firm registration in different parts of 
the country. The impetus behind such growth was profit. Different capital groups 
(TNCs, national firms) and industrialists operating in different sectors (informatics, 
consumer electronics, components) behaved differently to realize their business goals. 
The formulation and approval of the national policy facilitated the emergence of a 
national informatics industry. TNCs that came to Brazil before industrial regulation 
sought ways to circumvent the national informatics policy and maintain their market 
shares. The creation of the Manaus Export Zone coincided with significant 
technological change in television production and promoted the development o f a new 
industrial area in the North and attracted the business o f large TNCs operating in the 
consumer electronics sector.
Similarly to the analysis o f sales, employment and computer installations, these 
maps portray an aggregate and positive picture o f industrial growth. They do not show, 
however, the types of relationships between companies within and between regions.
To complement the information given so far about changes in industrial location 
of informatics and other electronics firms, the next sections examine other types of 
geographically specific data. This information is limited, covering four aspects o f the 
industry’s geography:
1) the distribution of firms per sub-sector in the national territory;
*In 1988 total en^loyment in the electronics complex was 68,264, in services, 61,351 totaling 129,615 
(SEI, 1989:14). These figures exclude consumer electronics.
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2) the regional distribution of computer users;
3) regional sales and
4) employment.
The first set of data is based on the 368 amalgamated company data bases o f SEI 
and Gazeta Mercantil which were used to produce the locational maps. The second is 
based on Dados & Ideias* 500 largest users o f informatics. The third and fourth, 
regional sales and employment are provided by SEI.
6.3 Misleading Geographies
6.3,1 The Industrial Location of Producers
The purpose of this section is to find out who produces what and where in the 
national context. This section complements the four maps and it is based on the same 
source of information.
Following the patterns o f concentration illustrated in the maps the data was 
divided into seven areas. These were: 1) the South comprising the states o f Rio Grande 
do Sul (RS), Santa Catarina (SC) and Paranâ (PR); 2) The S. Paulo metropolitan area 
(Greater SP); 3) the S. Paulo state (SP); 4) the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area (RJ); 
5) the state of Minas Geraes (MG) and Brasilia (DP); 6) the North-Eastern (NE) region 
comprising the states o f Bahia (BA), Pernambuco (PE), Parafba (PB), and 7) lastly the 
Manaus region (AM). (See locational map in appendix 5) The metropolitan areas o f Rio 
and S. Paulo are considered individual units given the massive concentration of 
companies, services and buyers.
A breakdown of the total number of registered firms prior to 1974 and between 
that date and 1989 reveals a concentrated pattern of specialization and spatial division 
of labour amongst national regions. The two figures below show the spatial distribution 
in two distinct ways.
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Figure 6 .1 shows the sectoral distribution o f companies in the seven national 
regions. The figure illustrates the degree of industrial diversification/specialization in 
each o f  the seven regions. A darker shade has been used to distinguish the concentration 
o f inform atics firms from other firms in each region.
Figure 6.1
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the regional distribution o f companies according 
to nine industrial sectors (Mainframes and minicomputers, microcomputers; peripherals; 
parts; microelectronics; telecommunications; consum er electronics; industrial automation 
and instrumentation).
Figure 6.2
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The two figures complement each other. The nine industrial sectors are unevenly 
distributed throughout Brazil. Consumer electronics, for example, is found only in the 
SP and Manaus area. This sector represents 78% of the total number o f companies
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operating in the ZFM. Microcomputer producers are also in Manaus (12% of total 
number of producers in the country) in spite o f the battles between SEI and SUFRAMA 
to remove import facilities from computer companies located in the area.
Industrial automation and instrumentation are two relatively new sectors in 
Brazil, and are domestic companies, concentrated in the metropolitan area o f S. Paulo 
and S.Paulo state. 75% of all industrial automation companies and 80% of all 
instrumentation companies are located in the metropolitan area of S. Paulo. The former 
is also present in the South (16.1%) and in the Central area (9.6%). In the South and 
in Minas Geraes there is a concentration of Brazilian based companies o f varying sizes 
and with a range of industrial activities producing for local and regional markets.
The North-East region is at the bottom of the list when it comes to electronics 
companies. With only 1.5% o f the total number of companies in the country, North- 
Eastern companies are almost entirely detached from the industry’s national division of 
labour.
A buyers market is concentrated around Brasilia where the federal government 
is located, and producers are concentrated in the Belo Horizonte, Sul de Minas regions: 
5.6% of all national companies are located in these two localities. Chapter seven 
füirsues this discussion of industrial location, looking at the economics o f location of 
firms.
6,3,2 The Location of Users of Informatics Products
The second type of geographically specific data includes regional sales and 
distribution of computer users nation wide. This data shows where the markets are. 
While this thesis is primarily concerned with production, this is useful indicator of 
informatization (greater use of information technologies) in the country.
This analysis is based on data on the top 600 industrial, commercial and public 
users o f informatics goods in the country, and the types of system configurations they 
have at their disposal. The data base included only large central data processing offices 
within companies and government institutions, the numbers of mainframes or 
minicomputers, microcomputers available to each of them, the types of application used 
and the types o f data processing operations performed by these centres.‘
Figure 6.3 shows the total number of data processing centres (566) in 18 states
‘ Dados e Idéias, no. 126, Nov/Dec 1988 "As 500 Maiores Empresas Usuârias de Infonnàtica.
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of the nation. As the figure illustrates, 49% of all data processing facilities in the 
country are located in S. Paulo. The state is followed by Rio de Janeiro (16%), Rio 
Grande do Sul (6.9%), Minas Geraes (6.4%) Paranâ (5.7%) and Brasilia. The North 
and North-East are poorly represented with few data processing centres.
Figure 6.3
Regional Distribution of Installed Computer Systems in Brazil, 1988
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Table 6.1, in turn, illustrates where data processing facilities are located both 
within states and within economic category.
Column A (% national distribution of systems per industrial sector) shows that 
computers are widely used in the 18 sectors listed. Sectors with a greater concentration 
of computer users include food processing and petrochemicals (7.6%), electro­
electronics (industry and services) (7.3%), retail, civil construction and financial 
institutions (6%).
These patterns of computer use based on company informatization must be put 
into perspective. The survey includes only large computer users and excludes smaller 
companies. Thus the sample is biased towards TNCs, state companies and large 
Brazilian corporations. At least 39% of the companies listed are Brazilian subsidiaries 
of TNCs. Another large proportion are Brazilian state owned companies (18%), and
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most of the remainder are in the hands of producers of the country’s most important 
export products such as orange juice and pulp, agricultural and meat products, leather, 
military and defense, metallurgy, petrochemicals and civil construction. Moving away 
from public users, TNCs and major exporters, come large national companies 
producing consumer goods for the internal market (e.g., clothing, beverages, furniture, 
retailing, motor vehicles), and in service provision (e.g., transports, private banks).
These data indicate , nevertheless, the extent of informatization of the public 
sector, which includes the public banking system (national and state banks), public 
services companies (electricity, telecommunications, transports.), all federal agencies, 
and naturally, big state companies, key representatives of the state procurement strategy 
(e.g., Petrobras, CSN, Vale do Rio Doce).
To conclude, the distribution of users o f informatics goods demonstrates that 
computers are already in use by companies operating in 18 different economic sectors. 
As for the regional distribution of installed systems, the South-East region has the 
largest numbers of computer producers and users. Other regions o f the country, 
including the North and North-east and Central regions have production facilities, but 
do not have developed computer user markets.
ESMG SP PR SCBA RSPE DFPB GOState Locatio CE RNPA APAM
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6.3,3 Regional Sales and Regional Employment
This section looks at regional sales and jobs and it is based on SEFs data.
SEI measures regional sales according to the amount of items purchased by each 
region. These items include only computers, peripherals, and parts. S. Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro are the largest markets having bought 43% and 17.2% of all sales in the 
country in 1987 (Table 6.2). The Minas/Brasilia region fluctuated between 8% and 
15%, thus confirming the role o f government as one o f the largest consumers of 
informatics goods in the country. A sharp increase in sales from 4.8% to 11.3% 
between 1979 and 1980 in the South coincided with a successful regional campaign to 
attract informatics companies to the region, including the creation o f science parks in 
three Southern states, and most importantly, for existing Southern based companies to 
move into the sector. The North-East remains a residual market in the country, 
reflecting the lack o f major users, and other producing companies.
Table 6.2
Distribution of Sales of Informatics Goods per National R^ion
Areas/yrs 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
S. Paulo 39.4 42.7 41.6 33.7 31.3 37.1 42.7 42.1 43.0
R.Janeiro 29.1 33.2 29.6 24.5 26.4 20.3 17.7 17.7 17.2
SP State - - - 6.5 15.1 11.0 9.8 9.8 8.8
DF/MG 8.8 8.1 10.1 14.7 9.9 10.8 11.2 11.2 13.1
South 4.8 11.3 13.3 14.0 10.4 12.5 11.01 11.01 10.4
North-East - - - 4.1 4.2 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.12
The last set of data indicates employment figures for each o f the seven regions, 
in 1988. These are presented in Figure 6.4. These data, together with the information 
presented in the maps, most clearly illustrate the position of capital and labour in the 
national territory.
SEI’s employment data is limited. The annual company survey used by SEI does 
not require informants to provide geographically specific employment data. To 
illustrate: IBM employs 4,500 people, 2,7(X) o f whom work in its Sumare plant near 
S. Paulo. However, employment figures are usually included in those of Rio de Janeiro, 
and sometimes Brasilia, where the headquarters and main offices are. The same occurs 
with the largest national conglomerates like Itautec, Elebra and Sid which have branches
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located in more than one city and state, and yet employment figures are totalled for the 
company and included in those of one area.
Figure 6.4 
Regional Informatics Employment, 1988*
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Regions
* Employment in the Manaus area is 1985 data (Hewitt, 1988)
Source: Own research, 1989
6.4 Summary & Conclusions
To conclude, the purpose of this chapter was to map out the geography of the 
Brazilian informatics industry in the broader context of the electronics complex in 
Brazil. To do that four angles of the geography of Brazil’s informatics industry were 
examined. These included growth and distribution of electronics firms in the national 
territory, regional distribution of computer users through 18 economic sectors, regional 
sales, and employment.
The major findings of the chapter were first, to illustrate with four thematic 
maps, the convergence of often competing industrial growth patterns and industrial 
policies,^^e development of the electronics complex in different parts o f Brazil.
Second, the impetus behind such growth cannot be reduced only to profit 
making, as Smith would argue, and as it has been argued in government reports and 
other specialized literature (SEI, 1989). Certain events have had a clear impact on the 
location of firms in different parts of the national territory. These events included the 
approval of a national policy for the informatics sector, the creation o f a national 
company - Cobra, and the formulation and approval of competing regional policies.
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Other events which have affected the location of firms in Brazil have had most impact 
elsewhere. These include, for example, technological innovation and change first in 
televisions (affecting the relocation of consumer electronic industries from the South- 
East to the North), and then microelectronics (leading to the appearance of the 
microcomputer).
Third, the global economic crisis in the late 1970s (and discussed in Chapters 
two, three and four) also had an impact at the national level. First, many TNCs began 
to relocate their activities to developing countries like Brazil as a profit seeking 
strategy. Many of the firms that came to Brazil were in the consumer electronics sector, 
others were in the informatics sectors. Once established in Brazil these firms did not 
move . They chose a location that suited their needs (proximity to ports and airports, 
in or near major urban centres, well served by transportation, communications, public 
services). In spite of rigid and flexible industrial policies (for informatics and consumer 
electronics respectively), TNCs encountered no barriers to carrying out operations in 
Brazil in line with their headquarters strategies.
Lastly, the chapter explained how the geography o f Brazilian informatics has 
gained through the policy (PNI). Maps 1 to 4 show the steady growth of firm 
registration throughout the country over a period of 20 years. These geographical 
changes, however, give only an aggregate image of the geography of the industry in 
Brazil. The next chapter goes beyond the aggregate picture focusing on the relationships 
between firms and localities on the local level, and the relevance o f these relationships 
for a sustained development of this national industry.
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CHAPTER VII
VII Industrial Location of Informatics in Brazil 
7.1 Introduction
This last empirical chapter complements Chapter six in examining the geography 
of the national informatics industry. Using the same geographical distribution employed 
in Chapter six this chapter examines linkages between firms and localities, the types 
of policies used to promote this sector in different parts of the country, and how these 
have been shaped and affected by local conditions.
Most of the data in this chapter results from interviews with key individuals 
working in firms and other relevant institutions. Other relevant information includes 
company reports, answers to the survey questionnaire, and available material on science 
parks. For the sake o f confidentiality, companies are identified by letters rather than 
their real names.
7,L I Structure of the Chapter
The chapter has two parts. The first focuses on industrial clusters in six 
Brazilian regions: 1) S. Paulo and S. Paulo state; 2) the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan 
Area; 3) the South; 4) the North-East; 5) Minas Geraes and Brasilia, and the Manaus 
area. Each region is examined with the following criteria: the structure o f the local 
informatics industry, the presence o f backward and forward linkages between 
companies, the impact of different forms of regional assistance on local development, 
and the links between the region and other national and international players.
The policy for export production zones in Brazil is examined in section 7.2.7. 
This theme deserves particular attention as it was originally planned under the national 
informatics policy, and if  approved, could become another major competing 
development policy regulating high profitable sectors like informatics. Section 7.3 
summarizes and concludes the chapter.
7.2 The Electronics Industry in Brazil: Regional Patterns
7,2,1 S, Paulo, S, Paulo State
The South-Eastern corridor is the most important industrial region in Brazil, and
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as was demonstrated in Chapter six, is also the centre o f the national informatics 
industry.
As noted in Chapter six, a total of 189 firms were registered in the region in 
1989. This figure represented 55.6% of all mainframe and minicomputer producers; 
53.8% of microcomputer producers; 54.8% of peripherals; 66.7% of makers o f parts 
and components; 41.9% of data communication companies; 56.5% of the industrial 
automation sector and 68% of the instrumentation sector. Seven of Brazil’s largest 
informatics conglomerates are located in S. Paulo (Elebra, Itautec, Sid, Scopus, 
Digilab, ABC Bull and Multitel). In 1988 there were 37,870 people employed by the 
industry % or 50.5% of the total electronics employment in the country. Nearly 5,000 
technical support personnel, or 57% of all technicians were employed in the region 
(SEI, 1989:133).
Firms located in the city of S. Paulo also benefit from an infrastructure 
stretching outojtra 200 km radius including research centres, universities and industrial 
facilities o f many companies with headquarters located in S. Paulo.
This region has a complex and well defined spatial division of labour including 
a military defence complex centred in S. Jose dos Campos and a major university based 
R&D centre located in and around S. Paulo and Campinas. In sum, this region is at the 
forefront of industrial and technological developments in Brazil providing both TNCs 
and national companies with a well developed business (developed services) and 
industrial (multi-sectoral industrial parks) environment required by investors.
S. Jose dos Campos is one of the largest and most developed cities in the area 
located 90 Km from S. Paulo with a population o f half a million people. The city is 
also the centre of the Brazilian military defence industry with the presence o f Embraer 
and A vibras, producers of civil and military aircraft, and of the Aerospace Technical 
Centre (CTA) and its four institutes including an university (TTA) and three R&D 
centres o f the Air Force (IPD, lAE, IE A). Another five hundred companies are based 
in the municipality, employing 25,000 people.
The second largest city in the state, Campinas, with one million inhabitants, is 
an important research centre with three leading state R&D Centres: CPqD 
(Telecommunications), CTI (informatics) and Sincotron (Nuclear accelerator). There 
are two major universities: UNICAMP and Puc Campinas with a population o f 4,(X)0
^Figure reflects total en^loyment in 1988 of the 368 firms listed in the data base (73,000).
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post-graduate students. Some o f the largest national and international corporations are 
in Campinas totaling 1300 industrial companies and 70,000 jobs. At least 40 companies 
operate in the electronics sector. They are distributed as follows: 5.4% in 
microelectronics, 29% in telecommunications, 15% in computer production and 15% 
in instrumentation . Important companies include IBM, Hewlett Packard, Fairchild, 
Elebra Microelectronica, Digilab and PHT.
Firms located in the region vary in size from very large (more than 1,000 
employees) and a large number of small firms (less than 50 employees). Of the total 
number of 189 firms: 0.5% had more than 1,000 employees, 14.3% had between 999 
and 300 employees, 24% had between 299 and 100, and the rest employed less than 
100 workers. Most firms (34%), however, were small.
Inter-firm commercial transactions were quite high in the area. This was done 
by looking at subcontracting contracts between companies. Two types o f subcontracting 
arrangements used by national and Brazilian based TNCs were most common. These 
included commercial and specialized subcontracting.
Brazilian based TNCs, as has been discussed in Chapters four and six 
established themselves in Brazil before the existence o f a national informatics industry. 
Up to the mid 1970s the national industry was very dependent on the activities and 
technologies introduced by TNCs. After the institutionalization o f the policy, (PNI) 
companies were forced to seek ways to circumvent policy barriers and to meet new 
guidelines stated by the government. One key element o f new government demands was 
for an increased use o f national suppliers and services (import substitution). 
Commercial subcontracting was, therefore, a scheme that permitted TNCs to identify 
national suppliers and provide them with the necessary know-how and inputs, in 
exchange for product. This type of subcontracting also had other advantages, including 
the possibility o f reducing production costs when and where cheaper and less skilled 
labour was available. Of all TNCs operating in Brazil, IBM had gone further in 
establishing a well developed network of subcontractors in the S. Paulo region. At the 
time of field work, the company had over 420 suppliers with 291 active ones listed on 
its roster.
To identify these firms, IBM created an International Procurement Office (IPO) 
to select potential suppliers to sell to IBM Brazil and other foreign branches o f the 
corporation. IBM and IPO offered these companies production support services and
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legal advice on commercial transactions. The initiative, according to two companies 
selected to participate in the scheme, allowed Brazilian producers to contact potential 
foreign buyers, and to familiarize themselves with the international market. These 
factors were highly regarded at a time when the country was going through a period of 
economic uncertainty.
On the whole, the key criteria used by TNCs for the selection of subcontractors 
was an attractive quality/performance/price ratio that made local sourcing an alternative 
to imports. TNCs also enjoyed a privileged position vis-a-vis their subcontractors with 
respect to their demands. Most of the process technology used by these companies had 
already been tested and used elsewhere. TNCs were therefore able to provide 
subcontractors with a support structure, appropriate documentation, staff training and 
a captive market.
Questionnaire and interview replies indicated that Brazilian based companies 
operating in the region were also equally engaged in subcontracting arrangements with 
other companies primarily of the same region. National companies relied on local 
suppliers as one way to circumvent economic (inflation and economic plans) market 
instability and risk. This was particularly true for smaller companies operating with 
shorter term production plans, with limited production capacity, few trained staff and 
little cash.
Subcontractors produced a diversified list of inputs, including mechanical 
(components for disk drivers and printers), electric (cables and plugs), electronic 
(boards) and structural parts (carcasses for monitor, keyboards and cpu’s, covers, mats, 
brand labels).
Subcontracting relationships between national companies were limited only by 
potential changes in the global divisions of labour. Instead, they were more exposed to 
the economic volatility and fragility of the domestic market, as demonstrated by the 
experience of company A.
Company A used to do most of its manufacturing in-house. After experiencing 
difficulties in developing products, and lOdjaJUnjwith day-to-day routines of production, 
A decided to work as a systems integrator, that is putting together machines of different 
makes and selling them as complete systems. To do that, the company purchased the 
entire system from between 14 to 57 different suppliers after receiving a customer’s 
order and specifications. According to A, most of its suppliers were also dependent on
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other producers to get their products ready for delivery. In order for this complex chain 
o f suppliers to work properly, production and exchange transactions had to operate in 
equilibrium, which was particularly difficult. During the Cruzado Plan, for example, 
the company was able to sell only two complete units/month. This corresponded to an 
almost 90% reduction in the firm’s sales of 20 units/month. In spite of these difficulties 
and risks, A still preferred to operate as a system integrator rather than resume its 
previous role as a manufacturer.
A ’s experience was shared by many other companies. Between 1987 and 1989 
poor company-supplier interactions was one of the most important problems faced by 
the national industry affecting both national and international firms big and small (SEI, 
1989). The volatility of the national economy was the first problem listed by 
industrialists when commenting on their commercial transactions. According to SEI’s 
staff, smaller companies were faced with a double burden: they lacked capital to finance 
their operations and could not cope with very rapid inflationary periods. Companies 
complained about suppliers’ irregular and faulty delivery patterns and the inferior 
quality o f products. Together these problems made sourcing one o f the most difficult 
problems faced by the industry (SEI, 1989:93), which in turn reflected on the national 
capacity to carry out a complete process of technological development, transfer, 
adaptation and diffusion.
Another important indicator of firms’ performance and integration with other 
national and international players was export activity. Linkages between Brazilian based 
firms and foreign buyers (other than Brazilian based TNCs) were very weak. Practically 
all exporters were operating in the S. Paulo region. IBM and Unisys together responded 
to 97.6% of the sector’s exports in 1986 (US$231 million) (SEI: 1989:34). Most of 
these exports were to the United States. Domestic companies tried to export but were 
not so successful. Their activities corresponded to 2.4% of all exports in 1988. 
Brazilian based companies’ export markets were in Latin America (7.8% of all export 
sales to Argentina and Mexico) and Asia (3.5% o f all export sales to China). (SEI, 
1989:35).
Firms operating in sectors other than informatics were, on the whole, more 
successful in their export activity than those producers o f computers, parts and 
peripherals. A visit to two national companies operating in the digital instrumentation 
sector illustrated how the national informatics policy favoured industrial sectors which
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were primarily controlled by national firms. Companies B and C (with 80 and 150 
employees respectively) began their activities in 1984 producing and selling equipment 
(digital instruments) in the national market. By 1988 the two companies alone accounted 
for 96% of the sector’s exports. Their market was primary restricted to Third World 
and developing countries including Angola, Nicaragua, Argentina and Colombia. Their 
success was related to two factors: the market reserve (PNI) barred TNCs from 
operating in the instrumentation sector, and the absence of high import tariffs imposed 
by other Latin American buyers, (which was in direct contrast with the case of 
computer and peripherals).
Another factor that made S. Paulo a desirable and successful location for 
informatics firms (and others) was the close proximity to research centres. As noted in 
Chapter two, one strategy used by companies in both the AICs and NICs case was to 
seek financial and technological support from government, higher eduction institutions 
and private investors as, for example, was tried in several programmes under the 
auspices o f the EEC.
On the whole industrial collaboration and cooperation programmes between and 
within NICs have been limited, if  not mostly restricted to multilateral initiatives funded 
by organizations such as the UN (Beer-Gabel & Conquy, 1984). In the case of Brazil 
initiatives were mainly restricted to programmes being generated in and for S. Paulo’s 
regional market. The region led the country in the number and diversity o f collaboration 
and cooperation programmes between university and industry. 1988 data for Campinas 
showed that 45% of the companies enrolled in CIATEC, the local science park, 
maintained some form o f cooperation with research institutes in UNICAMP. 28% of 
the companies worked with the Ministry of Telecommunications Research Centre 
(CPqD). Elebra Telecom, for example, produced together with CPqD and UNICAMP 
its electronic switch TROPICO used in the national telephone network systems by 
Telebras, the state telecommunications company. CTI, the federal informatics R&D 
centre was also active in microelectronics R&D. The centre bought an encapsulating 
and mounting IC line from Burroughs and, together with national producers, worked 
on the development o f appropriate process and product technologies. Sid, which in 1988 
was the fifth largest informatics company in the country joined effort with 10 research 
institutions located in and around the S. Paulo area to develop the project ESTRA. 
The objective o f the project was to develop different software prediction environments
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(SID interviews). UNICAMP and Itautec worked together in the development o f a 
system to generate circuit boards.
S. Paulo based institutions and scientists were also heavily involved in basic 
R&D in strategic areas such as data base systems, software engineering, 
microelectronics, local area networks, computer graphics, parallel processing, artificial 
intelligence and supercomputing (Info, Aug 1989:25). Concurrent with views expressed 
in Chapter four regarding national support to science and technology programmes 
(section 4.4), the quality o f the research and the results achieved varied from sector to 
sector. Staff identified^ain problems in carrying out research programmes effectively 
as a lack o f trained staff, lack of funds and lack of state-of-the-art equipment. Senior 
researchers at recognized centres such as CTI in Campinas and the LST at the 
University of S. Paulo argued that their institutions and research work were the victims 
of the national informatics policy which restricted the importation o f essential research 
equipment and hampered the process of technology acquisition, transfer and adaptation 
in the country.
Companies located in the S. Paulo area benefitted from regional assistance 
provided by three science parks established in the state. In addition to CIATEC located 
in Campinas, both S. Jose dos Campos and S. Carlos had such formally established 
organizations. The S. Jose based park was primarily geared to activities in the military 
defence complex serving a large concentration of firms operating along the three largest 
corporations (Engesa, Avibras and Embraer) employing 17,000 people. In the S. Carlos 
park, informatics represented 10% of the total number of science intensive companies 
located in the area. These companies were entitled to a range of benefits (municipal tax 
levies) and technical support from the University o f S. Paulo, S. Carlos Campus, and 
the Federal University of S. Carlos (UFSCar).
Another important feature of many of the largest corporations located in S. 
Paulo was the concentration of corporate decision making (and therefore control over 
the firms’ internal operations) inside the region.
D was a Brazilian company established in 1981 with the support o f one o f the 
largest private banks in the country. D was a holding company o f a group o f five other 
companies operating in microelectronics, office equipment, computers and peripherals, 
circuit boards and surface mounting device integrated circuits. D had a partnership with 
another large Brazilian company E to produce printers and a joint venture project with
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IBM in software development and computer technology licencing. In 1988 D s parent 
company acquired a major producer of consumer electronic goods in the country and 
was taking over the microelectronics division of company E to become probably the 
largest national group on microelectronics.
D began as a producer of microcomputers and then diversified into office 
automation (copiers, facsimile), banking automation (ATMs, CPUs, cash dispensers), 
commercial automation (electronic cash registers, supermarket laser scanners), 
peripherals (hard disks and printers), data communication systems, minicomputers and 
a range of microelectronics devices. D recognized that it should bring together technical 
skills developed in various divisions so to facilitate problem solving and dissemination 
o f results. Thus, D ’s business strategy was, according to the company, based on an 
accumulation of efforts and resources to dominate and control production and process 
technologies from the most simple to the most complex equipment. D was organized 
in large units (4,500 workforce on five different industrial sites -two in the Amazon and 
the rest in S. Paulo) with a network of 23 sales points in 15 states. 12.3% o f the 
company’s work force was involved in R&D and most of these were in S. Paulo. 30% 
o f the work force had university degrees and over 80% of them were between the ages 
18 and 30. D had offered a range of in-house and external training programmes to staff 
including management courses, technical support and assistance, language training and 
overseas technical training. These programmes were designed to make up for the gaps 
in state support to S&T programmes, and for the poor technical and research knowledge 
of new graduates. This commitment to R&D brought D good business results. D  
introduced to the Brazilian market the 286 chip, laser scanners, copiers and 
communication control devices. In 1988 the company invested 15% of its total 
investments in R&D and human resources. The company* s modem management 
methods and employment policies, introduced to build a corporate identity and a 
nationally recognized trade mark for Brazilian computers, was based on a programme 
of ‘total quality and total solutions’.
Company E, in turn, had stakes in all sectors of the electronic complex with the 
exception of consumer electronics. E was organized as a conglomerate. Each division 
had total control over management/labour relations and production whereas investments 
were made at the corporate level. In contrast to D, E opted for this decentralized 
approach of industrial organization relying on a network of suppliers and concentrating
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its resources on the most crucial aspects of technology, administration and marketing.
Both D  and E were model national companies committed to the principles of the 
national informatics policy and determined to establish themselves firmly in the national 
market. After 1986 these two companies sought to restructure their operations seeking 
a greater concentration of resources to maximize their business opportunities. This 
process focused on improving management, production and marketing as a way to cope 
with economic problems and to strengthen their market position. It included a growing 
awareness o f customer needs by improving the firm’s support services. These 
innovative characteristics differentiated large Brazilian firms located in the area from 
other, smaller companies.
In short, industrial location and concentration in S. Paulo started in the late 
1920s and developed to become the largest and most complex industrial area of the 
country. Following this tradition, many companies which now operate in the informatics 
sector were set up or moved into the region to take advantage o f new business 
opportunities created by information technologies. The contributions o f this new 
industrial complex amount to absolute increases in the number o f firms, jobs and 
revenues, and in relative terms (establishment o f backward and forward linkages with 
other sectors o f the region’s economy) to the region’s development. This contribution 
was differentiated across technological areas (e.g. technological competence in the 
production o f simpler computer architectures) and markets (e.g. new sectors such as 
electronic banking and retail). The dominant characteristic o f the region is^large 
concentration o f small, medium and large companies operating in all segments of the 
electronics complex, and notably in the informatics sector with 51.9% o f all national 
sales in 1987, 61% o f national employment in 1988 and 51% (of 189 firms) o f all 
registered firms in the sector (SEI: 1989:132). Competition is keen amongst S. Paulo 
based firms and together with a volatile national economic scenario for over six years, 
the companies have been forced to develop a strong market orientation at the expense 
of investments in R&D, indigenous development and quality control. Companies’ efforts 
to control greater market share and guarantee return on investments have led many to 
turn to contraband and different forms of industrial espionage, as already discribed in 
Chapter Five, section 5.3.2.3.
During the period of field work and after it, larger corporations (and S. Paulo 
is headquarters for at least ten o f them) were moving towards a greater concentration
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o f resources in selected industrial sectors Industrial restructuring aimed at improving 
firms’ management capacity to effectively respond to changes in the economy, in 
technology and in the market while at the same time to consolidate the companies 
position in a sector with a very high growth prospect (Dados & Ideias, 1989:23). 
Moreover, S. Paulo’s industrial and business tradition,including the experiences with 
science parks and industry-university collaboration programmes, served as a 
development model-fer similar initiatives elsewhere in the country.
7.2.2 The Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area
Rio de Janeiro never had a long tradition in manufacturing given its historical 
role as an administrative centre. The city became an attractive location for electronics 
firms after the opening of IBM’s factory in Benfica in the mid 1960s and the creation 
o f COBRA in 1974. It was also during the late 1950s and 1960s that other important 
industries were set up in the area including chemistry, metallurgy and transport 
(shipbuilding).
Electronics companies were concentrated in two parts of the Rio de Janeiro 
Metropolitan area: the Jacarepagua area in the south of the city and in Zona Norte, 
along the Avenida Brazil, located north of the city centre. Many o f the largest national 
data processing centres were also located in Rio de Janeiro and the nearby town of 
Petropolis.
In 1988 electronics employment (excluding consumer electronics) in Rio 
amounted to 14,1 % o f total national employment. Industrial conglomerates including 
ABC, Cobra, Compart, Digiponto, Moddata and Racimec accounted for 6,(XX) jobs. 
The sector of greater importance in Rio de Janeiro was telecommunications (with 
27.9% o f all firms), followed by an even distribution of companies producing 
mainframes (16.7%), microcomputers (16.9%) and peripherals (17.8%).
Rio de Janeiro enjoyed, like S. Paulo, the proximity benefits of research centres 
and universities. These included PUC (Catholic University), UFRJ (Rio de Janeiro State 
University), Federal Fluminense University, the Army’s Institute o f Engineering and 
the National Technology Institute (INT) which was part o f the extinct Ministry of 
Science and Technology. Many of these institutes had programmes in basic R&D and 
carried out selected joint research cooperation programmes such as the work done on 
supercomputing based on a parallel processor with 16 nodes (Info, 1988).
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According to SEI’s 1988 data on regional sales, Rio de Janeiro was the second
market for informatics products in Brazil after S. Paulo with a diversified demand from
most sectors of the economy. In 1988 sales in Rio de Janeiro accounted for 17.2% of
the total national sales in the year (SEI, 1988).
Companies located in the area profited from a range of incentives offered by
both the municipal and state government and from three science parks located in the
region. These included RIOTEC (Polo de Alta Tecnologia de Jacarepagua), BIO-RIO
(Polo de Biotecnologia) in the Ilha do Fundao, and the Petropolis Science Park based
in the city of Petropolis. Urban and property tax levies were the most common types
o f incentives offered by the state and city.
Of all national experiences with science parks the RIOTEC initiative was by far
the most developed, as acknowledged by professional, academic and business circles.
RIOTEC was set up in the southern part of the city in Jacarepagua region to serve the
concentration of informatics firms in the area. The park in turn emerged partly as a
result o f growing pressure to bring together universities and industries in both basic and
applied research, and with the support from firms who felt they could benefit from the
park. RIOTEC was to receive financial patronage both from the private sector, which
would oversee the park’s management, and from the public sector which would fund
some o f the project proposals put forth by a consortia o f member firms. RIOTEC plans
were very ambitious including the construction o f two sites with 43 and 54 companies
each, covering a wide range of services (e.g. laboratories, training centres, commercial
centres). The initiative was also based on the convergence o f industrial infrastructure
provision and regional development:
"The park’s third objective involved two aspects: one is to promote greater 
integration of the park with the S&T based centres in the region including the 
military institutes; the other aims to disseminate new technologies in order to 
modernize the public and private productive sectors in the state. The basic 
underlying idea for the two objectives rests on the fact that high technology is 
not an end but a means for social and regional development" (Riotec, 1987).
Between 1987-1988 there were 73 companies affiliated to the park, most o f them 
operating in the informatics sector. However, very few o f them had actually moved 
their facilities inside the park, and many of the park’s development targets had not been 
achieved. To illustrate, of the proposed 43 companies (site I) and 54 companies (site 
n) that were to construct in the area, only 12 had begun building. The main reason 
given by firms was lack of money to fund their relocation. The park had also beaitbe
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victim of natural and social disasters. The January/February rains of 1988 destroyed 
large sections of Rio’s shanty towns and urbanization in and around the city leaving 
many homeless. RIOTEC’s industrial site which was partly urbanized, (electricity, 
drawn roads and sewage) practically vacant, unfenced and located in a flood-free 
terrain, was target o f an invasion by homeless^&ort in cash and almost inoperative, the 
park had to borrow money from members to fence the property in less than four days 
to avoid invasion and future conflict with the community.
With respect to firm size, 30% of the firms located in the city had between 9 
and 30 employees; 15% of them employed between 51 and 100 people, 20% had 
between 100 and 300 workers and the remaining had over 300 employees. Unlike S. 
Paulo, only two companies had more than 1000 work force. The degree o f industrial 
diversification, production processes, management structures and inter-firm linkages 
were quite high in Rio de Janeiro, as confirmed by interviews and field visits.
Company F, established in 1966, started activities in the informatics sector in 
the early 1970s. The company produced banking and commercial automation equipment 
which, as discussed in Chapter four, was one of the most competitive markets in the 
country. F  was also one of the few national companies to successfully export products 
(banking terminals) to Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, and Portugal. Between 1987-88 
F had five companies under its direct control employing a total of 187 people. Four of 
the subsidiary companies were located in Rio de Janeiro and one in S. Paulo. 
Restructuring plans for F led to the closure of the S. Paulo based subsidiary and a 
concentration of decision-making on one site. Employment also decreased significantly 
after 1985. The restructuring strategy adopted by the company included expansion of  
the plant’s production capacity in high precision mechanics (essential for the production 
of printers and disk drivers), building of a new plant and a signing o f a technology 
licenoe agreement with a Japanese company. It also included increased investment in 
human resources and a continued commitment to technology transfer and adaptation.
Another evidence o f the national companies’ commitment to streamline their 
operations to increase profitability was in human resource development and 
management-employee relations. Company G was created in 1974, the first Brazilian 
informatics company and destined to set the technological and markets standards for the 
rest o f the national industry. Over the years G underwent many changes fulfilling its 
role o f a national champion. A management team installed in 1985 focused on the role
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o f labour in the command and control of the labour process and sought to combine it 
with emerging production processes being tried elsewhere such as ‘just-in-time’ 
systems. For the company the workers were "the ones who know best how to optimize 
a production process, while the management’s role is to transform workers’ knowledge 
into operational routines." The ‘just-in-time’ system adopted for the PC line relied on 
the supply of all computer parts by 14 subcontractors who received the technical 
specifications and training from G (quality control). Provided the system worked well, 
the time between delivery of inputs and final products was not to exceed 48 hours. In 
practice, however, the system did not work well. G, like many other Brazilian 
companies, suffered from under capitalization, poor market performance and, in spite 
o f its strategies to bring workers’ participation into the production process, very high 
labour (and management) turn over.
To summarize, the heart of the national informatics industry is located between 
S. Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The latter’s main characteristic is a geographically 
concentrated industrial zone (north and south of the city centre) where firms have 
clustered and engaged in active and dynamic inter-firm transactions. The closeness to 
centres o f excellence, the availability of a pool o f skilled labour, the proximity to those 
individuals and institutions directly responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of the PNI, made Rio de Janeiro a desirable and profitable location. Many o f Rio’s 
strengths were, nevertheless, offset by an equal number o f problems, including 
saturated communication transportation networks (long commuting hours), urban social 
stress (poverty and crime) and environmental problems (floods) which made day-to-day 
business very hard on many companies. Together with S. Paulo, these two regions were 
at the forefront o f national economic life and concentrated all the best resources the 
country could offer to potential new national and international investors wishing to enter 
the informatics sector.
7.2.5. The South
The South (which includes the states o f Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and 
Parana) presented an interesting contrast to the traditional industrial South-East region 
described above. The region has a tradition o f family based manufacturing companies 
that were established during the 1930s. With the appearance of new information 
technologies, some o f these companies diversified their production activities to
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incorporate the new digital technologies notably in two sectors: industrial automation 
and instrumentation.
Most of the companies in the South originated there (87% o f the sample), giving 
the region, and notably the state of Rio Grande do Sul, a high level of internal control 
and decision making. This had a direct impact on the ways these companies integrated 
themselves and the types of social innovations they were able to bring in.
Of the total surveyed companies located in the South, most o f them produced 
industrial automation systems, computers and telecommunications equipment. 1988 
employment was 5.7% of the nation’s total as indicated in figure 6.4.
Different forms of municipal and regional schemes were set up to support the 
local industry. Five science parks were in operation, or were being planned, in the 
South. These included CTTPAR in Curitiba, CERTI in Florianopolis, one in Joinville, 
and two other initiatives in Rio Grande do Sul.
According to survey replies Rio Grande do Sul was the most developed state of  
the region and offered the best infrastructure to accommodate new informatics 
companies coming into the area. In 1987 the state had 50 companies directly employing 
48,000 people. This represented an increase of 300% from 1982 when there were 17 
companies, 8 of which were producing peripherals and components. They varied in size 
having anywhere from 7 employees to 1,200. One company had more than 1000 
employees, and the rest were distributed as follows (1988 data), 25% of all firms had 
more than 300 employees, 15% had more than one hundred employees, and the 
remaining 60% had less than 100 people. Larger companies like Edisa, Multidigit and 
Meno, on the other hand, contributed the most in terms o f tax revenues to the state 
(Pereira, 1987:125)
Financial assistance in the form of development grants and management guidance 
were provided by the Rio Grande do Sul Development Bank. Technical assistance was 
provided by the local university UFRGS, which was one o f the first institutions in the 
country to work with digital technologies and research. Four local companies were 
founded by university professors and therefore maintained the university-industry link 
that put them in business in the first place.
One criticism raised by companies operating in the area was an insufficient 
supply o f skilled labour. Between 1987 and 1989 local universities trained 50 
professionals per year in the fields of electronics and electrical engineering. This supply
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was way below the 1987-1990 demand for 950 engineers and technicians to work in 
local industry (Pereira et all, 1987:146). This gap, together with the scarcity o f financial 
resources, have delayed the region’s industry growth and consolidation o f science 
intensive industries in the area.
Different companies used different strategies to maximize their business 
opportunities drawing on the region’s existing resources. Following a process affecting 
the informatics industry nationwide, in 1988 H restructured its activities to become more 
competitive. The company sold microcomputers under OEM contracts, supermicros 
produced in-house and superminis and mainframes using HP technology. Subsidiary H I 
produced work stations with HP technology. H ’s restructuring strategy was to 
concentrate the activities of two subsidiaries (both located in the state) under the same 
management board and to adopt different strategies in different product markets. H  did 
not include job cuts in its restructuring plans. In fact, from 1979, when it began 
operations, to 1988 employment increased 9 fold.
The predominance of higher level functions in Rio Grande do Sul differentiated 
the state from the other two in the region, Santa Catarina and Parana. Both, despite 
their ‘developed’ status as a part of the Southern region, did not have advantages in 
their favour such as renowned research centres, an industrial and business tradition, and 
a well developed services industry to attract concentration o f high technology industries. 
Both states tried different development strategies using the concept of science parks. 
Two attempts in S.Catarina (Joinville and Florianopolis, the capital), were unsuccessful. 
They lacked proper management, resources and government subsidies. Parana based 
firms, benefitted from the proximity to S. Paulo and some medium sized companies 
considered the state as a potential location. Even so, Parana remained essentially 
dependent on the extensive agri-business operating in the state.
In sum, the Southern region occupied the third position in the nation with the 
highest concentration of informatics firms, jobs, and business after Rio de Janeiro and 
S. Paulo. Rio Grande do Sul offered the best business environment for companies 
willing to enter this sector including the availability of financial incentives offered by 
the local State Development Bank, and the proximity to the Federal University UFRGS. 
The industrial structure of informatics and other electronics firms in the South was 
characterized by a cluster o f small family-based firms with a high degree o f control o f 
internal operations, capital and human resources to master more traditional (e.g..
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computer manufacturing) and innovative productive processes (e.g., new sectors such 
as digital instrumentation).
7.2.4. The North-East (NE)
The Brazilian North-East has for a long time been considered peripheral within 
the country. The focus of multiple and often inadequate regional development policies, 
the area has continually failed to successfully attract industry or other income-generation 
activities. In 1988 the North-East had the lowest position in the electronics industry in 
terms o f both level and status o f employment. The region hosted the low^tnumber of 
companies (1.5% of the country’s total) operating in four areas: in groups 2 (micros), 
3 (peripherals), 4 (parts) and 6 (telecom). Employment in electronics was less than 
0.2% of the nation’s total. None of these companies originated in the North-East 
region, making it the region where firms had the highest degree of external control over 
their management and production activities.
The activities carried out by North-East based companies were o f low status 
within the corporate hierarchical divisions of labour including final assembly and 
packaging instead o f being involved in the commercialization of products. Companies 
moved to the North-East for two reasons: to benefit from a regional incentive 
programme and, to a lesser extent, to exploit new markets (Fleury, 1987).
Sudene, the North-East regional development agency created in 1962, was the 
main driving force of regional development offering concessional loans and grants to 
willing investors regardless of employment effects, the nature of the productive activity, 
and, with respect to electronics, the technological content o f products. Despite the 
apparent ease in obtaining Sudene grants, regional aid was not successful in attracting 
electronics companies to the region.
The second reason given by companies for moving to the North-East was to 
tap the unexplored local and regional markets. Two indicators highlight the potential 
size o f such a market: sales and installations. In 1988, the North-East market was still 
very small, absorbing only 4.1% of total national sales (Table 6.2). In the six states that 
form the North-East region (Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco 
and Bahia), only 35 clients had computer installations (Table 6.1) including banks (a 
total o f seven) civil construction companies (5), food processing companies (4), and 
commerce (5). These figures were not imposing enough to justify a relocation of
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manufacturers and sellers into the area, even if we added the myriad of small business 
and individual users who were begining to introduce computers.
According to a company who^ sold products in the North-East, the 3000 
kilometers separating the city of S.Paulo from Fortaleza and Recife^pital of Ceara and 
Pernambuco respectively) made manufacturing of products in the area economically 
unfeasible. Stocking was also ill-advised. Products were seldom displayed by the 
distributors or in showrooms. When a customer wanted to buy a system, an order was 
placed and the good ves shipped from the headquarters to the consumer. This was 
corroborated at another interview carried out in the South-East by an informant who 
argued that "The ones (companies and individuals) who want computers have the money 
to fly to Rio and S.Paulo and buy them."(interviews).
Only some of the larger national producers had sales offices in the region’s 
capitals including Salvador, Recife and Fortaleza. Other producers chose local 
distributors (representacoes) in the main capitals to represent their interests in the area. 
These companies occasionally trained sales personnel in the company’s headquarters. 
In 1988 the North-East had 14.2% of the total number of distributors (1447) in Brazil. 
By w aÿ  of comparison, the South-Eastern region had 44.8% and the North 5.2% 
(SEI, 1989:24)
Another crucial issue affecting North-East based companies was the lack of 
centres o f knowledge (universities, technical colleges) in the region. In 1988 only the 
universities in Pernambuco, Paraiba and Bahia offered graduate courses in informatics. 
The region also had a severe shortage of skilled workers.
Assessing the performance of companies in the area was a difficult task given 
the enormous gaps in the data available and the lack of data from direct field work in 
the region. This was partly compensated by telephone interviews and questionnaire 
responses. All six companies operating in the North-East were subsidiaries of 
companies located elsewhere. These firms had a precarious position vis-a-vis 
competitors in other parts of the country because of their level of under capitalization, 
low volume of production, restricted markets, and very important, a poor connection 
with the parent company’s national division of labour.
Company II, for example, was a subsidiary of I located in Rio de Janeiro, 
producer of super computers, disk drives, ATM’s and other products. The company’s 
main range of products and markets were in banking automation and, up to 1988, it
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occupied a leading position in the top 15 companies in the sub-sector. Subsidiary II  
was established during a period of high growth rates in the industry (1979-1986) to 
produce wires and cables and other parts. Two years later, in 1988, II was operating 
in deficit and suffered from the economic and political pressures affecting Brazil.
J, a subsidiary of a Brazilian-based TNC on the other hand, produced integrated 
circuits. The plant’s entire output was geared for export. J multiplier effect was very 
limited. The plant imported most its inputs from Japan and Europe. In 1987, K  
exported US$6.09 million or 40.6% of Brazilian exports in the sector (SEI, 1989:79). 
These products were bought by the parent company following the branch 
plant/headquarters model practiced by TNCs in places like Mexico or South-East Asia.
During the late 1980s two science parks were established in the North-East, the 
NUTEC Fundacao Nucleo de Tecnologia Industrial, in Fortaleza and the PaqTe, Parque 
Tecnologico da Paraiba, in Campina Grande. These initiatives were part o f another 
regional strategy to strengthen the weak articulation between firms in and outside the 
region. Both strategies were to be partly financed by the state and federal agencies 
(SUDENE, CNPq, and FINEP) to carry out their activities in the areas.
The presence of electrical and electronic companies in both parks were negligible 
(one company in Campina Grande had planned to produce digital equipment), despite 
the fact that one objective of both parks was to promote the electronics sector based on 
the economic success experienced up to 1986, and on the strategic value o f new 
technologies.
To conclude, the experience of six companies based in the North-East during the 
late 1980s demonstrated that business opportunities for companies located in, or 
considering relocating to, the region were quite limited. The region’s limited supply of  
skilled labour, restricted markets, distance from more dynamic production centres in the 
South-East and limited amounts of local investment capital,a^qrav/afted the region’s 
overall peripheral position in the national division o f labour. This added to a regional 
economy still primarily based on extractive activities (agriculture and cottage industries), 
Brazil’s gloomy economic conjuncture rendered local initiatives (L a$ in the science 
parks) weak in bringing a positive impact to the region’s economy and to the national 
informatics industry at large.
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7.2.5 Minas Geraes and Brasilia
This region groups together the state of Minas Geraes and the federal district of 
Brasilia. Minas is geographically and culturally nearer S.Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Companies located there have long benefitted from proximity to other well developed 
regional economies around the Belo Horizonte and Sul de Minas regions.
In Minas Geraes informatics firms were concentrated in two areas. The most 
important cluster of firms both in employment and volume of business was the Belo 
Horizonte -Contagem region, a smaller cluster o f firms found in the town o f Santa Rita 
do Sapucai in the southern part of the state.
Belo Horizonte offered to companies similar business opportunities to those of 
S. Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, that is an industrial tradition and diversified regional 
economy, research centres and a skilled labour force, good transportation and 
communication facilities and some indigenous capital. A mixture o f indigenous and out 
of state companies located in the area were engaged in the electronics sector.
The most prominent company was M, a member o f a S.Paulo based industrial group 
with interests in all sectors of the electronic complex, and with plants and offices in 
most regions including Manaus. The plant produced ram’s, discrete components, linear 
and digital integrated circuits which were sold primarily to the domestic market. M ’s 
position in the national division of labour was solid. Protected by a special 
microelectronics policy, M , together with another Brazilian company, was selected to 
receive financial and technical support from the government to operate in the 
microelectronics market.
M  enjoyed greater autonomy than an ordinary subsidiary taking decisions over 
investments and management/labour relations. This autonomy was positively translated 
to relations with employees and suppliers. Being in the microelectronic sector, M  
imported most of its raw material from Japan. This tight dependency on foreign 
suppliers inhibited a greater integration of the company in the local economy. Thi5 
was further limited by a corporate decision to undertake most of the company’s 
domestic sourcing in the S.P and Rio markets, partly due to the lack o f suitable 
suppliers and by ignoring the potential of the B. Horizonte area.
Local S&T capacity was on the whole more limited in Belo Horizonte. The local 
branch o f the federal university UFMG had courses focusing on informatics and the 
university engaged in a collaboration programme with IBM and other S. Paulo based
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companies to re-design existing computer architectures based on analytical structures.
The other cluster o f electronics companies was found in Sta. Rita 200 km from 
S. Paulo. Primarily an agricultural (dairy and coffee) region, Santa Rita nevertheless 
had four institutes and a faculty set up to produce electrical, electronic and mechanical 
engineers operating there since the mid-1960s. This cluster of institutes and 
entrepreneurial motivation of a selected few led to the creation of micro companies (two 
to 15 employees) operating in the telecommunications and electronics sectors. Some 
experiences were quite successful.
Company N  originated inside a college laboratory in Sta. Rita, to produce 
antennas and television signal receivers to fit domestic TV sets. N  found in the area the 
skills, suppliers and market to increase production four-fold during the first four years 
of activity. N  developed its technology and products using traditional low skilled labour 
intensive methods. After 1984, the company had to change its business strategies to 
accommodate new policies (PNI).
First o f all, N  opted to invest in new R&D and to introduce digital technologies 
into its products. To do that it recruited two newly graduated engineers from the local 
technical school. At the same time, N decided to phase out its production o f electric TV 
signal receivers. This was possible thanks to the mayor’s decision to convert ‘political 
favouritism’ (paying votes back with jobs in the public sector), to some form of  
‘technological favouritism’. He also provided development grants to local infant firms 
for investment. N ’s owners eventually sold the traditional line o f manufacturing to 
focus on more advanced digital TV signals, receivers and other communications 
devices.
Since 1987, N ’s business performance and that o f other small companies located 
in the area deteriorated as a result o f a continued national economic crisis. Sales 
plunged by 39% and an unplanned influx o f new companies, attracted by the mayor’s 
fiscal incentives, led to more intense competition. Firms also suffered from the region’s 
lack of capital and bank credit lines.
The other extreme of the region was Brasilia. The federal district is a 
government town, par excellence, concentrating a large number of data processing 
centres and representative offices o f leading national and international companies. 
Government procurement policies and the strategy to modernize and informatize the 
federal administration, attracted skilled personnel to Brasilia and even some companies
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to cater for local demands. Brasilia remains, nevertheless, more a market than a 
production area for informatics goods. A total o f 34 electronics companies are located 
in the region with the greatest predominance of industrial automation and 
telecommunications devices. Regional employment is 5.4% of the national total.
The clustering of firms in both Minas Geraes and Brasilia followed an industrial 
expansion trend that began in the late 1970s in synergy with the growth o f the 
informatics industry.
For such a regulated industry, Brasilia’s role was to be the political stage where 
pre-policy battles were fought and, after the policy was approved, where companies 
went to obtain approval for their industrial plans. Another isolated area was Santa Rita 
do Sapucai, where the concentration of small electric and electronic firms were product 
of the town’s entrepreneurial and political flair rather than a direct result o f national 
industrial policy.
7.2.6. The Manaus Area
The experience o f Manaus is reviewed in the context o f the Manaus Free Trade 
Zone. The data used in this section is secondary including technical papers and 
government data.
The key feature of the Manaus industrial hub revolved around the Manaus Free 
Trade Zone (ZFM) created in 1976 (Decree no. 288 o f 2/67) to promote and finance 
economic development of the Brazilian Amazon region. The ZFM was part o f a series 
o f development measures implemented in the 1960s together with the local regional 
development agency SUD AM (Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento da Amazonia) and 
BASA (Banco da Amazonia). The main thrust o f the policy was to foster territorial 
occupation of the Amazonian region through the promotion o f economic activities in the 
area, and in so doing, to restructure the region’s economy which until then was entirely 
based on extractive activities (e.g., rubber, timber, cocoa, fishing). The policy was 
based on an import substitution scheme (Suzigan, 1987) and targeted a gamut o f sectors 
such as motorcycles, watches, optics, packaging and electronics.
Electronics were to receive the greatest attention from the state, particularly 
manufacturing activities in the consumer electronics sector. The mechanisms used to 
lure investors in the region included primarily tax levies on the import o f components. 
This policy was particularly attractive to industries whose products required high levels
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of input not yet available in the country or whose production was not economically 
feasible. According to Baptista, the combination of subsidies and a liberal import policy 
resulted in a 25-30% reduction in production costs in the Manaus area (Baptista, 1985).
The result was a gradual migration of selected industrial sectors from other parts 
of the country, and an inflow of direct forein investment mainly from Japanese 
companies (Yamaha, Honda, Seiko) seeking an opportunity to enlarge their regional 
markets. Television producers, for example, migrated to the North in response to 
changes in colour technology, to be able to import key components (Baptista, 1985). 
Most companies operating in the area depended heavily on the import o f integrated 
circuits. Baptista calculated that 43% of all IC imports in the country were utilized by 
the consumer electronics companies (Baptista, 1985:88). All these industries had a 
common denominator: a dependency on key components that had to be imported, 
which represented a substantial share o f production cost. By 1983, 39 firms operated 
in various sectors of the electronics complex and employed 37% of the region’s work 
force (16,586). In 1988, there were 200 companies active in 20 different industrial 
sectors providing 40,000 jobs (Hewitt, 1988:60).
The creation of the ZFM, and the free importation of key components, had 
serious implications for the development of national technologies as outlined by the 
PNI. While it was not a part o f the original development plan, the ZFM scheme 
encouraged producers to target their outputs almost exclusive to the domestic market. 
In 1987 94% of the local production was distributed to the rest o f the country (Dytz,
1987).
Production activities carried out in Manaus were restricted mainly to assembly 
o f final products using both imported and locally-sourced inputs. Some o f these locally- 
made inputs were however, imported into the country and sold re-labeled ‘made in 
Brazil’ (circumventing the law o f product nationalization) (Baptista, 1985; Hewitt,
1988).
Manaus suffered perhaps more than any other region in the country from the 
lack o f qualified personnel to work in the area. National companies mediated the 
problem by maintaining their product development division in the headquarters in the 
South-East (Hewitt, 1988:75), or by recruiting in the South-East. During field work 
in 1987/88, out of an average of 20 job announcements in electronics advertised in the 
Sunday employment section of O Estado de S. Paulo, only one was for a position in
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Manaus. This ratio was considered low both by the person in charge o f job advertising 
in the paper, and by the recruitment officer of company D, a major S.Paulo based 
conglomerate with two plants in the Manaus area. The limited supply o f jobs was linked 
to the 1987 Cruzado crisis. These positions were often offered together with a package 
o f benefits (housing subsidy, company car, family health insurance, schooling) to attract 
the best candidates. Another strategy used by D was to fill positions with its own staff 
based in the South-East. Volunteers were offered advantageous benefits and a fixed 
term contract (5 years) with job security after termination o f service in the Manaus 
area. This volunteer rotating system seemed to be the best way o f keeping good 
professionals in the company, to circumvent the problems o f recruiting an outsider who 
would also have to live in Manaus, and one that offered the least amount o f staff 
resistance.
To summarize, the Manaus experience has had both positive and negative impact 
on the region’s development and on the sustainability o f the PNI. The consumer 
electronics sector which migrated and flourished in the region after the mid 1970s was 
as early as 1985, the largest in terms o f output and the biggest consumer o f electronics 
components in the country (Baptista, 1985). The resulting industrial agglomeration 
transformed the geography of Brazilian electronics and the urban geography o f Manaus 
with the introduction of new factories, civil construction, services, public transport, 
retail, banking, and all sorts of other services needed for the reproduction o f the 
industry and of the labour force moving into the region.
The ZFM strategy was also a threat to the PNI as the former liberated what the 
latter prohibited: the import o f key electronics and electrical-mechanical components 
which were too costly, risky, or not yet economically feasible to be produced in Brazil.
The nature o f the integration between a Brazilian based industry and global one 
was quite tenuous and characterized by a dependency on key legally imported or 
smuggled electronic components used in the assembly of final products in Manaus or 
shipped to the rest of the country where assembly activities were carried out.
Because of the heavy influx o f imported goods into the area and a dependency 
on foreign suppliers, the local industry was subjected to sudden changes in the 
international markets. During the chip famine o f 1987/88, Brazilian firms were well- 
supplied by the Japanese producers. So much so that American and European 
companies, starving for raw materials, decided to buy them in Brazil. When the
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Japanese realized what was happening, warned Brazil to raise its prices and/or control 
their exports. Company D, for example, had a remarkable performance. This was quite 
extraordinary when theoretically and even historically. Third World producers 
dependent on supplies from TNCs were the first ones to be affected by fluctuations in 
the international market, usually by having their contracts suspended (which did not 
occur in Brazil).
By 1988 when both government (federal and regional) and industry were fully 
aware of the limiting effects of the ZFM on the regional development of the Amazonian 
region, new programmes were proposed by SUFRAMA and FUCAPI. These included 
nationalization schemes, regionalization (intensification o f local purchasing) and 
disaggregation (to prevent products from being imported and having their labels 
changed and being re-sold) (Hewitt, 1988:70).
Along similar lines to the Manaus import processing zone the government, in 
its most explicit regional policy, devised the export processing zones model in 1984, 
geared to the development of electronics and other industries in the country. This 
experience is reviewed below.
7.2.7 The Export Production Zones - EFZs
"the EPZs would have a positive impact on the solution o f the regional problem 
in the absorption o f technology, job creation and the induction o f industrial 
modernization. Its implementation will strengthen rather than a negatively affect 
the Brazilian industry"^
This section discusses one of Brazil’s regional development policies, the export
production zones, which was conceptualized as part of the national informatics policy.
The first reference to the development role to be played by EPZs was made in the PNI.
Article 24 o f the law 7232 stated:
"excepting the situations which may already exist and in the event that the 
corresponding technology is available in the country, the use o f foreign 
technology by business which do not meet the requirements of article 12 shall 
be conditioned to: 1. production for foreign markets, 2.production units within 
the export production zones
The law also \  mat these export production zones should be set up in the
 ^ Correio Brasiliense, 06/03/88:17 Conclusion of a report by Ambassador J.M. Villar de Queiroz on the 
impact of the EPZs in Brazil.
 ^Article 24, Law 7232 o f 23/10/84.
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Brazilian North and North-Eastern regions, and that the production and export o f EPZs 
outputs were entitled to receive the same tax incentives created to promote companies 
located in other parts of the country/
The provisions of these articles received very little attention from the industrial 
and regional lobby groups during the first three years o f the law. By early 1987 the 
situation changed. Under the Ministry o f Industry and Trade, the EPZ concept was re­
launched with the goal of alleviating regional imbalances among some o f the 
economically deprived zones and to transform them into internationally competitive 
industrial production sites. Or, as the Trade Minister then affirmed: "we’ll be creating 
an industrial shopping centre to promote the industrial development o f the North and 
North-Eastern regions".^ "The EPZs represent "islands of freedom for the North and 
the North-East where current levels o f economic development resemble those of 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea 15 to 20 years ago".^ "The creation o f the EPZ 
is also particularly opportune given the sharp fall o f foreign and national direct 
investment in the country".'*
Opposition to the EPZ’s proposal was equally vocal. On one side, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology feared for the integrity of the informatics companies. The 
suspicion was based on the potential danger o f government benefits to be pumped into 
the areas and how they could undermine the PNI achievements, as much as the ZFM. 
At the bargaining table, the Ministry o f Science and Technology managed to guarantee 
that companies operating in the informatics sector could not be located in the EPZs. 
This exclusion could not, however, prevent the circulation o f inputs and final products 
between the EPZs and areas where informatics firms were regulated (given the 
technological and industrial complementarity o f the sectors) as occurred between 
firms located in the Manaus area. Even stronger opposition came from the House of 
Representatives against approval o f the plan through decree and not through legislative 
powers. The group, headed by a SP representative Mr. J. Serra, produced a list o f 300 
signatures, including those of influential North-East politicians, against the measure and 
its importance to be decided by a single decree. Forces contrary to the creation of the
* Articles 25, 26 and 28 of the Law 7232 of 23/10/84.
 ^Jom al do Brasil^ 18/01/1988:7 "Decreto de criacao das EPZs sera entregue hoje a Samey."
 ^ O Estado de S. Paulo, 03/02/1988:18 "Ministro deve anunciar ZPEs oficialmente apos o carnaval.'
* Correio Brasiliense, 27/01/88:9 "MIC deseja ZPEs sem impostos."
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EPZs failed. In reality, given the political scenario of the early 1980s, the EPZ plan 
was more a political issue than anything else. The plan was to serve as a bargaining 
tool in Congress to satisfy the North-East representatives who wanted a piece o f the 
development cake for themselves and not a legitimate regional development policy as 
the law stated it.
The 1987 version of the EPZ was forged on the basis o f a perceived successful 
experience in four South-East Asian countries (Taiwan, Singapore, S.Korea and Hong 
Kong) in overcoming economic underdevelopment.  ^ According to the Ministry, the 
plan provided for the provision of infrastructure, fiscal incentives, free exchange 
mechanisms and repatriation of profits. It also recommended the utilization o f a local 
labour force, complemented by the presence of foreign technicians and managers, and 
with specific legislation to protect the foreign investor against industrial actions in the 
EPZs areas.^ The North-East region was chosen given its proximity to major North 
American and European consumer centres vis-a-vis the distant South-East Asian poles. 
In sum, the project was based on an assumed low transport cost comparative advantage 
rather than on cheap labour criteria.
The project also lacked a more orchestrated government support. During the 
formulation the government made no effort to publicize its intentions and to attract 
potential foreign investors to these industrial areas. It simply assumed that foreign 
capital would come, as they had been going to other Sout-East Asian localities.
From the TNC’s side, the question was altogether different. The EPZ concept 
assumed that capital internationalization occured as a response to increasing labour costs 
and other costs in core regions, and that these increases could only be reduced by 
splitting the production process geographically between conceptualization, assembling 
and commercialization (with the first and last remaining in the core country, and the 
second relocated to zones where production costs were lower). In 1980 there were 166 
EPZ spread in fifty five different developing countries. Despite such popularity. 
Chapters three and four above have argued against this interpretation of capital mobility 
based on Vernon’s product life cycle theory and Frobel’s NIDL theories. This 
opposition was also expressed by Cho who pointed out that at the same time (late 
1970s) an increasing number of production facilities returned to the advanced capitalist
 ^ Correio de Minas, 21/02/1988:17 "Experiencia Asiatica desaconselha”.
^Correio Brasiliense, 06/03/88:17 "Emissario do Planalto defende criacao das ZPEs’
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countries (Cho, 1985:188). Between 1978 and 1980, the USA received 77% of the 
total value of global direct investment growth (Cho, 1985:189). The manufacturing 
sector, moreover, experienced the fastest rate of investment growth.
In 1989, the EPZ plan was revived again as a political issue supported by liberal 
factions in the government who saw in it a possibility to dismantle the long established 
tradition o f nationalism and protectionism in the Brazilian economy. Considering the 
lack o f support given to this regional development policy in 1984 and in 1987, it seems 
plausible to suggest that the Brazilian strategy to promote the EPZs is bound to fail the 
second time around. Firstly, the idea is isolated as a single piece of regional policy 
disconnected from existing regional policies to promote high technology industries. 
Secondly, as a product of ideological interests within the state, the EPZ concept takes 
for granted the strategic behaviour o f TNCs regarding the location o f part o f their 
productive activities in other countries. Thirdly, given the current economic difficulties 
of the Brazilian government, the country lacks the necessary financial resources to fiind 
the infrastructure projects needed to make these North and North-Eastern regions 
attractive to foreign investors (e.g. more roads, better communications facilities, etc.). 
Lastly, the Brazilian initiative comes nearly 15 years later than the rest o f the world, 
ignoring significant changes in capitalist accumulation, analyzed above in Chapters two 
and three. The national initiative conflicts with current developments taking place in 
the AICs and if not prop erly supported will contribute minimally to the development 
of the national industry and its capacity to export.
7.3 Summary & Conclusions
The main purpose of this last empirical chapter has been to complement Chapter 
six’s analysis of the geography of the Brazilian informatics industry by looking at the 
existence or non-existence o f linkages between firms and localities, the types o f regional 
policies used to promote the industry in different parts o f the country and how these 
regional developments have affected and influenced the development o f the industry 
nationwide.
The main findings of the chapter can be divided into three areas: the first looks 
at the composition and structure o f industrial and service facilities o f informatics 
companies nationwide; the second examines the relative importance of each region vis- 
a-vis other regions in the country and vis-a-vis international players, and lastly, it
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assesses the relevance of competing regional development policies to concrete 
developments in the industry up to 1988.
Following a geographical and data distribution of firms used in Chapter six, this 
chapter demonstrates that there are considerable differences in the types of activities 
being carried out in the six regions. These differences can be described in terms of a 
hierarchy o f functions (not necessarily complementary) being performed by different 
regions which gave them greater or lesser economic and strategic importance in the 
nation. S. Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were unquestionably the geographical, business, 
capital and R&D centres of the Brazilian informatics industry with the largest 
concentration of firms, jobs, services, centres of excellence and markets. The 
establishment and migration of informatics firms into both regions followed an earlier 
pattern of Brazilian industrialization, and was driven by a well developed spatial 
economy. The relative importance o f other regional centres decreased as they moved 
away from the S. Paulo - Rio de Janeiro corridor, with extreme peripheral cases found 
in the North-East and Western part o f the country.
Rio Grande do Sul came third in the list of potential sites being characterized
by a cluster of small family-based businesses who entered the sector attracted by the
business opportunities linked to new technologies. Firms located in the state were from
the outset backed by state-led initiatives (science parks, subsidies and credit), the
ot
proximity o f a good university and plenty enterpreneurial initiative. The other two states 
were peripheral as far as their locational advantages wene concerned.*
Minas Geraes and Brasilia were clustered together for data analysis purposesbut 
were regulated by different regimes. The region around Belo Horizonte and Contagem 
offered new investors and companies willing to locate there a well developed spatial 
economy without many of the urban and environmental pressures found in Rio de 
Janeiro and S. Paulo. Companies could also benefit from the growing regional 
economy. Brasilia has always been the political centre o f the Brazilian informatics 
industry and policy, and a developed market (public sector) for informatics products. 
The political role of the city is likely to decrease after 1992 when the policy will be 
evaluated, but the city will continue to be a heavy consumer o f information 
technologies.
Research demonstrated that the driving force behind developments in more 
remote clusters o f firms such as the North-East, Santa Catarina and Minas Geraes were
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a result of specific regional development policies, or local entrepreneurial drive that 
brought together basic ingredients to attract new industries and jobs, namely the ZFM 
in Manaus, science parks and Santa Rita do Sapucai.
On the whole, regional development policies including ZFM, the science parks 
and the EPZs were ambitious blue prints-for regional development, each having had a 
different spatial and economic impact on regions. The first one certainly altered the 
geography o f the consumer electronics sector forcing plant closures and or relocation 
from the South-East to the North of the country. It facilitated the internationalization 
o f the sector and the free-flow of legal and ilkgal imports into the country. These 
imports became vital inputs for the manufacture of ‘Brazilian-made’ products for sale 
primarily to the domestic market. To conclude, the chapter makes a contribution to the 
debate on uneven development by illustrating how a national industry has been created 
and settled in a country.
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CHAPTER VIII 
VIII CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction
This chapter draws together the major findings of the research and is divided 
into five sections. First, it reiterates the argument and objectives of the thesis as 
presented in the introduction (Section 8.2). Section 8.3 is a summary o f the contextual 
information gathered and presented in Chapters two and three. Section 8.4 summarizes 
the empirical findings presented in Chapters four to seven. Finally, Section 8.5 gives 
a final assessment and discusses achievements and limitations of this research.
8.2 The Thesis Objectives
In this thesis I examined both past and present links between the creation of a 
national informatics industry in Brazil and those of a global electronics complex. I 
argue that policies adopted by the Brazilian government (summarized in the Informatics 
Law of 1984) were instrumental in the development of the present industry. However, 
these policies have not consid^^the links between the development of the Brazilian 
industry and the development of informatics industry worldwide, and therefore failed 
to acknowledge the influence of international events (e.g., technology and market 
changes) on Brazilian initiatives.
The focus of this thesis has been Brazil’s informatics sub-sector, which has been 
at the centre of growth. "Informatics" was defined as a particularly pervasive industry 
drawing from several industrial sectors and involving different technological levels and 
complexities. The definition of the informatics sub-sector in Brazil given in the 
Introduction -fotLovA/odL the guidelines outlined in the 1984 Informatics Law and 
included producers of computers, peripherals and parts. This thesis also compared and 
contrasted the policies and performance of the informatics sector to other sub-sectors 
of the electronics complex. This aimed to situate informatics in a broader industrial and 
technologically relevant context. Technological developments in the industry have led 
to dramatic changes in the competitive structure of this sector and have transformed the 
way people and communities perceive the strategic value of informatics.
The approach adopted in the thesis was first, to review and describe the 
technological context that marked the development of electronics and informatics
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worldwide. This was done in the Introduction. Secondly, the thesis examined the 
international context of global informatics focusing on experiences in the AICs and 
NICs. "The international situation [which has been described in Chapters two and three] 
is not simply a back cloth to events played out on the national and regional stage; the 
two levels stand in a dialectical relationship of whole to part in which the parts 
(countries, regions, and individual firms and plants) actively constitute, reproduce and 
transform the whole while simultaneously being influenced by their places within the 
whole." (Morgan & Sayer, 1988:119). Following Morgan and Sayer, the third step was 
to move from a global to a national level to examine developments in Brazil.
The Brazilian experience was the focus of four chapters (four to seven). The 
main purpose o f these chapters was to review the policy (Chapter four) and the 
industrial performance of the sub-sector (Chapter five); to map out the geography of the 
industry (Chapter six) and to analyze the interactions between firms and places (Chapter 
seven). The regional focus, central to this thesis, aimed at 1) putting Brazilian 
development in a sharpar perspective, and 2) contributing to the existing literature on the 
theme by offering an innovative and critical way o f analyzing industrial growth. As 
indicated in the Introduction, the literature on Brazil’s experience in developing a 
national informatics industry concentrated attention on political, economic and 
technological facets of the industry and policy. While opinions expressed on the 
Brazilian initiative were mixed, in general most analysts have supported or have at least 
recognized the benefits of Brazil’s protectionist strategy as a prerequisite for the 
development of infant industries. Moreover, industry (including both academic, 
government and business) analysts have taken regional development processes for 
granted paying very little attention to how different policies, technology changes and 
government strategies influenced developments in Brazil.
The thesis has drawn heavily on secondary sources looking at the Brazilian 
experience per se and on the experience of other developing and developed countries. 
Primary sources of data have been used to cover gaps in the existing literature, and to 
analyze changes in the geography of Brazil’s informatics industry. Primary research has 
focused on industrial collaboration between AICs . the lack of effective forms
of collaboration between industries, and the emergence of science parks in developing 
countries. With respect to events in Brazil, primary research focused on the perception 
of firrris vis-a-vis the government policy and their business interests. It also focused on
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successes in electronic banking, the role o f contraband and its effect on the 
competitiveness of firms, on the support given to science and technology, and lastly, 
on how firms organized themselves and benefitted from their particular locations.
The theoretical framework used in the thesis was based on a review and 
synthesis of three major theoretical contributions on development. These included the 
arguments put forth by dependency theory, the NIDL thesis and by regulation theory.
The first theory, dependency, is limiting in its interpretation of the real 
possibilities o f growth and development in the Third World. Based on a system of 
unequal exchange between developed and less developed parts of the world, dependency 
theorists do not see the possibility of full development in the Third World. 
Furthermore, events described in the thesis regarding the creation and growth o f new 
industrial sectors in many parts o f the developing world have challenged the dependency 
paradigm.
The second theory, based on the New International Division of Labour Thesis, 
explained Third World industrialization as a result o f the expansion and relocation of 
TNCs to areas over and beyond their national boundaries. According to the NIDL, the 
internationalization of capital that started in the early 1950s was driven by TNCs and 
responded to TNCs’ interests. The assumption that foreign capital operated in a free­
wheeling manner around the globe searching for what Smith called ‘profitable, 
individual and particular’ capitals concealed the important role played by the state as 
an active development agent (Smith, 1984). The role of the Brazilian state in developing 
a national industry rebuts the NIDL thesis (explained in Chapter four), rendering the 
NIDL thesis an inappropriate analytical framework. It has been shown however, that 
the NIDL was useful in explaining developments in other parts of the developing world 
(e.g.. Second-tier Latin America and Asian NICs).
One important theme raised in the thesis is uneven development. Smith described 
unevenness in terms of a model of capital movement between sectors and sub-sectors 
of the economy that responded to declining rates of profit. Both model and analysis 
were dissociated from what Smith described as "messy historical conditions permeating 
real events." (Smith. 1984). The subject matter addressed in this research is laden with 
messy historical, political and technological conditions.
It was therefore the complexity of developments of informatics industries in both 
AICs and NICs that made the framework proposed by regulation theory appropriate to
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understand developments in Brazil. Regulation theory defines the global economic 
trends that prevailed from the late 1950s to the mid 1980s as Fordism. This regime has 
been ridden by crises and booms influencing the world at large.
The following section summarizes the main findings o f Chapters two and three 
which described the international context.
8.3 The International Background
The international context was dealt with in Chapters two and three. The purpose 
o f both chapters was threefold. First, following regulation theory’s conceptualization of 
Fordism, to look at the changing nature of capitalist development during the 40 odd 
years o f the informatics industry. In this respect, the chapter’s contribution was to 
conceptualize and explain capitalist internationalization o f the industry in terms of 
competing industrial development regimes (American, Japanese and European). 
Secondly, the chapter aimed to demonstrate the role of states behind the development 
of major multinational corporations and national industries. This was particularly evident 
in the review o f Japanese and European policies with respect to electronics. Lastly, the 
chapter focused on some outcomes of these industrial development strategies namely 
with respect to labour, technology and regional development policies.
To summarize, it has been shown that the American model predominated from 
the 1950s, when the United States produced its first computer, to the present.
The American model was characterized by:
- A policy regime based on a direct support to (‘hands on’) defence related 
activities, contrasted by a ‘hands o f f  laissez faire  approach to activities in the civil 
sphere, these in the hands of American TNCs.
- An industrial structure based on the existence o f very large, vertically 
integrated companies whose internationalization strategies began in the early 1930s who 
have had a commitment to developing state-of-the-art technologies and to being at the 
fore front of the market.
- Production systems differentiated by sectors, but based nevertheless on large 
scale, geographically distributed facilities polarized between different regions and 
different productive activities (front-end versus back-end activities).
This model afforded American based corporations the opportunity to develop and 
to maximize their business opportunities over and beyond national boundaries for nearly
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35 years (1950s to 1980s). After the mid 1980s the model is being eroded away by cut­
throat competition from Japanese competitors operating initially in selected sectors 
(consumer electronics, semiconductors) and gradually moving to other segments o f the 
electronics complex. Thus, it has been argued, the increasing pressures from Japan
have already turned the attention of some major European and American corporations 
of
to Ô clo5e e>Q\nifeto? the Japanese strategy.
Set in a sharp contrast to the American approach, the Japanese model was 
characterized by:
- Policy institutionally centralized under a single agency (MITI) whose 
enforcement powers have gone beyond the life of different governments, assuring 
continuity and wholeness to the development of a gamut of industrial sectors o f the 
electronics complex;
- Emphasis on the importance of competitiveness in internal markets, making 
Japanese companies very fit to face export markets. First, the strategy was based on 
internal market protection and reduced export activity. At a second stage, it was 
characterized by liberalization of domestic markets and exportation o f productive 
facilities to circumvent protective barriers, as, for example, in the EEC case, in Brazil, 
and other countries.
- Emphasis on applied and basic R&D, so as to keep Japanese corporations, 
notably semiconductor producers, in the fore of the technological race. Conscious of 
the strategic importance of micro components and miniaturization of products, Japanese 
corporations have managed to introduce product innovations ahead of American and 
European contenders.
-Process technologies favouring the adoption of economies of scope, flexibility 
and ‘just-in-time’ systems, rendering factories able to adjust rapidly to technological 
and market changes occurring worldwide.
Set between an American and a Japanese race is the European experience. 
Europe’s approach to protecting and securing what was left of the European informatics 
and electronics industry from the predatory activities of both Japanese and American 
TNCs in the European markets rested on the member countries’ perceptions o f Europe’s 
strategic, economic and political importance as a regional power. The discussion of this 
approach suggested that Europe operates like a unity of diversities, that is a collection 
of competing national interests having to compromise to get the best share of the pie.
244
Concentrated in the hands of many projects, European nations and firms are more 
firmly involved in the definition of European wide communications standards than in 
competition to be at the fore o f technological developments or to overtake leaders like 
IBM or the Japanese runners-up.
To conclude, the main findings of Chapter two were that developments in the 
AICs were far from being homogeneous and/or fully orchestrated. Instead, cut-throat 
competition and higher barriers of entry resulting from escalating R&D costs have 
shaped the industry worldwide. Leading AICs partners such as the United Kingdom 
and France, have not been able to match American businesses and Japanese 
government’s support to this sector and have fallen behind the race. The consequences 
of competing AICs development regimes on other potential entrants in this industry, 
namely developing countries like Brazil and other NICs have changed over time and 
amounted to contrasting outcomes. These were explored in Chapter three.
The aim of Chapter three was to situate the experience of many NICs in 
developing national informatics industries in the context of the industrial development 
regimes described in Chapter two. The chapter also compared and contrasted the 
experience o f NICs and AICs. It was shown that development and industrialization 
patterns differed significantly for both groups. AICs economies have had a longer history 
of industrial development with internationally strong and competitive capital goods 
industries which benefitted the development o f electronics and informatics industries. 
The NICs, in turn, share common characteristics o f latecomer industrialization including 
very fast development histories of less than 40 years. In the quest*fco develop national 
industrial sectors, NICs have suffered from small or ineffective/disorganized capital 
goods industries which are important suppliers and consumer of informatics, and from 
a poorly developed or absent array of industrial and social linkages (e.g., support 
services, subcontracting relations, skilled labour, support to S&T programmes).
In spite of the differences between NICs and AICs, Chapter three has shown that 
many NICs have managed to develop national informatics industries. These 
developments described in terms of a growing intra-regional differentiation among 
developing countries challenges the theoretical rationale advocated by dependency and 
NIDL theorists. Guided by different principles, both theories advocated a situation of 
variable dependency between AICs and NICs. Reiterating from Chapter one, for the 
first group, dependency theorists, development takes place in more advanced countries
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at the experience of the perpetuation of underdevelopment elsewhere. For the NIDL 
theories the industrialization that started in the 1960s and 1970s resulted from capital 
accumulation forces headed by American corporations who sought new market 
opportunities. Both theories however, failed to account for the role o f the state in 
shaping the development process, and the role of national capital and its vested interests 
in the industrialization of their specific countries. Therefore, while new Third World 
markets were an important factor in the consolidation o f American development 
strategies, some NICs, notably the first-tier Asian NICs succeeded in differentiating 
themselves firom other NICs and even AICs.
The conditions under which this process of differentiation occurred were 
complex and particular to both Asian and Latin American NICs. With respect to the 
first group of NICs it has been suggested that intra-regional differentiation (leading to 
a split between first- and second-tier NICs) was possible due to four factors. One, the 
utilization o f export orientation as a mechanism to acquire scale economies, and 
command o f process technologies and labour skills enabled the first-tier Asian NICs to 
become internationally competitive. Two, pre-export promotion strategies (based on 
import substitution and market protection in the 1950s and early 1960s), have helped 
and eventually consolidated the position of local capital in these national industries. 
Three, national firms (e.g., Samsung, Leading Edge), have managed to gain a position 
in the industry’s international division of labour (as major world suppliers o f computer 
systems) and can better defend their (and national) interests. Four, since the mid 1980s, 
the proximity to Japan, and the flow of Japanese products, technologies and production 
processes through Japanese FDI and Japanese foreign aid, has passed on to these NICs 
the ideology and principle of the Japanese industrial development regime described in 
Chapter two and summarized above.
The principles guiding the development of informatics industries in Latin 
America have been somewhat different from those outlined above. American TNCs 
control most o f Latin America’s regional markets, the technological trajectories 
employed by national Latin American firms, and the industrial and managerial models 
developed throughout Latin America. In an attempt to sLoW the speed of 
internationalization of electronics industries throughout Latin America policies 
formulated by various countries in the region have hoped to halt the expansion o f the 
American model and corporations in national territories with a view to strengthening
246
national industries and markets. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina were in a better position 
to design and implement targeted policies relying on the existence of a broad industrial 
base, human resources, capital, market and state support.
To conclude, the effect of AICs led industrial development regimes for both 
Latin America and South-East Asia have been expressed by a) differing roles of 
international capital and types of FDI in both cases; b) a labour force differentiated in 
terms of skill, wages, and their condition of internalizing the social benefits of 
electronics technologies in their national social strata, and lastly c) a geographical level 
of differentiation with pockets of growth, stagnation, and underdevelopment, against ^  
of a mushrooming of science parks, export processing zones, and other forms of regional 
industrial development strategies to host electronics industries: in sum, a very complex 
and uneven development process.
I  The international setting discussed by both chapters provided the context for an
analysis and discussion of the Brazilian experience. The factors considered to analyze 
the Brazilian experience were historical development of Brazilian industrialization, the 
national informatics policy, policies regulating other sectors of the electronics complex 
and support for Science and Technology in the country. These were addressed at length 
in Chapter four. Drawing from the available literature I also focused on aggregate 
industrial performance looking at computer installations, sales and employment.
8.4 The National Framework
This section summarizes the main findings of Chapters four to seven.
The overall aim of the four chapters on Brazil was to analyze the Brazilian 
experience in a global context to identify the existence or non existence of linkages 
between the Brazilian experience and that of the international informatics industry and 
the implications of these for a sustained success of the Brazilian initiative.
Brazilian industrialization was result of the alternation of import substitution and 
export promotion strategies, and the alternation of civil and military rulership whose 
liberal ideologies endorsed a top to bottom development approach.
The level of Brazilian industrial output has been significantly high for a long 
period of time. Two factors contributed to that. First, the national economy has 
favoured primarily the internal market. However, after nearly forty years o f import 
substitution the Brazilian industrial base is in urgent need of restructuring.
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modernization and expansion. The export sectors which lead the performance of the 
Brazilian economy internationally (and therefore which comprise the ‘modem sector’ 
o f Brazilian industry) are subsidized (at a high public cost) to make Brazilian products 
price competitive. The second factor contributing to high levels of growth waS a state- 
led capitalist growth based on the extraction of absolute surplus value through the 
exploitation of a national and poorly paid wage labour. The benefits o f this buildup 
have been appropriated by a class of national capitalists and state bureaucrats; than by 
any process of creation of value based on the support, and encouragement of other 
factors such as science and technology, education, productivity gains, and provision of 
basic conditions for the proper reproduction of the labour class. The result is an uneven 
concentration and distribution of wealth leading to social inequalities and rising social 
pressures pointing to the exhaustion of this growth model. It is in this context that 
Brazilian informatics and the model used to promote its development emerged.
The Brazilian model, it has been argued here, personified the ideology and 
values that propelled the industrialization models used in Brazil. It has been inspired by 
the American industrial development regime and has drawn from other regimes selected 
notions such as picking national champions, and policy centralization (from France). 
The model, however, fails in achieving its desired goal (to build national S&T capacity 
and an internationally competitive national informatics industry).
Reiterating from Chapter four, the model was based on prerequisites and
assumptions. With respect to the first, the model necessitated TNCs willing to provide
over thevr use
state-of-the-art technologies to Brazilian firms vWh little or no control! It also assumed 
the existence of a national absorptive capacity which could transform, adapt and develop 
new technologies suitable for the Brazilian market. With respect to the second point, 
the model ignored patterns of capital internationalization practiced by TNCs including 
export (licencing) of outdated technologies and/or the relocation of vertically 
disintegrated assembly plants which hampered the internalization of knowledge of 
processes and organization which are essential components of any embodied technology. 
Second, it neglected the changing and converging nature o f digital technologies by 
isolating the computer manufacturing sector under a market protection, and ignored 
existing policies for consumer electronics and other sectors of the electronics complex. 
Third, the model anticipated the existence of a solid national S&T base, or in its 
absence, a strong and consistent support for S&T programmes from government and
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private sectors. Lastly, it predicted that once firms received and adapted foreign 
technologies they would achieve productivity gains and become internationally 
competitive.
The changing nature of digital technologies have led to a convergence of 
industrial sectors. In the AICs context this opportunity was seized by Japan and later 
by the EEC as a strategic move to maximize the position of Japanese and European 
companies in the international informatics industry. The thesis has shown that in Brazil 
political divergence between national interests groups over the formulation of the 
national informatics policy resulted in a collection of diverging national sectoral policies 
for informatics, telecommunications, consumer electronics, microelectronics and 
software, and in different relationships with foreign capital operating in each of these 
sectors.
This diverging policy structure affected developments in Brazil in at least three 
ways. It made^^more difficult for companies operating in various sectors of the 
electronics complex to benefit from technical developments taking place in other 
sectors. It enhanced the rigidities and differences between Brazilian and foreign capitals 
across the whole electronics complex. Lastly, it diminished a national capacity to 
maximize limited financial and technological resources to achieve desired outputs: that 
is a strengthened national technological capacity to serve national interests in many 
industrial sectors. This finding is corroborated by a review of conflicting regional 
development policies (Chapter seven) that enhanced unevenness between the consumer 
electronics industry in the North (the Manaus export processing zone) and other 
industrial sectors clustered in other parts o f the country.
National support for S&T programmes was the last factor addressed in Chapter 
four. Restating from Chapter two support for S&T programmes was one precondition 
for the successful development of technology intensive industries in the AICs. NICs 
approach to supporting national S&T programmes varied. In general first-tier NICs in 
both Latin America and Asia have invested in  developing human and technical 
resources. Compared to other countries Brazil’s commitment to S&T has been 
rsiaHvef^ consistent. Chapter four, however, examined this commitment to detect that 
the national S&T system is very fragile. This fragility results both from an uneven 
financial support to S&T programmes over a period of nearly 20 years (1970-1989), 
and from a gradual process of technological obsolescense of research equipment
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resulting from import restrictions imposed pre-1984 and post 1984. Permeating these 
two aspects, a succession of economic crises have eroded the isolated success achieved 
by the national S&T policy (e.g., salaries of researchers, value of scholarship 
programmes).
Chapter five focused on the industry’s performance. Over a period of 15 years 
from 1974 (creation of Cobra) to 1989 (end of research), Ibr five years the 
industry was regulated by the PNI, the performance o f the Brazilian industry surpassed 
that o f Brazilian based TNCs, reached a plateau, and experienced decline primarily 
because o f crises in the national economy.
Some achievements o f this period amount to a significant involvement o f 
national capitalists in the sector, represented by the number of firms that have been 
created since 1974; the creation of 30,000 plus direct jobs in informatics and another 
95,000 jobs in other sectors of the electronics complex including informatics services. 
The literature reviewing the performance of the industry argued that the market reserve 
(and PNI) heightened national industrialists’ commitment to developing and adapting 
new product and process technologies, and to investing in R&D and human resources 
(Piragibe, 1985; Tigre, 1983, 1987). With respect to human resource development, it 
has been demonstrated that the PNI contributed to the creation of a new model of 
employment where the kinds of jobs created and offered included a proportion of skilled 
engineering and technical labour (Hewitt, 1988).
To contrast these achievements, many industry analysts have demonstrated the 
limited international competitiveness of Brazilian firms. This has been illustrated with 
price comparisons with similar goods produced abroad, export capacity and production 
scales, all o f which, despite low national labour costs and a commitment to the 
principles o f technological autonomy put forth in the policy, have not managed to get 
Brazilian firms out o f their sheltered domestic market (Cline, 1987; Firschtak, 1986; 
Piragibe, 1984; Tigre & Perine, 1984). Perhaps more telling o f the performance of 
Brazilian firms than interpretations given by the literature was contraband. It has been 
shown in the thesis that contraband has become an important mechanism used by firms 
and consumers to bypass national policies and to achieve desired and expected profit 
targets. Smuggling and contraband, and the long term implications o f these practices 
for the success of the Brazilian initiative, have not been fully addressed by the 
literature, nor by the government. Both have limited their interpretations to a political
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and an economic view of events which led to optimistic conclusions about the Brazilian 
experience.
The limitations of the literature also extended to other dimensions, namely the 
spatial context of developments in Brazil, and the political and economic context of  
conflicting regional development policies. These dimensions were addressed in Chapters 
six and seven.
The two chapters looked at the industry in terms of national geographical 
distribution and growth. Also examined were the linkages between firms and localities, 
the types o f policy used to promote the informatics sector in different parts of the 
country and how these have been shaped and affected by local conditions. The main 
contributions of the two chapters were to collect and analyze existing geographically 
specific data and present it in a format relevant to the thesis discussion. Anotherinncvâtîpï] 
was the analysis of different regional development policies with respect to their support 
(or lack of) of the guidelines outlined in the PNI.
The geographical analysis of the growth of Brazilian informatics exposed a
gloomier picture than that portrayed by aggregate indicators such as sales, outputs,
firms registration and employment. The character of such complex industrial
development was also difficult to measure. One reason for that was the permanent state
“theo f flux of the development of the informatics industry on one hand and changing 
regional conditions on the other.
The main findings of Chapter seven covered three areas. First it presented the 
configuration of industrial facilities in different areas. Secondly, it assessed the relative 
importance of each region vis-a-vis other regions in the country and international 
players. Lastly, it evaluated the relevance o f competing regional development policies 
for informatics.
The four maps presented in Chapter six summarized the patterns of industrial 
growth of the electronics complex in Brazil from 1974 to 1988. Chapter six summarized 
the industrial sectoral composition in the six regions. The spatial division of labour of 
Brazilian electronics in 1988 included a high concentration of firms operating in all 
sectors of the complex in three regions (S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and the South). The 
North had a high concentration o f consumer electronics firms. The Minas Geraes and 
the North-East were sites for producers o f parts. Brasilia was a major political centre 
and consumer market. These divisions of labour reflected an hierarchy of functions (not
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necessarily complementary) performed by each region according to their strategic 
position in the nation. Not surprisingly then, the core of the Brazilian informatics 
industry was in the S. Paulo-Rio de Janeiro corridor with the largest concentration 
firms, R&D centres, services, markets, subcontracting relations between firms, local 
capital involvement and a strong foreign presence. The relative importance o f other 
centres decreased as th^moved away from S. Paulo with extreme peripheral cases in 
the North-East and Western parts o f the country.
It has been demonstrated that the constraints on successful development of 
electronics industries in the North-East region were not restricted by the inability o f the 
region to attract potential investments nor to develop a class o f researchers and research 
activity in the local universities, but by the peripheral position of the North-East vis-a- 
vis other regions in the country. This peripheral role results from regional development 
strategies designed to satisfy regional political interests in congress (e.g ., the EPZs) 
rather than the region’s needs and potential.
In direct contrast with the North-East, firms located in the South had greater 
opportunities to withstand the impact of policy liberalization drawing on their well 
developed linkages (industrial, commercial, financial and political) inside and outside 
the region. Moreover, the involvement of local capital in the industrial development of 
the region provided an additional and important internal control factor which was absent 
from investments made in the North-East, and to some extent in the North.
The last major contribution of the thesis was an analysis of regional development 
policies that came in parallel and/or separated from the PNI. These included the 
Manaus Export Zone, the science parks, and the Export Processing Zones initiative. 
The first policy was formulated before and independently from the PNI and aimed at 
bringing about the development of the northernjnost Brazilian region. The impact o f 
this policy was reviewed at length in Chapters four and seven.
The science park approach, on the other hand, was linked to a wider and global 
approach to regional development, and it was geared to performing a catalytic role 
bringing together public support and private resources and interests to benefit clusters 
of companies in a given region. It was meant to be a positive departure from a previous 
version o f regional development targeted at technology-intensive industries based on 
export promotion zones. Brazilian experiences in developing science parks however, 
could not withstand the vagaries of the national economy. Most attempts failed not due
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to lack of motivation but to the lack of public and private funds.
The last type of regional policy resulting from the national initiatives to promote 
informatics was the EPZ initiative. Destined to fail even before they became law the 
EPZs were a political token to satisfy the nationalistic anger of the North-East over its 
underprivileged economic position vis-a-vis other parts of the country. The main 
problems behind the concept were: it ignored the real nature of production activities 
(e .g ., labour intensive assembly of low value added products) carried out inside existing 
EPZs located in other parts of the world (discussed in Chapter three). It neglected the 
patterns o f capital internationalization behind the development of EPZs in South-East 
Asia which were associated with the export of assembly operations and theorized by the 
NIDL. Lastly, like with the PNI, the EPZs concept assumed that foreign capital would 
be willing to invest in Brazil.
8.5 Final Assessment
The analysis carried out in this thesis about the experience of Brazil in 
developing a national informatics industry demonstrates that Brazil in its approach to 
tackling a complex issue of technology transfer, building of national capacity, creating 
a nationally and internationally competitive industry, has been victim of excessive 
nationalism. Moreover the approach was shortsighted.
Nationalism was a common thread used to sew together political, technological 
and economic factors. However, this nationalist net was not cast wide enough to 
include other interest groups inside Brazil nor strong enough to resist pressures 
from foreign and national capitals. The nationalist group included politicians, the 
military, scientists, engineers and academics, and government users who shared common 
interests regarding computer technologies.
The second group included the international players (TNCs) who had control 
over key product and process technologies, and had their own views of how they wanted 
to handle their business in the country. Technological change and convergence was also 
an important factor. The appearance of the microcomputer lowered entry barriers to 
many developing countries. Ten years later cut-throat competition between AICs 
players inspired by capitalist fears of declining rates of profit (e.g., European based 
companies) led to greater investments in R&D greater mobilization of political, 
technological and economic resources which pushed barriers up again.
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The last important factor was a missing link between Brazil’s national 
development plan and the country’s national S&T policies. The PNI has been an 
important chapter in Brazil’s S&T policy, however, it was formulated at the margin of 
what should have been an all-encompassing national economic development policy. 
Instead, the Brazilian strategy for informatics was segregated from other important 
national policies (e.g., S&T, education, regional development, export promotion,
•from
industrial modernization), and as such it could not benefit nor contribute to these 
policies.
As o f 1989 when the research for this thesis ended, and certainly thereafter, the 
initial impetus behind the policy had already lost its speed. The PNI was under a lot of 
pressure from competing fronts.
Brazilian based TNCs wanted the market protection removed because it clearly 
put limits on these companies’ growth. Given the strategic role played by TNCs as 
suppliers of technology, their pressure counted. The PNI also discouraged many other 
TNCs (operating both in the electronics and other industrial sectors) from wanting to 
invest in Brazil.
Pressures came from other sectors of the economy which needed to restructure 
and modernize themselves and therefore depended on new technologies which Brazilian 
informatics producers could not deliver, and more imporfer^ could not produce.
Ultimately, there were social and economic pressures pushing rates o f growth 
downwards following the Cruzado and the Collor plans. These periods
of severe profit squeeze forced industrialists to seek new strategies including export 
markets and contraband. The thesis has shown, however that the performance of 
Brazilian firms in the former were limited. The latter in turn, was an attractive and 
effortless way for companies to remain in business. I ts  implications cannot be 
predicted.
This thesis has contributed to the debate otl industrialization in developing 
countries by looking at the Brazilian experience. It provided an understanding o f the 
Brazilian experience looking outward, that is, the position of Brazil in the world 
system. The analysis revealed, as already stated, a very uneven configuration over the 
national territory which in turn suggests a more profound unevenness o f Brazilian 
development at large. Thus, the possibility o f continued development o f the Brazilian 
industry is very much tied to the development of the country’s social structures at large.
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which as I have said, vEc^virc -further investigation.
This last point brings me to discuss the major shortcoming of this type of study.
It is both a theoretical and historical/empirical reconstruction of industrialization over
different localities, whose major theoretical framework, as earlier stated, is based on the
changing nature of historical regularities between different regions. It is not therefore
obes
oriented toward policy recommendations nor it offer clear-cut yes/no conclusions. It 
is instead a contribution to a debate that has been very important for Brazil and other 
NICs centered around sustainable development, technology transfer and building of 
national capacities. This debate has received considerable attention from government, 
industry and academics, but notably in the case of Brazil, it has focused too much on 
outcomes rather than on processes and on policy rather than politics.
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Appendix 1 Research Methodology 
Introduction
This appendix explains the methodology and describes the research design used 
in this thesis. The aim of the thesis was to examine the linkages between Brazil’s 
informatics industry and the global industry. With particular respect to the Brazilian 
case, the objectives of the empirical work were fourfold: to examine the Brazilian policy 
and how it facilitated/hampered the relationship between Brazilian and foreign 
companies (Chapter four); to examine the performance of the industry by looking at the 
level and nature of competitiveness (Chapter three); to map the geography o f Brazilian 
informatics (Chapter six), and to examine the linkages (or lack of) between firms and 
localities (Chapter seven). Both primary and secondary sources were used to develop 
the arguments of this thesis. These are explained below.
Sources of Information
This section details the primary and secondary sources o f information used in 
this thesis and explains the research procedures used for different sources and how and 
where this information was used.
The primary sources used in this thesis included two surveys carried out in 1987 
before going to the field, followed by a questionnaire/interview with individuals 
working in government, professional institutions, research institutions, and others 
carried out in 1988/1989. Secondary sources include data available from the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, from commercially established industrial databases, 
academic and technical papers, newspapers and journals.
Primary Sources
Primary sources were used in this thesis to obtain information on broad aspects 
of the informatics industry and policy in the AICs and NICs, and to obtain information 
on key issues affecting the development o f the Brazilian informatics industry. In what 
follows I describe the main sources and purposes of information collected.
From November 1986 to November 1987 I contacted relevant institutions, 
companies, and government bodies to learn about the electronics industry, industrial 
policy, regional development policies and their implementation. I visited and 
interviewed professionals working in these institutions and those whom I could not 
personally visit were contacted by letter. These included:
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personally visit were contacted by letter. These included:
Government Institutions
DTI - Dept. Trade and Industry, UK 
Alvey Directory, UK 
ESPRIT Directory, UK
EEC Institutions
EEC - ESPRIT Directory, Brussels
IBI - International Bureau of Informatics, Roma
These institutes/departments were contacted to obtain information on EEC 
policies in science and technology.
Research Institutes
SPRU, University o f Sussex,
CURBS, University of Newcastle.
These two institutes have been directly involved in the evaluation o f the ALVEY
and ESPRIT programmes on behalf of the British Government and of the EEC.
Companies
IBM, UK 
UNISYS, UK 
Ferranti 
ICL
Siemens
These companies were approached to provide annual reports and other
documentation available about their international operations. I visited and interviewed
heads of international operations department of three of these firms.
Parallel to these interviews I did a survey on different government policies for
informatics throughout Latin America. Fifteen government agencies received the
questionnaire, four replied to the questionnaires and two sent their own information.
Autoridad Informatica Del Gobiemo, Chile 
Centro Nacional de Computacion - CENACO, Bolivia 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, Colombia 
Subsecretaria de Informatics Y Desarrollo - SID, Argentina
The Officina Regional de Ciencia y Technologia de la Unesco, Uruguay also 
replied to the letter survey. The purpose of this survey was to identify any other 
relevant information about national policies, to identify key policy issues affecting
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industrial development in developing countries, and to identify possible cooperation 
strategies between NICs.
The other batch o f primary data collected focused on the main aspects o f the 
Brazilian experience in developing the informatics industry. The following points were 
considered when collecting data:
1) companies’ reactions to the National Informatics Policy;
2) national support to Science & Technology programmes;
3) linkages between Brazilian and foreign firms;
4) special considerations directly or indirectly related to the PNI including 
contraband and electronic banking;
5) regional policies targeting science parks, special export zones
6) and other collaborative ventures between Brazilian and non Brazilian firms.
The field work in Brazil was done in two parts. The first one was carried out 
between December 1987 - April 1988. The second one was carried out between March 
1989 - April 1989. The field work included interviews and visits to relevant institutions 
and firms. The following bodies were visited and their staff interviewed:
Government Bodies
CNPq - Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa
Conselho Nacional de Informâtica, CONIN
FINEP - Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos
IBGE - Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatfstica
IBICT - Institute Brasileiro de Informaçâo em Ciencia a Tecnologia
Ministry o f Communications - MINICOM
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs - Itamaraty
Ministry o f Science and Technology - MCT
National Development Bank - BNDES
Secretaria de Ciencia e Tecnologia do Estado de S. Paulo
Special Informatics Secretariat - SEI
These agencies provided relevant information about national science and
technology programmes and how it was affected by the national informatics policy;
about the policy itself and other sectoral policies regulating other sectors o f the
electronics complex, and lastly about industrial cooperation programmes.
Universities
USP: Dept Economics
UFRJ - Institute of Industrial Economics
UFRJ/Coppe/ NIT - Nucleo de Inovaçâo Tecnologica
UNICAMP: NPCT - Nucleo de Pesquisa em Ciencia e Tecnologia
IE - Economics Institute
Professional Associations
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ABCPAI - Ass. Bras, de Contrôle de Processes e Automaçâo Industrial 
ABICOMP - Ass. Bras. Industria de Computadores e Periféricos 
ABIMEE - Ass. Bras, da Industria Electro-eletrônica 
ASSESPRO - Ass. Bras, das Empresas de Serviços de Informâtica 
INSISTE - Ass. Bras, de Instrumentaçâo e Sistemas Técnicos e Cientfficos 
SUCESU - Sociedade Usuârios de Computadores e Equipamentos Subsidiârios
One year prior to going to Brazil, I set up a company survey to obtain data on 
industrial performance o f firms in Brazil. The choice o f firms to receive the survey 
information was based on SEI’s list of companies registered as producers o f informatics 
goods and on Abicomp’s membership list. A total o f 130 firms received an introduction 
letter from London. Forty nine (49) firms replied the first survey round, or 37.6% of  
the total. The second round consisted o f sending an extensive mail questionnaire 
covering a wide range o f information not readily available from the existing data. A 
total o f 80 questionnaires were sent from Brazil while I was in the country conducting 
the interviews. A questionnaire schedule is in appendix 4.
Only 17 firm replied to the questionnaires (21%), and interviews were used to 
compensate for that. The questionnaire was first of all extremely long and complex. As 
it covered practically the entire spectrum of an industrial operation (research, 
production, distribution, employment, marketing, management and planning), it could 
not be answered by a single person. Having to be circulated around the plant, 
questionnaires were easily lost or left unanswered. Only the larger firms with a 
division o f social communication were able to reply. That, in turn, was very positive, 
as the seven larger national firms responsible for over 45% of national industrial profits 
did reply to the questionnaire (Cobra, Digirede, Edisa, Elebra, Labo, IBM, Sid, 
Unysis). Negatively, I missed capturing the realities of smaller companies trying to 
keep their heads above water. Company visits and interviews covered some o f the gaps 
left by the survey. I also contacted and visited two banks, 5 distributors and 3 computer 
repair shops to observe and discuss informatization in the banks, regional sales and 
contraband.
Firms were selected to be interviewed and visited based on their previous and 
positive response to the letter and questionnaire, and on their accessibility. I identified 
30 firms in the informatics sector (computer and peripherals) located in five 
geographical areas (South, S. Paulo state, S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Geraes). Of 
a sample o f 30 firms I interviewed 49 people in 16 different companies (three o f which 
are Brazilian based TNCs). Phone interviews were also used when visits could not be
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arranged. Three subsidiaries located in the North-East were contacted using this 
method.
Whenever possible interviews were carried out with managers in four areas: 
finance, strategic planning, marketing, and production. Despite an ample source of 
informants and the responses to questionnaires, I faced resistance in obtaining 
information from interviewees, notably anything that related to illicit practices. Firms 
located both in S. Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were already quite familiar with researchers 
studying the subject. Yet many were unwilling to release information that had not 
already been distributed publicly (e.g., either in the SEI surveys or on the studies 
produced by professional associations, lobbying groups and so on). Some o f firms were 
used to researchers others were not familiar with or sympathetic to research.
The reasons for this were many. The national industry is heavily regulated by 
the government. There were concrete barriers to doing business in the sector, such as 
ways o f obtaining foreign technology, importation of components and parts and so on. 
The divergence between business interests and national targets lead to a surge o f illicit 
business practices (e.g., reverse engineering, contraband, industrial espionage). These 
difficulties were obvious when trying to use a survey method to complement and cross­
check existing information. These gaps are visible in the thesis. Survey, questionnaire 
and interview material was used throughout the thesis, especially in Chapter four 
(dealing with science and technology programmes). Chapter five (banking automation 
and contraband), and in Chapter seven.
To obtain information for the production o f the maps used in Chapter six I 
needed a complete list of all firms operating in the informatics sub-sector and in other 
sectors of the complex. The first source of information was SETs computerized 
1987/1988 data base o f registered firms listing every firm, location, area o f operation 
and year o f creation. This list of registered firms is available from the library o f SEI, 
located in the now-extinct Ministry of Science and Technology. The list was updated 
on a regular basis and included over 4(X) firms. In addition to this list, and following 
recommendation o f SETs staff in the Market Study division, I used three other 
additional lists to cross-check and complement the information. These included:
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1. the ABICOMP roster of hardware producers affiliated to the association with a total 
of 98 firms.
2. the directory of informatics producers in Brazil published by Gazeta 
Mercantil with 200 firms.
3. A list of the companies that participated in SEI’s 1988 annual survey with their year 
of creation, type of industrial activity, location, and total employment.
The amalgamation of these three sources o f data (SEI, ABICOMP and Gazeta
Mercantil) resulted in a final list of 368 firms, 168 o f which were registered as
informatics companies and the remaining 200 engaged in production in other sectors of
the electronic complex. The final list was reviewed by SEI to assure that there was no
duplication of entries and that all firms included were registered and in business.
Appendix 2 gives the alphabetical complete list. In addition to using the data for the
production o f the four maps, I used it for the production of the bar charts also included
in Chapter six.
This information was organized geographically by area and distributed according
to the year o f creation of firms before being analyzed.
In addition to the above I also researched the development of science parks in
Brazil. Primary data on this subject was obtained through interviews with
representatives of the parks. Interviews were done during an International Seminar on
Science Parks organized by OEA/COPPE/USP between 1-4 December 1987 in Rio de
Janeiro. Appendix 3 is the schedule used for interviews. The following parks were
being planned or were in operation during the time o f the research:
Biotec - P61o de Biotecnologia do Rio de Janeiro
Certi - Centro Regional de Tecnologia e Informâtica
Ciatec - Cia de Desenvolvimento do Polo de Alta de Tecnologia de Campinas
Citpar - Centro de Integraçâo de Tecnologia do Parâ
Cpqd - Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento da Telebrâs, Campinas
Createm - Centro Regional de Automaçâo Industrial e Telemâtica, RS
C n  - Centro Tecnoldgico de Informâtica da Sei, Campinas
Fundaçâo Parque Tecnoldgico da Parafba
Fundaçâo Parque de Alta Tecnologia de Petrdpolis, RJ
Fundaçâo Parque de Alta Tecnologia de S. Carlos, SP
NTT/Coppe/UFRJ - Nucleo de Inovaçâo Tecnoldgica, RJ
NUTEC - Fundaçâo Nucleo de Tecnologia Industrial, Fortaleza, CE
Riotec - Polo de Alta Tecnologia do Rio de Janeiro
SUFRAMA - Superintendencia da Zona Franca de Manaus
These interviews provided information about the parks and where they already 
had a developed infrastructure, about the role o f informatics and other electronics 
companies on the site. To complement the gaps in the collection o f regional data I also
261
used a survey on Brazilian Science Parks done by USP/COPPE/OEA on the creation 
of science parks in Latin America/
Secondary Sources
The thesis relied heavily on existing secondary sources including government 
published works, technical and academic data available. These were as follows: 
Government Data
The Ministry of Science and Technology under the supervision o f SEI maintains 
a large data base on the economic life of Brazilian owned companies. SEI publishes an 
annual survey on the performance of selected sectors o f the electronic complex 
(informatics, telecommunications, microelectronics, instrumentation, automation, 
software, and informatics services).
The compilation of quantitative data is based on responses to SEI annual 
surveys. SEI defines its representativeness based on the aggregate sales figures for each 
sector. For the 1988/89 survey, responses equaled more than 85% of each sector’s 
sales. Most o f SEI’s figures, some of which are used here, are given in dollars. Values 
are calculated in terms of the mean of the US$ dollar for a given year. This medium 
is an index produced by the Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro (SEI, 
1989:11). Given Brazil’s two massive monetary reforms in the past five years, 
including the creation o f a new currency an usually high inflation rate, the usual 
methods of deflation are not applicable here. Figures produced should reflect as close 
as possible the reality in a given period 
Commercial Data
For the analysis o f distribution of computer usage in 20 industrial sectors I used 
data on the top 600 industrial informatics users published by Gazeta Mercantil.  ^These 
data were analyzed using Excel Spread Sheet to generate table 6.1 (the distribution of 
computer installations by 18 sectors of the economy). Finally, I used information 
collected and published by professional organizations listed above. An extensive 
bibliography of academic and other technical papers is included below.
' Lnplementaçâo de Parques Tecnolôgicos na América Latina (1988) Projeto USP/COPPE/OEA. Rio 
de Janeiro: Coppe/NIT.
 ^Dodos e Idêias, no. 126, Nov/Dec 1988 "AsSOO Maiores Empresas Usuârias de Informâtica."
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Appendix 2 List of Firms
Abaco Abe Bull Abe Computadores
ABC dados Abe Ixtal ABC Sistemas
ABC Telecom Acatec Active
ADD Addprint Apletronic
AIT Alfa Digital Alfatest
Altus Amelco Amplus
Analitic Anamed Ata
Atos ATS Autodata
Automatic Automax Bal. Ferrando
Base Basf Basic
BCM Bergman Bese-Rio
Biodata BK Bondwell
Brap Brascom Braswey
Cad Calcom Cambridge
Cape Carton CBB
CCE Amazonas CCE Computadores CCE
CCE Informatica CCM Centelha
Cetus CFLCL Chronos
Cirpress Cluster CMA
CMC CMW Cobra
Codimex Columbia Com. Dourado
Conq>art Compasa Compo
Compseg Compuleader Computec
Compute! Computex Comsip
Contrap Control Control Data
CP CP Computadores CP Amazonas
CTL Cursor Daisy Wheel
Daruma Darumatec Data General
Data Point Datacal Datamidia
Datanav Dataregis Datateck Diadur
Dicon Digibyte Digicom
Digigraph Digilab Digimat
Diginet Digiplay Digiponto
Digiponto Amazonas Digirede Digirede Nordeste
Digital Digitel Digitron
Digitus Dimep Dismac
Distronic Drystal Dots
Dynacom EA- Electronica EBC
Ecam Ecil/P&D Ecodata
Eden Edisa EE
Elebra Computadores Elebra Informatica Elebra Microelectmica
Elebra telecom Eletrocontrol Eletrodigi
Eletrotela Elgin Elo
Elogica Engecom Engeletro
Engemac Engemauticos Engespaso
Engistrel Ensec Epcom
Equitel Ericson Escricentre
Euro Control Evadin Ecadin Comp.
Expansao Facit Faichild
Ease Fasor Ferranti
Firmware Flexidisc Fujitsu
GBM Geotron Gepeto
Globus Gradiente Gradiente Computadores
Gutemberg Heliodinamica Heller
Helmac Hengesystems Hibrid
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Hidrologia Honeywell Houston
HP IBM Ica
Icthus Icotron Ikro
Imagem Impelco Ind. Ramos
Ind. Romi Input Intertecnica
Intralab IPS Ipso
Italvolt Itaucam Itaucom
Itautec Jade Kemitron
Kintron Labo Lasertech
Leucotron Lince Logodata
Logus Luppy Paquay Lz
Lz Electronica Magnet Maquis
Marte Master Maxitec
MCS MDA Mecaf
Medidata Mega Menno
Metal leve Metalma Metabdlo
Metrixer Microcom Microdigital
Microcraft Microlab Micromatica
Micronal Microperifericos Microsol
Microtec Midia Milmar
Mips Moddata Moddata Telecom
Monydata Monytel Moplan
Mpv Ms Mtl Universo
Multidata Multidigit Multitel
NCR NCT Nec
Nortronic Novadata Novelprint
Noxxon Olivetti Omega
P&D PAA Parks
Pecc Pema Percomp
Perifericos Pgm Philco
Philco Con^utadores Philips Philips Comp.
PHT Polimax Politronic
Procéda Procomp Prologica
Prologo Promptus Protocolo
Psi Pulse Qualitron
Quartzil Racimec Remington
Rhede Rifran Rio Data
Ritas Robert Bosch Ruf
Saga Sanyo Schause
Schenk Schumec Scopus
Scritta Sector Sedasa
Semco Semikron Senq) Toshiba
Semp Toshiba Comp. Servus Sharp
Sicomig Sid Sid Microelectronica
Sid Telecom Sigma Sinatron
Sinomatic Sisco Sisco Computadores
Sistema Sistenac Sky
Smar Softec Sony
Sony Computadores Sosecal Spectrum
Splice Splice Amazonas Springer National
Standard STD STI
Stratus Sul America Sun Electric
Swedata Sysdata Tabra
Tandem Tauros TDA
Tecnocoop Tecnodata Tecnologia
Teleftinken Telematica Telsist
Tesc Tesis Texas Instrument
Themag TME Toledo
T ranscontinental
Tropical
Unitron
Uptronik
VAT
Videotek
Wintec
2k>rzi
Transmicro
Troppus
Universal
Van Den
Verbatim
Vilares
Yok
Zselics.
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Transmitel
Unicontrol
Unysis
Varig
Victor
Weg
2^thus
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Appendix 3 Science Parks Interview Schedule/ Questionnaire
Name 
City _  
State _
Park’s primary Industrial/R&D activity^
Number o f Firms in the Area/ Park  ________
Number of Firms Planning to Join the Scheme 
Park/Area Capacity.
Institutional Support/Involvement in the Park 
Government Agencies____________________
Research Institutes, Universities______________________________
Relationship between park location and proximity to R&D Centres 
How do universities contribute/participate
How does the Government (Nacional, State, Local) contribute/participate 
Does the Park receive/depend on any incentive.
Please specify the incentives available, amount, origin and conditions
Park’s Infrastructure. Please describe the existing facilities_________
Please describe your planned facilities
Human resources: Please describe labour resources in your area. Park’s labour demands,
training facilities, skill levels_______ ___________________________________________ _
Number of employees working in the Park today________________________________
Administration_______________ Laboratories______________ Firms___________ Others
Please specify________________________________________________________________
Do you have employment records of previous years__________yes_______________no
Please indicate changes in employment over a period o f years
Has employment expanded/decreased/remained the same Firms Employment: please
indicate firm’s employment in the following skill categories______________________
Administration/Management Production Services Sales R&D
Markets: The park produces for which market(s) ■ . -__________
Do firms at the park export___________ what_________ where____________________
Please comment on how you have (not have) achieved your objectives. 
Please list and explain you greatest difficulties_____________________
Please list any other information you may find relevant
s(N
»
1
I
I>U
Tf
X
ï
CL
The following questionnaire is a translation of the one used during 
interviews and/or sent to firms. When used  at Interviews It functioned as  a  guide to the overall 
inturviow. Not all questions were asked at all times given the length and scope of the schedule. 
D nscisions over to what questions to ask wore m ade at my discretion.
PART I • INFORMATIVE
1. GENERAL DATA
1.1 NAfVIE
1.2 ADDRESS
1.3 NAfVIE OF INFORfVIANT (S |
Position  __
phone (
phone; J L
postal code: J s t a t e :
2. C o m p a n y 's  H is to ry  a n d  O rg a n iz a tio n
2.1 iS THE FiRtvl? ____________________
(mark with an X ) 
independent 
part of a  congiom erate 
subsid iary  
pic com pany 
limited com pany
2.2 MAJOR SHARE HOLDERS
2.3 WAS THE FIRM CONSTITUTED OR PURCHASED BY A GROUP?
2.4 DATE OF CREATION/PURCHASE y e a r  [ ]
2 5  WHERE ARE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS MADE?
in ternal 
Decisions
capital investm ents 
product developm ent 
production sutxontracting 
m arketing 
employment policies 
w ages 
work organization
E xternal
Decisions
2 6  PLEASE LIST OTHER COMPANIES IN THE GROUP 
Name Market a rea
1
3. S o c ia l C ap ita l 
monetary unit used 
CS$
C2$
US$
4. M arke t S e g m e n t
s y s te m s
1978 I 1 9 8 0  I  1 9 8 2  I 1 9 8 4  | 1 9 8 6  I 1 9 8 7  I
m icros 
minis 
super minis
peripheric
Indicate with an X your most important market segment
te lecom m un ications_________
industrial au to m atio n_________
digital in s trum en ta tion_________
technical s e rv ic e s _________
o th e rs
5. E co n o m ic  P e r fo rm a n c e  a n d  M arket S h a re s :
5.1 PROFITS / SALES
a. p lease inidicate your fiscal year m o n th /y r.
b. indicate conversion indexes used  for the given year
c. indicate the monetary unit used  
(circle the option)
Cz$ US$ C r$
ac tiv ity
sa le s  
e x p o rt 
g ro ss  profits 
liquid profits 
num ber of em ployees
1 9 7 8  1 1 9 8 0  1 1 9 8 2  I 1 9 8 4  | 1 9 8 6  | 1987
5.2 SALES AND MARKETING STRATEGIES
Marketing S tra teg ies
Direct sa le  
Inidrect sa le  
fXM 
Leasing 
re n t
5.3 SECTORAL GROWTH 
product area___________
1 9 7 8  1 1 9 8 0  1 1 9 8 2  I  1 9 8 4  | 1 9 8 6  I  19 8 7
com pu ters  
perip h era ls  
te lecom m unications 
sem iconducto rs 
so f tw a re  
s e rv ic e s  
special products
1 9 7 8  1 1 9 8 0  1 1 9 8 2  I 1 9 8 4  | 1 9 8 6  | 198 7
5.4 IDENTIFY FACTORS THAT K40ST AFFECTED/AIDED INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
IN THE PERIOD INDICATED ABOVE
6. Inve s t lm an ts
List investm ents in the following a rea s  
(please specify monetary unit used) 
1 9 7 8
R&D
1 98 0
in f ra s tru c tu re  
construction, installa tions 
hum an resources
m arketing
capital
new  projects
o th e rs
1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7
< N
PART II • PRODUrCS AND PRODUCTION
1. M ajo r P ro d u c t*  List by order o l importance your products
J_________________________ •______________________
2_______________________________________________
2_______________________________________________
_4______ ____________________________________________________ _______ ____________
_5_______________________________________________________________________________
6  _____
1.1 IDENTIFY % OF PFtODUCTION UNDER EACH MARKETING STFIATEGY
Total production 
Com m ercialization 
Direct S ale  
Indirect Sale
ce^
Leasing
Ftent
E xports
P roduçâo
1978 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1984 1986 1987
2. P ro d u c tiv e  S tru c tu r e
2.1 IS THE FIRM? vertically  In tegrated  
d ec en tra lised
2 2  IF YOU ANSWERED VERTICAL INTEGRATION IDENTIFY. USING THE SCALE PROVIDED 
THE REASONS WHY THIS FORM OF ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN CHOSEN
RELEVANT -  1-2-3-4-S -  IRELEVANT
'econom ies of s c a le '________
more capital ________
risk p re v e n tio n ________
greater bargaining p o w e r________
w ider m a rk e ts ________
national econom ic situation favorable to verticaliza tlon________
industrial policy favourable to vertica liza tlon ________
monopoly p o w e rs ________
m ore b u sin ess  se cu rity ________
2.3 IF YOUR ANSWER IS DECENTRALIZATION IDENTIFY. USING THE SCALE PROVIDED. 
THE REASONS FOR YOUR CHOICE
RELEVANT .1 -2  3-4 5.  IRRELEVANT
u n d e rca p ita liz a tio n ________
Instability of national ec o n o m y ________
industrial policy not favourable to co n c en tra tio n________
troble sh o o tin g ________
r i s k ________
s e c u r i t y ________
avallabilty and  realability on s u p p lie rs________
labour c o s t s ________
lack of m anagerial ex p e rie n c e________
lack of R&D re s o u rc e s ________
restric ted  m arkets
2.4 DOES THE FIRM PLAN (HAVE PLANNED) THE RESTRUCTURING OF ITS 
ORGANIZATION TO BE MORE COMPETITIVE? ye s |
2.5 WHY?
2.6 IDENTIFY AREAS WHICH WIUVHAVE BEEN RESTRUCTURED 
production 
R&D
hum an resources
3. Raw m a te r ia ls  a n d  s u p p l ie r s
3.1 NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS
3.2 LIST YOUR ACTIVE SUPPLIERS
Product
1.......................................................
2..................................................
 3..........................................................
 4..................................................
 5..........................................................
 6.......................................................
adm in istra tion
m arketing
o th e rs
ac tiv e  1 p ass iv e
Suppliers
3.3 HOW DOES THE FIRM SELECT A SUPPLIER?
Indicate using the sca le  provided a sp ec ts  your firm consider important
RELEVANT.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .IRRELEVANT
geographical location________
s i z e ________
previous e x p e rin c e ________
d isp o n ib ility ________
f le x ib i l i ty ________
com petitive m arket p r ic e s ________
acep tan ce  of the firm's cu ltu re________
financial c a p a c ity ________
technical a s s is ta n c e ________
ethical c h a ra c te r is tic s________
professional ex c e lle n ce________
o th e r s ________
3.4 WHICH FACTORS MOST AFFECT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SUPPLIERS?
RELEVANT-1.2.3.4.5-IRRELEVANT
lack of confiability________
scarcity  of p a r t s ________
high p r ic e s ________
inferior q u a lity ________
non regularity on d e liv e ries________
con trac t ru p tu re s ________
o th e rs
4. Im por ts :
4.1 LIST YOUR FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
P roducts
1...............
2 ...............
3 ................
Supplier
ooVO
CN
4.2 AUTHORIZED IMPORT QUOTAS/ IMPORTATION 
Value In US$
Category / Y ear I 1978  I 19 8 0  I 1 9 8 2  | 198 4  I 1986  |
Solicited
A uthorised
Realised
4.3 IDENTIFY WHAT AFFECTS YOUR IMPORT ACTIVITY
NEGATIVE
diflculty to purchase com p o n en ts__________
scarcity of co m p o n en ts__________
high p r ic e s__________
delivery d e la y s __________
resolution 767/1982 of CM N __________
lack of financial su p p o rt__________
high interest r a t e s __________
high ta r r lf s__________
high ta x e s __________
fiscal incentives of law 7232 /84__________
lack of knowledge of international su p p lie rs__________
POSITIVE
PART III .  MARKETING
1. M a rk e ts
1.1 IDENTFY YOUR PRODUCT tWVRKETS 
(please indicate the product(s))
public civil sec to r 
defence
rivate sec to r/cap ita l goods 
consum er goods 
te lecom m unications 
private banking sector 
public banking sector 
o th e rs
12  WHO ARE YOUR COMPETITORS? 
P roduct Com petitor Prod, sim ilar/brand
1.
2
3
4
5
2. P ro d u c tio n  fo r E x p o rts
21 DOES YOUR FIRM EXPORT? y e s
If your answer is negative please go to questions 2.6 to 2.10
2.2 % OF YOUR PRODUCTION FOR EXPORTS
2 3  EXPORTABLE PRODUCTS
P roducts S ales Volume
1 .........................
2   ........................
3 ............................................... ..................................
4 .......................................................
Importing countries
2.4 WHO MANAGES YOUR EXPORT ACTIVITIES?
2.5 DOES YOUR FIRM WANT TO EXPORT?________
2.6 WHICH PRODUCTS? __________
2.7 WHEN? __________
2.8 IMPORTING COUNTRIES
trad ing  [_
2.9 PLEASE IDENTIFY. USING THE SCALE PROVIDED, THE PROBLEMS YOU 
ENCOUNTER TO EXPORT
R elevant*  1-2 3-4-5
no knowledge of International m ark e ts__________
lack of an  export policy__________
small production__________
ample internal m a rk e t__________
non competitive p r ic e s __________
outdated technology__________
TNCs com petition__________
o th e rs
Irrelevant
3. C o m m e rc ia l  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
3.1 DOES YOUR COfVlPANY USE SALES REPRESENTATIVES?
y«vs|
3.2 HOW DOES THE FIRM SELECT A DISTRIBUTOR?
RELEVANT . 1-2 3-4-5 .  IRRELEVANT
geographical location________
am ple distribution netw ork________
experience in the a r e a ________
good technical a s s is ta n c e ________
re l ia b i l i ty ________
finantlal s tab ility ________
o th e rs
PART IV  - TECHNOLOGY
1. R&D INVESTMENTS
( $)
$?............................
19 7 8 19 8 0 1 9 8 2 198 4 1 9 8 6 1987
1.1 HOW DOES THE FIRM OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY? 
Indentify product and area 1.
licencing 
technology packet 
open technology transference 
copy 'cloning' 
reverse  engineering 
transference of personnel and  technicians 
o th e rs
2. G e n e ra l Q u e s t io n s
21 DOES THE FIRM SELL TECHNOLOGY?
2.2 NATIONALLY/INTERNATIONALLY
2.3 TO WHOM? _____________
2.4 WHERE TO?
y es
y es
$
CN
2.5 HOW DO YOU DEFINE THIS TECHNOLOGY
new Industrial techniques 
R&D Investm ents 
capital goods 
Marketing and m anagerial strateg ies 
R&D techniques 
Technology Imbeded In the final product 
o th e rs
specify
3. T e c h n o lo g ic a l c h a n g e :
3.1 IDENTIFY SECTORS THAT AFFECT OR CURTAIL TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
a ffe c t cu rta il
lack of financial re s o u rc e s ________
small Internal m a rk e ts ________
low participation/exposure to external m a rk e ts ________
restrictive Imports p o licy ________
lack of International c o n a tc s ________
lack of strategic p la n n in g ________
lack of fiscal Incentives _ _ _ _ _
no or limited c re d i t________
r i s k ________
no export s c a l e ________
bureaucracy of CA CEX /SEI________
o th e rs
3. P r o f e s s io n a l  P ro f ile :
m anagers
eng ineers
technicians
se rv ic e
adm in is tra tions
TOTAL
4. T r a in in g :
4.1 DOES THE FIRM TRAIN EMPLOYEES' y e s [
4.2 IDETIFY WHO RECEIVES TRAINNING
number
(mark with an X) 
m a rk e tin g ________
developm ent of human resources 
technical serv ices 
adm inistrative support 
R&D 
production 
o th e rs
S.Hiring p ro c e d u re # :
5.1 DOES THE FIRM RECRUIT IN THE REGONÆITY OR OUTSIDE
4. T e c h n o lo g y  A b s o rp t io n  P ro g ra m m e s
R e le v a n t-  1-2 3-4-5
firm that ow ns technology refuses to transfer I t__________
no money to buy techno logy__________
m arket In s tab ility__________
lack of federal su p p o rt__________
o th e rs
5.2 DOES THE FIRM SUFFER FROM A LACK OF OUAUFIED PERSONNEL?
yes| I
Identify the o n es  tha t m ost affect the firm
irrelevant RELEVANT-1.2 .3 .4 .5-IRRELEVANT 
difficulty in h iring________
PART V .  HUMAN RESOURCES
high labour turnover 
lack of policy for hum an resources 
high w ages for qualified personnel 
high w ages outside the region 
high latjour turnover of qualified personnel 
lack of qualified personnel In the reglon/clty
1. G e n e ra l In fo rm a tio n
1.1 TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 19 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1986 1987
w ages  
social duties
em ploym ent per division 19 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1986 1987
adm lnstra tion
production
R&D
s a le s
o th e rs
2. S k ill L e v e ls : most recent data y e a r  I ~1
num ber %
university d eg ree
incom plete university d eg ree  
high school 
o th e r
IX  •  IN D U S T R IA L  A N D  E C O N O M IC  P O L IC Y 2.  I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y
1 .E c o n o m ic  P o lic y
1.1 HOW DID THE CRUZADO PLANS I AND IIAFEECT YOUR FIRM?
D uring  CRUZADO I
H3W
[D uring CRUZADO II
Price freezes
Increase in the cost of labour
Increase in dem and
high finantial bills
Economic stability and possiblity ol long term strategic planning
Which econom ic problem s m ost affect your firm
Did the m arket reserve  help your firm's business
you b egan  your acitvities 
in terfere with your existing activities 
crea ted  problem s 
im proved 
ind iferen t
please comment
2.1 Law 7232/84 INCLUDES A SERIES OF BENEFITS AND SUBSIDIES TO 
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY
H as your firm benefits from any of th e se  incentives? Indicate using the chart below.
A.* reduction of import tarrifs 
for products without national similars
B.* Reduction of IPI
y e s
C.* reduction of IPI for classified products
D /Tariff reduction for investm ents in R&D 
ibid for investm ents in human resources
C.* Financing Priority 
given by federal banks 
for investm ents 
and imports
F /F o r  SOFTWARE development:
Indentify which of the Incentives listed above have contributed to 
an  im provem ent of your firm's b u sin ess
g rea te r capitalization[
Im proved dam aged Ind ife ren t
reduction on the price of final goods 
and services 
g rea te r m arket com petitveness 
in both internal and external markets
Import substitution[ 
g rea te r R&D capacity
industrial verticalizatlon  
m ergers and «guisitions
in c rease  of exports[
softw are deve lopm en t^
g reater technological capacity  for the 
production of m icroelectronics com ponents
more qualified em ployees
<N
4. I n lo r m a t lo n /c o o p e r a t lo n /  C o n s u l ta n c y
4.1 IS THE FIRM A MEMBER OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ORGAN indicate
ABCPAI ABINEE INSISTE
ABCIN ANFORSAI SUSESU
ABICOMP ASSESPRO APPD
OUTRAS
4.2 IS YOUR FIRM AWARE OF ANY OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGIRAMMES?
indicate familiar (t), not known (n)
national 
ADTENÆINEP 
AUSC/FINEP 
ACN/FINEP 
FNDCT/FINEP - MCT 
Itware Support Program m e 
• M anufacturing Automation 
o th e rs
In te rnationa l
CYTED (Espanha x America Latina (LA) 
PLANETA/UN-IBI (Coop. A m erica latina) 
CALAI (Conf. Inform. AL) 
ESPRIT (Coop. teen. Comunidade Europoia) 
ALVEY (Coop, em presa/estado  UK) 
•STAR WARS' (P&D. teen EUA) 
•5a. geraçâo* (P&D Jap&o) 
ARGENTINAXBRASIL 
POFTTUGALXBRAZIL
4.3 DOES THE FIRM WISH TO TAKE PART IN ANY OF THESE PROGRAMMES?
4.4 IS YOUR FIRM PAR OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SCHEMES?
CIATEC, Campinas 
CITPAR, P aranâ 
CREATEM, RS 
If you give a positive answer
4.5 WHICH ARE THE BENEFITS?
RIOTEC, RJ
o th e rs
4.6 WOULD YOU USE OF THE CONSULTANCY SERVICES OFFERED BY THE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW? 
please indicate yes (y) or no (n)
CNPql
CPO (Centro Info em P&D)______
CPCT (Centro Estudos Polit. C ientif.)______
CTI (Centro Teen. Informal. SEI) 
IBICT (Inst. info, cienc. & teen.) 
PROIN (prog, formac. RH inform!.) 
TIPS (SIst. Piloto Info. Teen.)
ou tro s
B rasilia
B rasilia
B rasilia
Campinas
B rasilia
C am pinas/U nicam p
U N /B rasilia
Appendix 5 Reference Maps
M A P 5
Locational Map of Brazil
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MAP 6
Locational Map of Science Parks in Brazil
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